study
Navigating the EU Cybersecurity Policy Ecosystem
A Comprehensive Overview of Legislation, Policies and Actors
Author
Programmes
Published by
Interface
June 27, 2024
The Evolution of EU Cybersecurity Policy
When faced with a large-scale cyber incident, European Union (EU) Member States bear the “primary responsibility for [...] response,” 1 along with their prerogative for national security matters (Art. 4(2) Treaty on the European Union, TEU). At the same time, a “significantly increasing level, complexity and scale of cybersecurity threats” 2 and the “public impact, cross-border nature and spill-over risk of cybersecurity threats” 3 make international cooperation and common approaches vital to address resulting challenges and contribute to a resilient cybersecurity posture across the EU.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that a lot has changed since the EU first adopted a Resolution on a common approach and specific actions in the area of network of information security in 2002, which called upon Member States, the European Commission, and industry stakeholders to enhance their efforts directed at increasing information security. For instance, in 2004, the EU established the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), now called the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity; in 2013, the Commission and the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security (HR/VP) published the first EU Cybersecurity Strategy, “An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace”; and in 2016, EU Member States and the European Parliament adopted the EU’s first horizontal cybersecurity legislation, the first Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive.
A keyword search in the EU document database EUR-Lex typifies the evolution of EU action on cyber and IT security policy since 1990 (see Figure 1). For 2023 alone, the database provides 1144 results for documents mentioning “cybersecurity”, “cyber security”, or “information (IT) security”. 4
Figure 1: Results of Keyword Search for Cyber or IT Security in EU Documents Overall
This observable increase in mentions is not only valid for the search within EU documents overall. It is also reflected in an elevated number of EU legal acts touching upon cyber and/or IT security underpinning the EU’s heightened regulatory activity on the matter (see Figure 2). Especially during the 2019-2024 Commission, there has been a notable increase in the number of EU legal acts explicitly mentioning cyber or IT security.
Figure 2: Results of Keyword Search for EU Legal Acts Mentioning Cyber/IT Security
These numbers indicate that the EU has progressively addressed and thus become an important player in the cyber and IT security policy realm, also resulting in an ever-expanding EU cybersecurity regulatory and policy ecosystem.
Not only these abstract numbers but also concrete regulatory and policy developments in various policy areas and sectors showcase the EU’s elevated attention to cyber and IT security. The revised NIS Directive (2023); new legal acts on the resilience of critical entities (CER Directive, 2023), digital operational resilience of financial entities (DORA, 2023), and the cybersecurity of EU Institutions, Bodies, and Agencies (EUIBAs, Regulation 2023/2841); the establishment of a European cybersecurity certification scheme (Cybersecurity Act, 2019); the possibility of controlling the exports of cyber-surveillance tools in specific circumstances (Regulation 2021/821); the initiative for a Cybersecurity Skills Academy (2023); or the revised implementing guidelines of the EU’s Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox (2023) are just a few very prominent cybersecurity-related developments at the EU level during the last few years.
What to Find Where in Compendium
As a side effect of the evolution of EU cybersecurity policy as outlined in Chapter 1, taking stock, monitoring and navigating within the EU cybersecurity policy 5 ecosystem has become an increasingly complex endeavor – for policy and decision-makers in the public and private sector as well as other stakeholders such as civil society and academia alike. The more a policy field evolves, the more important it becomes to maintain a comprehensive overview of efforts in place and underway. A policy field’s cultivation also makes extensive coordination procedures among involved political levels and entities more necessary. Consequently, an overview of the policy and actor landscape is a fundamental prerequisite for effectively implementing and applying cybersecurity-related legislation and policies and informing a smart, structured, and sustainable cybersecurity policy, both at the EU and Member State level. An overview can further contribute to minimizing fragmentation by facilitating common understandings across Member States.
Given the absence of a publicly available comprehensive overview of EU cybersecurity policy, this compendium sets out to take stock and shed light on the current state of EU cybersecurity policy by providing:
-
an explainer of the different types of EU legal acts and policies describing their characteristics (Chapter 3);
-
a tabular overview of cybersecurity-related EU legislation and policies (Chapter 4);
-
a comprehensive substantial review of identified cybersecurity-related EU legislation and policies, the compendium’s centerpiece (Chapters 5-12);
-
26 profiles of actors within the Union’s institutional cybersecurity architecture, specifically EUIBAs and coordination bodies, describing their tasks, activities, and relationships among one another that are of relevance to cyber or IT security (Chapter 13);
-
an overview of relevant EU cybersecurity-related legislative and non-legislative initiatives underway, which have not yet entered into force, also indicating relevant sources for tracking the progress of individual files (Chapter 14).
Within the scope of this compendium are all (i) EU legal acts published in the EU’s Official Journal and (ii) EU policies that were published up until or were in force by May 31, 2024, and contain cybersecurity and/or information security-related components (explicitly or implicitly). 6 Hence, the imperative for inclusion in this compendium is that the legal act or policy touches upon security considerations in relation to network and information systems.
A total of 154 documents 7 were identified that match this scoping. Because EU cybersecurity policy is a dynamic and rapidly evolving field (as discussed in Chapter 1), this compendium highly likely does not yet account for all EU legal acts and policy documents that fall within the delineated scope. Therefore, we greatly appreciate any pointers or suggestions for additional documents to which the scope applies.
Every identified document was assigned to one of eight policy areas, which are each dedicated a chapter within this compendium:
Figure 3: Policy Areas of Compendium
These policy areas reflect the cross-cutting nature of cyber and IT security policy. The assignment of legal acts and policies to these policy areas further builds on the principle of conferral, meaning that the EU needs competence – exclusively or shared with the Member States – to take action in a particular policy field (Art. 5 TEU). In accordance, any competencies not specified in EU primary law “remain with the Member States” (Art. 5(2) TEU). 8 Thus, any EU legal act or EU policy addressing cybersecurity must also be traceable to a specific area in which the EU holds competence. Against this backdrop, each section (except for policy area 1 (overarching policies) and 8 (cybersecurity of EUIBAs)) explains the EU’s mandate and competence in the respective policy area at the outset.
Within each policy area chapter, the review of a legal act or policy is either covered in the form of a dedicated deep dive or in chronological order within issue area-specific sections. The summaries of each legal act or policy’s cybersecurity-related components provide a comprehensive, but not necessarily fully exhaustive overview. Accordingly, the summaries are deliberately not meant to represent a legally authoritative synopsis or guideline but rather seek to highlight areas and aspects of policy relevance and importance. As much as deemed useful, the policy reviews refer to the legal act’s or policy’s original wording. Inherently actor-specific provisions of acts and policies are discussed within the respective actor profiles in Chapter 13.
In addition to these chapters, the compendium’s annex includes
-
a list of relevant EU websites offering information on EU cybersecurity policy and updates on related policy developments (Annex I);
-
an overview of cybersecurity-related definitions used within the identified EU documents (Annex II);
-
and a list of abbreviations used throughout this compendium (Annex III).
Through all of these elements, this compendium can contribute to Member States’ recent call for the need for comprehensible overviews on “the relevant horizontal and sectoral legislative frameworks and their interplay” as well as “the roles and responsibilities of all relevant EU entities, stakeholders and networks [...] active in the cybersecurity domain.” 9 In addition, the compendium is not only of interest to European decision-makers, entities and stakeholders seeking to navigate within the complex legislative and policy environment. It can also assist actors in other parts of the world, such as legislators, regulatory bodies, private sector entities seeking to sell their products in the EU internal market or non-governmental organizations, in better understanding the EU's approach to cybersecurity and its institutional landscape across various policy areas.
EU Legislation and Policies: A Basic Explainer
Before examining what specific legislation and policies say on cyber and IT security (policy), it is important to understand the types of documents covered within this compendium. To this end, this Chapter explains their characteristics, involved actors, and, if applicable, the extent to which the various document types are legally binding.
EU legislation can come in five different types that differ in their application, binding nature and addressee (Art. 288 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU). While Member States hold the primary responsibility for the correct and timely implementation of EU legal acts, the Commission (in its role as the “guardian of the treaties” 10 ) takes on the task of ensuring adherence. 11
Regulations are EU legal acts that “have general application, are binding in their entirety and are directly applicable” 12 in all EU Member States. They do not require national transposition and can be invoked directly before Member States’ national courts.
Directives are EU legal acts that have general application and may be addressed to either one, several, or all EU Member States. Unlike regulations, directives are binding only “as to the result to be achieved,” 13 granting Member States the power and flexibility to “choose the form and methods” 14 for achieving the specified result. Transposition into national law is required before directives become applicable in the Member States to which they are addressed to.
Decisions are EU legal acts that may be of general or specific application and “may have one or more addressees (one or several EU Member States, one or several companies or individuals).” 15 Like regulations, they are binding in their entirety and directly applicable.
These three types of legislation are adopted through one of the EU’s two legislative procedures, the ordinary legislative procedure or the special legislative procedure (Art. 289 and 294 TFEU). The ordinary legislative procedure is the most common legislative procedure of the EU. As co-legislators, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU jointly adopt legislative acts proposed by the European Commission, which is the only EU institution with the power to initiate such acts. 16 The special legislative procedure is only used in certain cases as stipulated in particular treaty provisions. In contrast to the ordinary legislative procedure, the Council acts as the sole legislator. Yet, the Council must either receive consent on the legislative proposal from the European Parliament or consult it. 17
In addition to legal acts adopted through the ordinary or special legislative procedures, which can be categorized as legislative acts, the European Commission, or exceptionally the Council, can adopt non-legislative acts. Delegated and implementing acts, for instance, a delegated regulation or an implementing directive, are the most common of such acts (Art. 291 and 292 TFEU). 18 Delegated acts by the European Commission supplement or amend non-essential parts of legislative acts. They are adopted, for instance, when they are provided for within a particular legal act or when adjustments to legislative acts are necessary to incorporate advancements in technical and scientific fields. Experts from EU Member States are consulted by the Commission before the adoption of such acts. Implementing acts, adopted by the Commission or, in exceptional cases, the Council, establish “uniform conditions for the implementation” 19 of legislative acts. These acts commonly address administrative or technical aspects and are adopted following consultations with committees consisting of technical experts from EU Member States.
In addition to regulations, directives, and decisions, EU legal acts also comprise recommendations and opinions as non-legally binding types of outputs. 20 Recommendations, on the one hand, allow EU institutions to express their views and propose a course of action “without imposing any legal obligation” 21 on the addressee. Opinions, on the other hand, allow EU institutions to articulate statements “without imposing any legal obligation on the subject of the opinion.” 22
Apart from legal acts, the Council of the EU may also articulate its political stance on matters within the EU’s sphere of activity and adopt non-legally binding documents, reflecting “political commitments or positions.” 23 Council conclusions, for instance, may be adopted following a debate in a Council meeting and “contain a political position on a specific topic.” 24 Council resolutions typically outline forthcoming initiatives foreseen in a specific policy domain. While both examples of documents have no legal effect, they may call upon the Commission or other EUIBAs to propose specific measures or pursue further actions.
Moreover, the Commission can publish other types of non-legally binding documents, such as Communications on a specific topic. Sometimes the Commission does so together with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the Commission (HR/VP) in the form of Joint Communications.
Table 1: Overview of Types of EU Legal Acts and Policies
|
|
Adopted by |
Binding Nature |
Addressee |
Cybersecurity-Related Example |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Regulation |
|
Binding in their entirety |
All EU Member States |
|
|
Directive |
Binding as to the result to be achieved |
One, several, or all EU Member States |
||
|
Decision |
Binding in their entirety |
One or several EU Member States, one or several companies or individuals |
||
|
Delegated Act (e.g. Delegated Regulation) |
European Commission |
Binding in their entirety |
Depends on the legislative act it amends or supplements |
|
|
Implementing Act (e.g. Implementing Decision) |
European Commission, in exceptional cases the Council of the EU |
Binding in their entirety |
Depends on the legislative act it aims to implement |
|
|
Recommendation |
European Commission, other EU institutions e.g. European Parliament, Council of the EU, European Central Bank |
Not binding |
Commission Recommendation on coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises |
|
|
Opinion |
Not binding |
NA |
||
|
Council conclusions |
Council of the EU |
Not binding |
Council Conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response |
|
|
Council resolution |
Not binding |
|||
|
Communication |
European Commission (sometimes as a Joint Communication with HR/VP) |
Not binding |
Joint Communication on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence (JOIN(2022) 49 final) |
|
Tabular Overview of EU Cybersecurity Policy
The following tabular overview lists all the EU legal acts and policies covered within this compendium. The month/year column specifies the date of their respective entry into force (for legal acts) or the date of their publication (for policies). The tables also specify the document’s type as explained in Chapter 3, the policy area assigned to it and lays out in which chapter and section the corresponding policy review can be found. If applicable, the tables also indicate any (repealed) previous legislation of cybersecurity relevance and/or subsequent corresponding legal acts (such as implementing/delegated acts), guidelines or other documents of relevance. In the latter cases, the date displayed in the month/year column specifies the date of the entry into force/publication of the initial document. 25 Drawing on EUR-Lex information, the table also include the “responsible body” in whose purview a particular legal act falls at the bottom of a row, if such an indication was available (e.g. [DG CONNECT]).
Overarching Policies
Internal Market
|
Month/ Year |
Legal Act/Policy |
Type |
Section |
|---|---|---|---|
|
September 2023 |
[DG CONNECT] |
Regulation |
6.6 General Rules |
|
July 2023 |
Regulation on machinery (2023/1230) [DG GROW] |
Regulation |
6.3 Product Safety and Market Surveillance |
|
June 2023 |
Communication |
6.2 Electronic Communications Networks |
|
|
May 2023 |
Regulation on general product safety (2023/988) [DG JUST] |
Regulation |
6.3 Product Safety and Market Surveillance |
|
January 2023 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance:
Previous legislation: Directive concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (2016/1148, NIS Directive) [DG CONNECT] |
Directive |
6.1 Deep Dives |
|
October 2022 |
Council Conclusions |
6.7 Council Conclusions and Resolutions |
|
|
September 2022 |
Regulation on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector (2022/1925, Digital Markets Act) [DG COMP] |
Regulation |
6.6 General Rules |
|
June 2022 |
Regulation on European data governance (2022/868, Data Governance Act) [DG CONNECT] |
Regulation |
6.5 Data Protection and Data Economy |
|
December 2020 |
Council Conclusions on the cybersecurity of connected devices (2020/C 427/04) |
Council Conclusions |
6.7 Council Conclusions and Resolutions |
|
December 2020 |
Council Resolution |
6.7 Council Conclusions and Resolutions |
|
|
January 2020 |
Cybersecurity of 5G networks - EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance: |
Publication |
6.2 Electronic Communications Networks |
|
December 2019 |
Council Conclusions |
6.2 Electronic Communications Networks |
|
|
December 2019 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance: [DG GROW] |
Regulation |
6.3 Product Safety and Market Surveillance |
|
May 2019 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance:
Previous legislation: [DG CONNECT] |
Regulation |
6.1 Deep Dives |
|
March 2019 |
Commission Recommendation Cybersecurity of 5G networks (2019/534) |
Recommendation |
6.2 Electronic Communications Networks |
|
December 2018 |
[DG CONNECT] |
Directive |
6.2 Electronic Communications Networks |
|
April 2017 |
Regulation on in vitro diagnostic medical devices (2017/746) [DG SANTE] |
Regulation |
6.3 Product Safety and Market Surveillance |
|
April 2017 |
Regulation on medical devices (2017/745) Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance: [DG GROW] |
Regulation |
6.3 Product Safety and Market Surveillance |
|
May 2016 |
[DG JUST] |
Regulation |
6.5 Data Protection and Data Economy |
|
August 2014 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance: [DG CONNECT] |
Regulation |
6.4 Electronic Identification |
|
May 2014 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance: [DG GROW] |
Directive |
6.2 Electronic Communications Networks |
Economic, Monetary and Commercial Policy
Internal Security, Justice and Law Enforcement
|
Month/ Year |
Legal Act/Policy |
Type |
Section |
|---|---|---|---|
|
May 2023 |
[DG JUST] |
Regulation |
8.3 IT Systems of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice |
|
January 2023 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance:
[DG HOME] |
Directive |
8.1 Deep Dive |
|
June 2022 |
[DG JUST] |
Regulation |
8.3 IT Systems of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice |
|
July 2021 |
Regulation establishing the Internal Security Fund (2021/1149) |
Regulation |
8.4 Judicial and Police Cooperation |
|
February 2021 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance: |
Council Conclusions |
8.5 Council Conclusions |
|
December 2018 |
Regulation on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) (2018/1727) [DG JUST] |
Regulation |
Covered in Chapter 13 |
|
December 2018 |
Previous legislation: Regulation establishing a European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (1077/2011) |
Regulation |
8.3 IT Systems of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice |
|
October 2018 |
Regulation establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) (2018/1240) [DG HOME] |
Regulation |
8.3 IT Systems of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice |
|
June 2016 |
Council conclusions on improving criminal justice in cyberspace (10007/16) |
Council Conclusions |
8.5 Council Conclusions |
|
June 2016 |
Regulation on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) (2016/794) [DG HOME] |
Regulation |
Covered in Chapter 13 |
|
September 2013 |
[DG HOME] |
Directive |
8.2 Cybercrime |
Energy, Transport and Health Policy
|
Month/ Year |
Legal Act/Policy |
Type |
Section |
|---|---|---|---|
|
October 2023 |
Directive |
9.1 Energy |
|
|
December 2020 |
[DG MOVE] |
Regulation |
9.2 Civil Aviation |
|
December 2020 |
[DG MOVE] |
Regulation |
9.2 Civil Aviation |
|
July 2019 |
[DG ENER] |
Directive |
9.1 Energy |
|
July 2019 |
Regulation on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector (2019/941) |
Regulation |
9.1 Energy |
|
July 2019 |
Regulation on the internal market for electricity (2019/943) Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance: [DG ENER] |
Regulation |
9.1 Energy |
|
April 2019 |
Commission Recommendation on cybersecurity in the energy sector (2019/553) |
Recommendation |
9.1 Energy |
|
February 2019 |
Commission Recommendation on a European Electronic Health Record exchange format (2019/243) |
Recommendation |
9.3 Health |
|
September 2018 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance:
[DG MOVE] |
Regulation |
9.2 Civil Aviation |
|
April 2018 |
Communication |
9.3 Health |
|
|
December 2017 |
Council Conclusions |
9.3 Health |
|
|
April 2011 |
Directive on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare (2011/24) Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance:
[DG SANTE] |
Directive |
9.3 Health |
Education, Research and Space Policy
|
Month/ Year |
Legal Act/Policy |
Type |
Section |
|---|---|---|---|
|
November 2023 |
Recommendation |
10.1 Education |
|
|
November 2023 |
Recommendation |
10.1 Education |
|
|
April 2023 |
Communication |
10.1 Education |
|
|
March 2023 |
Regulation establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027 (2023/588) [DG DEFIS] |
Regulation |
10.3 Space |
|
June 2021 |
Corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance:
[DG CONNECT] |
Regulation |
10.2 Research |
|
May 2021 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance: Previous legislation: Council Decision establishing the specific programme implementing Horizon 2020 - the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020) (2013/743) [DG RTD] |
Decision |
10.2 Research |
|
May 2021 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance: [DG DEFIS] |
Regulation |
10.3 Space |
Foreign and Security Policy
|
Month/ Year |
Legal Act/Policy |
Type |
Section |
|---|---|---|---|
|
February 2024 |
Prior decisions: [HR/VP, EEAS] |
Council Decision |
11.7 Support to Other International Organizations |
|
May 2023 |
Council Conclusions |
11.4 Cyber Defence |
|
|
May 2023 |
Previous documents of relevance:
[HR/VP, EEAS] |
Council Decision |
11.4 Cyber Defence |
|
May 2023 |
[HR/VP, EEAS] |
Council Decision |
11.4 Cyber Defence |
|
April 2023 |
Council Decision on a European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova (2023/855) [HR/VP, EEAS] |
Council Decision |
11.4 Cyber Defence |
|
November 2022 |
Joint Communication on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence (JOIN(2022) 49 final) |
Joint Communication |
11.4 Cyber Defence |
|
June 2022 |
Council conclusions on a Framework for a coordinated EU response to hybrid campaigns (10016/22) |
Council Conclusions |
11.5 Hybrid Threats and Campaigns |
|
June 2022 |
[HR/VP, EEAS] |
Council Decision |
11.4 Cyber Defence |
|
May 2022 |
Council conclusions on the development of the European Union’s cyber posture (9364/22) |
Council Conclusions |
11.1 Strategic Documents |
|
March 2022 |
Other |
11.1 Strategic Documents |
|
|
December 2021 |
[HR/VP, EEAS] |
Council Decision |
11.4 Cyber Defence |
|
December 2021 |
Joint Communication: The Global Gateway (JOIN(2021) 30 final) |
Communication |
11.6 Development Cooperation and Cyber Capacity-Building |
|
September 2021 |
Other |
11.4 Cyber Defence |
|
|
June 2021 |
[HR/VP, EEAS] |
Council Decision |
11.7 Support to Other International Organizations |
|
June 2021 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance: [DG INTPA] |
Regulation |
11.6 Development Cooperation and Cyber Capacity-Building |
|
April 2021 |
Regulation establishing the European Defence Fund (2021/697) Previous legislation: Regulation establishing the European Defence Industrial Development Programme aiming at supporting the competitiveness and innovation capacity of the Union's defence industry (2018/1092) |
Regulation |
11.4 Cyber Defence |
|
May 2019 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance:
[HR/VP, EEAS] |
Council Decision |
11.3 Sanctions Regime |
|
May 2019 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance:
|
Council Regulation |
11.3 Sanctions Regime |
|
November 2018 |
EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (14413/18) Previous framework:
|
Other |
11.4 Cyber Defence |
|
June 2018 |
Council conclusions on EU External Cyber Capacity Building Guidelines (10496/18) |
Council Conclusions |
11.6 Development Cooperation and Cyber Capacity-Building |
|
June 2018 |
Joint Communication |
11.5 Hybrid Threats and Campaigns |
|
|
April 2018 |
Council Conclusions |
11.2 Cyber Diplomacy |
|
|
December 2017 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance:
[HR/VP, EEAS] |
Council Decision |
11.4 Cyber Defence |
|
June 2017
|
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance: |
Council Conclusions
|
11.2 Cyber Diplomacy |
|
April 2016 |
Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats (JOIN(2016) 18 final) |
Joint Communication |
11.5 Hybrid Threats and Campaigns |
|
February 2015 |
Council Conclusions |
11.2 Cyber Diplomacy |
Cybersecurity of EU Institutions, Bodies and Agencies
|
Month/ Year |
Legal Act/Policy |
Type |
Section |
|---|---|---|---|
|
January 2024 |
Prior document providing a basis for CERT-EU: |
Regulation |
12.1 Deep Dive |
|
June 2023 |
Decision |
12.2 Rules for Particular EUIBAs |
|
|
January 2017 |
Subsequent corresponding legal acts, guidelines or other documents of relevance:
Previous legislation [not in force anymore]: |
Decision |
12.2 Rules for Particular EUIBAs |
|
March 2015 |
Commission Decision on Security in the Commission (2015/443) |
Decision |
12.2 Rules for Particular EUIBAs |
Policy Area 1: Overarching Policies
General
— Council Conclusions on the Future of Cybersecurity: Implement and Protect Together
In May 2024, the Council adopted 📄 Council Conclusions on the Future of Cybersecurity: Implement and Protect Together. In its conclusions, the Council sets out by noting the “key role and shared responsibility of Member States, and the EU to set and implement a clear and agile regulatory and policy framework laying down our collective ability to protect, detect, deter and defend against, cyberattacks and recover from them” (p. 5). The conclusions are centered around four elements and highlight the following exemplary issues:
Table 2: Overview of Provisions Contained in Council Conclusions on the Future of Cybersecurity
|
Elements |
Exemplary Provisions |
|---|---|
|
Focus Areas for Policy-Making |
|
|
Strengthening the Institutional Framework |
|
|
Internal/External Nexus for Cybersecurity Policy |
|
|
Cybersecurity Dimension of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies |
|
The Council concludes by calling for a review of the EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy, particularly inviting both the Commission and the HR/VP “to assess the results and gaps of the current Strategy and its impact, and to present on this basis a revised strategy without undue delay” (p. 24).
— EU Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade
In December 2020, the Commission and the HR/VP shared the 📄 EU Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade with the Council and the European Parliament. The document builds on previous EU cybersecurity strategies from 2017 26 and 2013. The Strategy sets out to “ensure a global and open Internet with strong guardrails to address the risks to the security and fundamental rights and freedoms of people in Europe” (p. 5), paired with the ambition to “supporting this strategy through an unprecedented level of investment in the EU's digital transition over the next seven years” (p. 5f.). Specifically, it lays out the following areas of EU action, priorities, and measures:
Table 3: Overview of Measures Outlined in the EU Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade
|
Area of EU action |
Priorities |
Measures |
|
|---|---|---|---|
|
“Thinking Global, Acting European” |
|||
|
1: Resilience, technological sovereignty and leadership |
Resilient infrastructure and critical services |
|
|
|
Building a European Cyber Shield |
|
||
|
An ultra-secure communication infrastructure |
|
||
|
Securing the next generation of broadband mobile networks |
|
||
|
An Internet of secure things |
|
||
|
Greater global Internet security |
Commission seeks to
|
||
|
A reinforced presence on the technology supply chain |
|
||
|
A cyber- skilled EU workforce |
|
||
|
2: Building operational capacity to prevent, deter and respond |
A Joint Cyber Unit (JCU) |
|
|
|
Tackling cybercrime |
|
||
|
EU cyber diplomacy toolbox |
|
||
|
Boosting cyber defence capabilities |
|
||
|
3: Advancing a global and open cyberspace |
EU leadership on standards, norms and frameworks in cyberspace |
Stepping up on international standardization |
|
|
Advance responsible state behaviour in cyberspace |
|
||
|
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime |
|
||
|
Cooperation with partners and the multi-stakeholder community |
|
||
|
Strengthening global capacities to increase global resilience |
|
||
|
Cybersecurity in the EU Institutions, Bodies and Agencies |
|||
|
|||
The first report on the implementation of the 2020 EU Cybersecurity Strategy was published in June 2021.
The Council reacted to the Strategy by adopting 📄 Conclusions on the EU’s Cybersecurity Strategy for the Digital Decade three months later. The Conclusions welcome the Cybersecurity Strategy and, inter alia, stress “the need to raise more awareness on cyber issues at the political and strategic decision-making levels by providing decision-makers with relevant knowledge and information” (p. 6) and reflect on the strategy’s components. Looking ahead, the Council “encourages the Commission and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to establish a detailed implementation plan setting the priorities and the schedule of planned actions” (p. 17). The Council itself commits to “monitor[ing] the progress in the implementation of these Conclusions by means of an Action Plan which will be regularly reviewed and updated by the Council in close cooperation with the European Commission and the High Representative” (p. 17). 27
— Security Union Strategy
The EU’s 📄 Security Union Strategy “focuses on building capabilities and capacities to secure a future-proof security environment” (p. 2) for the period 2020-2025. It was published in July 2020. In relation to cybersecurity, the strategy begins by noting that “the ever-increasing ways in which digital technologies benefit our lives ha[ve] also made the cybersecurity of technologies an issue of strategic importance” (p. 3). Specifically, in the context of the strategy’s chapter on a “rapidly changing European security threat landscape” (p. 2-5), it mentions “a wave of cybercrime”, “continued cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property” and “cyber theft of trade secrets” (all p. 3) as cybersecurity-related threats. The Strategy further stresses the need for “economic operators [..to] take greater responsibility for the cybersecurity of products and services they place on the market” and for “individuals [...] to have at least a basic understanding of cybersecurity to be able to protect themselves” (both p. 5). Of cybersecurity relevance are the following strategic priorities and corresponding actions of the strategy:
Table 4: Exemplary Actions Within EU Security Union Strategy
|
Strategic Priority |
Sub- Priority |
Exemplary Actions |
|---|---|---|
|
“A future- proof security environment” |
Critical infrastructure protection and resilience |
|
|
Cybersecurity |
|
|
|
“Tackling evolving threats” |
Cybercrime |
|
|
“A strong European security ecosystem” |
Cooperation and information exchange |
|
|
Strengthening security research and innovation |
|
|
|
Skills and awareness raising |
|
The Commission regularly publishes progress reports on the Security Union Strategy, as listed in the tabular overview contained in Chapter 4.
— Council Conclusions on Cybersecurity Capacity and Capabilities Building in the EU
In March 2019, the Council adopted 📄 Conclusions on cybersecurity capacity and capabilities building in the EU. Within the Conclusions, the Council, inter alia, stresses the following elements (p. 5-6):
Table 5: Overview of Council Conclusions on Cybersecurity Capacity and Capabilities Building in the EU
|
Vis-à-vis |
Provisions |
|---|---|
|
Member States |
|
|
EUIBAs |
|
|
Member States & EUIBAs |
|
Incident and Crisis Response
— Joint Cyber Unit
In June 2021, the Commission issued a 📄 Recommendation on building a Joint Cyber Unit (JCU), which “identif[ies] the actions necessary to coordinate EU efforts to prevent, detect, discourage, deter, mitigate and respond to large-scale cyber incidents and crises through a Joint Cyber Unit” (p. 7).
The Recommendation envisions the participation of the following actors in the JCU:
-
the Commission, EEAS (including EU INTCEN), ENISA, Europol, CERT-EU, CSIRTs Network, EU-CyCLONe as operational participants and
-
the Chairs of the NIS Cooperation Group and HWPCI, EDA and a “representative of the relevant PESCO projects” as supporting participants (p. 8).
The Recommendation assigns a particular role to ENISA within the JCU. The Commission advises to entrust ENISA with “ensur[ing] the coordination and support of Member States and relevant” EUIBAs, inter alia, by assuming the following tasks: “acting as secretariat, organising meetings and contributing to the implementation of actions both at Member State and EU level” (p. 9).
The realization of the JCU shall serve two objectives: (1) “ensur[ing] a coordinated EU response to and recovery from large-scale cyber incidents and crises”, including the coordination of “mutual assistance mechanisms [...] subject to the request from one or more Member States” (p. 8) and (2) “shar[ing] best practices, harness[ing] continuous shared situational awareness, and ensur[ing] necessary preparedness” (p. 8) through a variety of measures, to be ensured/enabled by Member States and EUIBAs:
Table 6: Objectives and Measures of the Joint Cyber Unit
|
Objective |
Measures |
|---|---|
|
(1) “Coordinated response to and recovery from large-scale incidents and crises” (p. 8) |
|
|
(2) Provision of “continuous shared situational awareness and preparedness against cyber-enabled crises across cybersecurity communities [1], as well as within those communities” (p. 8f.) |
Supporting operations
[1] Cybersecurity communities are defined as “collaborative civilian, law enforcement, diplomacy and defence groups representing both Member States and relevant EU institutions, bodies and agencies which exchange information in pursuit of shared goals, interests and missions in relation to cybersecurity” (p. 7) |
The Recommendation concludes by specifying “milestones and [a] timeline” (p. 7) for the JCU’s establishment (further specified in the Recommendation’s annex, p. 11-15). Accordingly, it was envisioned that the JCU would have been fully operational by 30 June 2023.
Five months after the Commission published its Recommendation on the JCU, the Council adopted 📄 Conclusions on exploring the potential of the Joint Cyber Unit initiative - complementing the EU Coordinated Response to Large-Scale Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises. In its Conclusions, the Council “acknowledges the Commission Recommendation on building a Joint Cyber Unit, as an initiative to be considered in further developing the EU cybersecurity crisis management framework” (p. 8). The Council emphasizes that “an incremental, transparent and inclusive process is essential for enhancing trust and, therefore, critical to the further development of an EU cybersecurity crisis management framework” (p. 8), while it concurrently underlines that “any possible participation in or contributions by Member States to a potential Joint Cyber Unit [would be] of a voluntary nature” (p. 8). Underpinning the Council’s stance in this respect, EU Member States further highlighted “the need to consolidate, as a matter of priority, existing networks and interactions within each community, as well as to establish a thorough mapping of possible information sharing gaps and needs within and across cyber communities and also within and across European [IBAs], and subsequently agree on possible primary objectives and priorities of a potential [JCU]” (p. 10). Hence, with respect to the JCU, the Council “calls for further consideration on a legal basis for the potential Joint Cyber Unit throughout the entire process [... and] further reflection on individual elements of the Recommendation on the Joint Cyber Unit, including with regard to the idea of the EU Cybersecurity Rapid Reaction Teams, and to the EU Cybersecurity Incident and Crisis Response Plan” (p. 11). Looking ahead, the Council “calls upon the EU and its Member States to consider the potential of a Joint Cyber Unit initiative” (p. 11) and commits itself to “provid[ing] further guidance for complementing the EU cybersecurity crisis management framework” (p. 11).
— Council Conclusions on EU Coordinated Response to Large-Scale Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises
In June 2018, the Council adopted 📄 Conclusions on EU Coordinated Response to Large-Scale Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises. In it, the Council, inter alia, stresses the following elements:
Table 7: Overview of Council Conclusions on EU Coordinated Response to Large-Scale Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises
|
Objectives |
Exemplary Provisions |
|---|---|
|
Fostering the preparedness and crisis prevention (p. 4) |
|
|
Increasing the situational awareness (p. 4) |
|
|
Ensuring the effective response (p. 5) |
|
|
Streamlining the public communication (p. 5f.) |
|
|
Building on the lessons learned and post incident analysis (p. 6) |
|
|
Developing a European Cybersecurity Crisis Cooperation Framework (p. 6) |
|
— Commission Recommendation on Coordinated Response to Large-Scale Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises
In September 2017, the Commission issued a 📄 Recommendation on coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises. It recommends the establishment of “an EU Cybersecurity Crisis Response Framework” (p. 4) on the basis of a Blueprint included in the Recommendation’s Annex. The Blueprint attached to the Recommendation “applies to cybersecurity incidents which cause disruption too extensive for a concerned Member State to handle on its own or which affect two or more Member States or EU institutions with such a wide-ranging and significant impact of technical or political significance that they require timely policy coordination and response at Union political level,” also referred to as a “cybersecurity crisis” (p. 6). The response to cybersecurity crises at the EU level may involve existing crisis management procedures such as the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR) arrangements 28 , the ARGUS rapid alert system, and the EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism (the Blueprint further explains these instruments in p. 19-22). The processes and activities outlined in the Blueprint are based on the principles of proportionality, subsidiarity, complementarity, and confidentiality of information (p. 6f.). The Blueprint is subdivided on the basis of three “objectives of cooperation”: “effective response,” “shared situational awareness,” and “public communication messages” (p. 7f.). For each of these objectives, the Blueprint lists measures to be taken at three different levels, namely the technical, operational, and the “strategic/political level.” 29
Each level shall undertake the following activities:
-
Technical level: “incident handling during a cybersecurity crisis” and “monitoring and surveillance of incident including continuous analysis of threats and risk” (p. 8);
-
Operational level: “preparing decision-making at the political level” and “coordinat[ing] the management of the cybersecurity crisis (as appropriate)” (p. 10);
-
Strategic/political level: “strategic and political management of both cyber and non-cyber aspects of the crisis including measures under the Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities” (p. 12).
For every level, the Blueprint suggests potential entities to be involved and lists activities to be undertaken under each of the three priority objectives. A few examples of such activities are listed below:
Table 8: Overview of Blueprint Measures
|
Objective |
Level |
Exemplary Measures |
|---|---|---|
|
Shared situational awareness |
1: Technical level (p. 9) |
|
|
2: Operational level (p. 11) |
|
|
|
3: Strategic/ political level (p. 12) |
|
|
|
Response |
1: Technical level (p. 9f.) |
|
|
2: Operational level (p. 11) |
“Upon request from the political level”
|
|
|
3: Strategic/ political level (p. 12) |
|
|
|
Public communications |
1: Technical level (p. 10) |
|
|
2: Operational level (p. 12) |
|
|
|
3: Strategic/ political level (p. 12) |
|
The Blueprint outlines further how these activities may specifically be integrated in the IPCR based on the IPCR’s Standard Operating Procedures (see further pp. 13-17).
Digital Transformation
— Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030
The 📄 Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 was established in 2022 to “creat[e] an environment favourable to innovation and investment by setting a clear direction for the digital transformation of the Union and for the delivery of digital targets 30 at Union level by 2030, on the basis of measurable indicators” (Art. 1(1), point (a)). As part of one of its eleven general objectives, the Programme includes cooperation by the European Parliament, the Commission, Council, and Member States on “improving resilience to cyberattacks, contributing to increasing risk-awareness and the knowledge of cybersecurity processes, and increasing the efforts of public and private organisations to achieve at least basic levels of cybersecurity” (Art. 3(1), point (k)), to be facilitated by multi-country projects. On an annual basis, the Commission shall draw up a “report on the state of the Digital Decade,” to be shared with the Council and European Parliament (Art. 6). 31 Member States, on the other hand, shall share with the Commission “national digital decade strategic roadmaps” (by October 2023), which shall comprise, among other things, the “main planned, adopted and implemented policies, measures and actions that contribute to achieving the general objectives and the digital targets” (Art. 7). 32
— Digital Europe Programme
📄 Regulation 2021/694 introduces the Digital Europe Programme for the EU’s budget period until 2027 in an effort to accelerate “the digital transformation of the European economy, industry and society” (Art. 3(1)). The Programme provides a planned funding of over €7.5 billion to support projects in five key areas, with over €1.6 billion allocated to cybersecurity. Funding in the area of cybersecurity shall:
-
“support the building-up and procurement of advanced cybersecurity equipment, tools and data infrastructures” in cooperation with Member States;
-
“support the building-up and best use of European knowledge, capacity and skills related to cybersecurity and the sharing and mainstreaming of best practices”;
-
“ensure a wide deployment of effective state-of-the-art cybersecurity solutions across the European economy” with a particular focus on “public authorities and SMEs”;
-
“reinforce capabilities within Member States and private sector” for compliance with the NIS Directive;
-
“improve resilience against cyberattacks, contribute towards increasing risk-awareness and knowledge of cybersecurity processes, support public and private organisations in achieving basics levels of cybersecurity [...]”;
-
and “enhance cooperation between the civil and defence spheres with regard to dual-use projects, services, competences and applications in cybersecurity [...]” (Art. 6(1)).
The implementation of respective initiatives rests primarily with the ECCC and the Network of NCCs (Art. 6(2)). The Commission adopted the Digital Europe Cybersecurity Work Programme 2023-2024 to specify the cybersecurity-related initiatives under the Digital Europe Programme. 33 The following table provides a non-exhaustive overview of some of the deployment actions, objectives, and sought deliverables of the work programme:
Table 9: Overview of Objectives and Deliverables of the Digital Europe Cybersecurity Work Programme 2023-2024
|
Deployment Action |
Objectives |
Examples of Sought Deliverables |
|---|---|---|
|
“Security Operation Centres” (pp. 14-27, Work Programme)
|
“support joint actions to create an advanced (state-of-the-art) threat detection and cyber early warning ecosystem” |
The ECCC will work with Member States to
[The Working Programme defines national SOCs as “public entities [which are] given the role at national level to act as clearinghouses for detecting, gathering and storing data on cybersecurity threats, analysing this data, and sharing and reporting Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), reviews and analyses” (p. 15)] |
|
“Support for the Implementation of the proposed Cyber Resilience Act” (pp. 29-33, Work Programme) |
|
|
|
“Cybersecurity Emergency Mechanism” (pp. 39-41, Work Programme) |
“increase the level of protection and resilience to cyber threats, in particular for large industrial installations and infrastructures, by assisting Member States in their efforts to improve the preparedness for cyber threats and incidents by providing them with knowledge and expertise” |
|
|
“Standardisation in the Area of Cybersecurity” (pp. 42-43, Work Programme) |
“support further standardisation in the area of cybersecurity, notably in view of the implementation of the proposed” CRA |
|
|
“Support for Implementation of EU Legislation on Cybersecurity and National Cybersecurity Strategies” (pp. 43-48, Work Programme) |
|
|
|
Other deployment actions include: deploying the Network of National Coordination Centres with Member States (1.9), the development and deployment of advanced key technologies (1.2), post quantum cryptography (1.4), and the coordination between the cybersecurity civilian and defence spheres (1.6). |
||
— 2030 Digital Compass: The European Way for the Digital Decade
In March 2021, the Commission published the 📄 2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade. The Digital Compass sets out a vision for 2030 based on four target areas, of which three particularly address cybersecurity-related objectives:
Table 10: Overview of Cybersecurity-Related Objectives of the 2030 Digital Compass
|
Target Area |
Objective |
|---|---|
|
A digitally skilled population and highly skilled digital professionals |
|
|
Secure and performant sustainable digital infrastructures |
|
|
Digitalisation of public services |
|
Emerging Technologies
— Commission Recommendation on a Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography
In April 2024, the Commission published a 📄 Recommendation on a Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography. The Recommendation, inter alia, advises Member States to “define a ‘Post-Quantum Cryptography [PGC] Coordinated Implementation Roadmap’ aimed at synchronising the efforts of Member States to design and implement national transition plans while ensuring cross-border interoperability” and “support the evaluation and selection of relevant Post-Quantum Cryptography EU algorithms [...] and further adoption of such algorithms as Union standards” (p. 4). As part of the suggested Roadmap, the Commission recommends that Member States set up a dedicated subgroup within the NIS Cooperation Group to draft such a roadmap. This subgroup shall discuss post-quantum cryptography with other stakeholders such as Europol or NATO, as part of its deliberations. After being set up, the PGC subgroup within the NIS Cooperation Group shall strive to adopt the Roadmap after two years to be “followed by the development and further adaptation of Post-Quantum Cryptography transition plans of individual Member States” (p. 5). In turn, the Commission foresees a monitoring and period assessment role for itself. On this basis, the Commission, among other activities, may “determine whether additional actions, including proposing binding acts of Union law, are required” (p. 5). The Recommendation shall be reviewed at the latest in April 2027.
Democratic Processes
— Commission Recommendation on Inclusive and Resilient Electoral Processes in the Union and Enhancing the European Nature and Efficient Conduct of the Elections to the European Parliament
In December 2023, the Commission adopted a 📄 Recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes in the Union and enhancing the European nature and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament. With respect to cybersecurity, the Recommendation notes, for instance, that “in addition to the obligations under [the NIS 2 and CER Directives], where applicable, Member States should strive to ensure a similar level of resilience of entities operating election-related infrastructure, by performing and updating risk assessments, conducting tests, and enhancing support for and the resilience of entities that play a significant role in the conduct of elections” (recital (33)) and carry out “specific measures [...] to further enhance the cybersecurity of voter registration databases, e-voting systems and other information systems used to manage electoral operations” (recital (34). The Recommendation sets out 11 principles, of which two address cybersecurity specifically:
Table 11: Overview of Cybersecurity-Related Provisions Contained in Commission Recommendation 2023/2829
|
Principles |
Specification |
|---|---|
|
IV. Encouraging election integrity and fair campaigning |
“Political parties and campaign organisations are encouraged to adopt campaign pledges and codes of conduct on election integrity and fair campaigning”, which shall, inter alia, include “active steps to maintain good cyber hygiene, such as regular cybersecurity checks, in order to recognize, deter and prevent attacks” (p. 13 f.) |
|
VII: Protecting election-related infrastructure and ensuring resilience against cyber and other hybrid threats |
Member States should
|
— European Democracy Action Plan
In December 2020, the Commission put forward a 📄 Communication on the European Democracy Action Plan. In its introduction, as part of a section on the “digital transformation of our democracies”, the Action Plan notes, inter alia, that “digitalisation enabled new ways to finance political actors from uncontrolled sources [and] cyber-attacks can target critical electoral infrastructure” (p. 2). Against this backdrop, the Action Plan lays out the following cybersecurity-related provisions to meet its specified objectives:
Table 12: Overview of Cybersecurity-Related Provisions of the European Democracy Action Plan
|
Objective |
Specific Objective |
Action |
|---|---|---|
|
Protecting election integrity and promoting democratic participation |
Strengthened cooperation in the EU to ensure free and fair elections |
|
|
Strengthening media freedom and media pluralism |
Safety of journalists |
|
|
Countering disinformation |
Improving EU and Member State capacity to counter disinformation |
|
Policy Area 2: Internal Market
Deep Dives: NIS 2 Directive and Cybersecurity Act
— Directive on Measures for a High Common Level of Cybersecurity Across the Union (NIS 2)
|
📄 Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (2022/2555) |
|---|
|
Entry into force: 16 January 2023 Deadline for national transposition: 17 October 2024, measures to apply from 18 October 2024 |
|
Previous legislation: Repeals Directive 2016/1148 (NIS 1) from 18 October 2024 onwards |
|
Subsequent documents of relevance: |
|
Objective (Art. 1): “achieve a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, with a view to improving the functioning of the internal market” |
|
Subject matter (Art. 1): “This Directive lays down:
|
|
Actors established/regulated by NIS 2 Directive:
|
|
Deep Dive Structure -> Scope -> Competent Authorities, Single Points of Contacts and CSIRTs -> National Cybersecurity Strategy -> Cyber Crisis Management -> Vulnerability Disclosure -> Cybersecurity Risk Management -> Reporting -> Information-Sharing -> Union-Level Cooperation and State of the Union Report -> Supervision and Enforcement -> Implementing and Delegated Acts -> Review |
Scope
In its application, the NIS 2 Directive distinguishes between essential and important entities. Both types of entities can be public or private. In general, essential entities are subject to more extensive obligations and a higher extent of supervision than important entities.
As a general rule, public or private entities fall in the scope of the NIS 2 Directive when they qualify at least as a medium-sized enterprise, 34 “provide their services or carry out their activities within the Union,” and its type is listed in the NIS 2’s Annex I or II (see further Table 13). Irrespective of the size requirement, the Directive applies to entities on the basis of circumstantial factors. In accordance, an entity is within the NIS 2’s scope if
-
it “is the sole provider in a Member State of a service which is essential for the maintenance of critical societal or economic activities;”
-
“disruption of the service provided by the entity could have a significant impact on public safety, public security or public health;”
-
“disruption of the service provided by the entity could induce a significant systemic risk, in particular for sectors where such disruption could have a cross-border impact;”
-
or “the entity is critical because of its specific importance at national or regional level for the particular sector or type of service, or for other interdependent sectors in the Member State” (Art. 2(2)).
Moreover, it applies to entities when “services are provided by” “providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services,” “trust service providers“ and “top-level domain name registries and domain name system service providers” (Art. 2(2), point (a)) as well as “entities providing domain name registration services” (Art. 2(4)). All entities designated as critical entities under the CER Directive are also within the scope of NIS 2 (Art. 2(3)).
An entity is deemed essential when it fulfills any of the following criteria:
-
it qualifies at least a medium-sized enterprise and additionally qualifies as an entity of the type outlined in Annex I (Art. 3(1), point (a));
-
it is a “qualified trust service provider[...,] top-level domain name registr[y … or] DNS service provider[...] (Art. 3(1), point (b));
-
it is a “provider[...] of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services” (Art. 3(1), point (c));
-
it is a “public administration entity [...] of central government as defined by a Member State in accordance with national law”[1];
-
or it is an entity that is designated as a ‘critical entity’ under the CER Directive.
[1] The NIS 2 Directive excludes “public administration entities that carry out their activities in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement, including the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences” (Art. 2(7)) from its scope of application. It is at a Member State’s discretion to exclude specific entities when they operate in these areas or provide services to the previously enumerated excluded public administration entities from complying with particular obligations (see further Art. 2(8)).
EU Member States may choose to classify previously designated “operators of essential services” in the framework of the NIS 1 Directive as essential entities (Art. 3(1), point (g)). Member States may also designate essential entities based on the circumstantial factors listed above (Art. 3(1), point (e)).
Any other entities of a type listed in Annex I or II that do not qualify as essential under any of the points enumerated above are considered as important entities. In terms of jurisdiction, an essential or important entity falls under the jurisdiction of the particular Member State in which it is established (Art. 26). 35
The following table provides an overview of the (sub)sectors listed in Annex I and II and gives examples of types of entities
36
, subsumed under the respective sectors:
Table 13: Sectors in the Scope of the NIS 2 Directive
|
“Sectors of high criticality” (Annex I) |
|
|---|---|
|
Energy |
|
|
Transport |
|
|
Banking |
|
|
Financial market infrastructures |
|
|
Health |
|
|
Drinking water |
|
|
Waste water |
|
|
Digital infrastructure |
|
|
ICT service management (business-to- business) |
|
|
Public administration |
|
|
Space |
|
|
“Critical sectors” (Annex II) |
|
|---|---|
|
Postal and courier services |
|
|
Waste management |
|
|
Manufacture, production and distribution of chemicals |
|
|
Production, processing and distribution of food |
|
|
Manufacturing |
|
|
Digital providers |
|
|
Research |
|
In the context of their national transposition of the NIS 2 Directive, EU Member States may choose to include “public administration entities at local level” and “education institutions” in their scope of application (Art. 2(5)).
EU Member States have until 17 April 2025 to draw up a list of entities that fall within the scope of NIS 2, which they must subsequently update at least every two years. Until the same date, EU Member States must, via their competent authorities, share “the number of essential and important entities listed [...] for each sector and subsector” with the Commission and the NIS Cooperation Group (Art. 3 (5)).
As a horizontal framework, the NIS 2 Directive also foresees the possibility of sector-specific Union legal acts to act as lex specialis (Art. 4). 37 In cases where “sector-specific Union legal acts require essential or important entities to adopt cybersecurity risk-management measures or to notify significant incidents and where those requirements are at least equivalent in effect to the obligations laid down in this Directive, the relevant provisions of this Directive, including the provisions on supervision and enforcement laid down in Chapter VII, shall not apply to such entities” (Art. 4(1)). When a sector-specific EU legal act “do[es] not cover all entities in a specific sector falling within the scope of this Directive, the relevant provisions of this Directive shall continue to apply to the entities not covered by those sector-specific Union legal acts” (Art. 4(1)). As instrumental in the determination of whether another legal act meets the equivalence requirement, the NIS 2 Directive lists that any such act shall ensure that the
-
“cybersecurity risk-management measures are at least equivalent in effect to those laid down in Article 21(1) and (2)”;
-
the respective provisions “provide[...] for immediate access, where appropriate automatic and direct, to the incident notifications by the CSIRTs, the competent authorities or the single points of contact under this Directive;”
-
and “requirements to notify significant incidents are at least equivalent in effect to those laid down in Article 23(1) to (6) of this Directive” (Art. 4(2)).
In September 2023, the Commission published “guidelines clarifying the application of paragraphs 1 and 2,” complying with Art. 4(3)). 38
|
Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Member States |
Development of a list of essential and important entities as well as entities providing domain name registration services |
17 April 2025 |
Update at least every two years thereafter |
Art. 3(3) |
|
Member States |
Notification of the number of essential and important entities listed for each sector and subsector -> Commission and NIS Cooperation Group |
17 April 2025 |
Every two years thereafter |
Art. 3(5) |
|
Member States |
Notification of specified relevant information in relation to essential and important entities -> Commission |
17 April 2025 |
Every two years thereafter |
Art. 3(5) |
Competent Authorities, Single Points of Contacts and CSIRTs
From an institutional perspective, EU Member States must designate (a) competent national authority/ies, that is/are in charge of cybersecurity and the directive’s supervision and enforcement, as well as a single point of contact (SPOC) (Art. 9). Each EU Member State SPOC is tasked to exercise a “liaison function” to ensure cooperation within its national jurisdiction and with other EU Member States, the Commission, or ENISA. The Commission is tasked with publishing a list of all national SPOCs.
Additionally, EU Member States must ensure that they have a computer security incident response team (CSIRT) (Art. 10), inter alia, tasked with
-
“monitoring and analyzing cyber threats, vulnerabilities and incidents at national level;”
-
“providing early warnings, alerts, announcements and dissemination of information to essential and important entities concerned;”
-
and “responding to incidents and providing assistance to the essential and important entities concerned” (Art. 11(3)).
EU Member States can request ENISA’s assistance in setting up their CSIRTs and must ensure their national CSIRTs’ active involvement in the CSIRTs Network (Art. 10(6) and (10). National CSIRTs shall engage with “relevant stakeholders in the private sector” (Art. 11(4). In the context of enforcing such cooperative relationships, they shall also undertake efforts to “promote the adoption and use of common or standardised practices, classification schemes and taxonomies in relation to:
-
incident-handling procedures;
-
crisis management;
-
and coordinated vulnerability disclosure” (Art. 11(5)).
EU Member States shall, in particular, ensure inter-agency cooperation and information-sharing between their competent authorities and CSIRTs under the NIS 2 Directive and their national competent authorities designated pursuant to other EU legal acts, inter alia, in the context of the DORA Regulation and the CER Directive (Art. 13).
National Cybersecurity Strategy
In implementing the NIS 2 Directive, EU Member States are required to “adopt a national cybersecurity strategy that provides for the strategic objectives, the resources required to achieve these objectives, and appropriate policy and regulatory measures” (Art. 7(1)). EU Member States shall include, inter alia, specific policies on the following:
-
“addressing cybersecurity in the supply chain for ICT products and services;”
-
the “inclusion and specification of cybersecurity-related requirements for ICT products and ICT services in public procurement;”
-
and vulnerability management, “encompassing the promotion and facilitation of coordinated vulnerability disclosure” (Art. 7(2)).
The strategy should also
-
specify governance arrangements at the national level, for instance, between competent authorities and single points of contact;
-
include “a mechanism to identify relevant assets and an assessment of the risks in that Member State;”
-
and identify “measures ensuring the preparedness for, responsiveness to and recovery from incidents” (Art. 7(1)).
The strategy should also include “a policy framework for enhanced coordination” (Art. 7(1), point (g)) among EU Member States’ competent authorities under the NIS 2 and the CER Directive.
For a complete list of elements to be included in the national cybersecurity strategy, see further Art. 7. Member States must share their strategies with the Commission at the latest three months after their approval (Art. 7(3)). If necessary, Member States can ask ENISA to provide support “in the development or the update of a national cybersecurity strategy” as well as the identification of “key performance indicators for the assessment of that strategy” (Art. 7(4)).
|
Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Member States |
Adoption of a national cybersecurity strategy |
Regular assessment |
Assessment at least every five years based on KPIs, update where necessary |
Art. 7(4) |
Cyber Crisis Management
To ensure effective cyber crisis management, EU Member States must additionally have a national competent authority “responsible for the management of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises” (Art. 9(1)). Building upon the definition of an incident as “an event compromising the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored, transmitted or processed data or of the services offered by, or accessible via, network and information systems” (Art. 6, point (6)), the NIS 2 Directive defines a large-scale cybersecurity incident as “an incident which causes a level of disruption that exceeds a Member State’s capacity to respond to it or which has a significant impact on at least two Member States” (Art. 6, point (7)). To comply with the Directive’s provisions in the area of cyber crisis management, EU Member States must put in place a “national large-scale cybersecurity incident and crisis response plan” and “identify capabilities, assets and procedures that can be deployed in the case of a crisis” (Art. 9(3) and (4)).
NIS 2 requires the national plan to stipulate, in particular:
-
“the objectives of national preparedness measures and activities;
-
the tasks and responsibilities of the cyber crisis management authorities;
-
the cyber crisis management procedures [...];
-
national preparedness measures, including exercises and training activities;
-
the relevant public and private stakeholders and infrastructure involved;
-
[and] national procedures and arrangements between relevant national authorities and bodies to ensure the Member State’s effective participation in and support of the coordinated management of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises at Union level” (Art. 9(4) points (a)-(f)).
Once adopted, EU Member States have three months to share their plans with both the Commission and EU-CyCLONe (Art. 9(5)).
|
Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Member States |
Notification of cyber crisis management authority |
At maximum three months after designation or establishment |
At maximum three months after any subsequent changes to the crisis management authority’s identity |
Art. 9(5) |
|
Member States |
Submission of “relevant information relating to [...] their national large-scale cybersecurity incident and crisis response plans” -> Commission and EU-CyCLONe |
At maximum three months after adoption |
- |
Art. 9(5) |
Vulnerability Disclosure
Member States shall designate national CSIRT as a national “coordinator for the purposes of coordinated vulnerability disclosure [CVD]” (Art. 12(1)). In implementing a national CVD policy, EU Member States must “ensure that natural or legal persons are able to report, anonymously where they so request, a vulnerability” to the entity assuming the functions of national CVD coordinator (Art. 12(1)). If, upon reporting of a vulnerability, it is determined that it “could have a significant impact on entities in more than one Member State”, national CVD coordinators shall interact with their counterparts in other EU Member States through the framework of the CSIRTs Network (Art. 12(1)).
At the European level, the NIS 2 Directive entrusts ENISA – upon consultation with the NIS Cooperation Group – with the development and maintenance of a “European vulnerability database” (Art. 12(2)). In terms of information provided, the European vulnerability database shall ensure that it includes
-
a description of the vulnerability;
-
“the affected ICT products or ICT services;”
-
“the severity of the vulnerability in terms of circumstances under which it may be exploited;”
-
and “the availability of patches” or relevant mitigatory guidance by national competent authorities or CSIRTs in their absence (Art. 12(2), points (a)-(c)).
Cybersecurity Risk Management
EU Member States must supervise and “ensure that essential and important entities take appropriate and proportionate technical, operational and organisational measures to manage the risks posed to the security of network and information systems which those entities use [...] and to prevent or minimise the impact of incidents” (Art. 21(1)). These measures shall be endorsed and overseen by an essential or important entities’ management body, which may also be held liable in case of non-compliance (Art. 20(1)). In addition, the NIS 2 Directive stipulates that “Member States shall ensure that the members of the management bodies of essential and important entities are required to follow training” (Art. 20(2)).
To comply with this provision, essential and important entities shall have in place at least the following measures/policies:
-
“policies on risk analysis and information system security;
-
incident handling;
-
business continuity, such as backup management and disaster recovery, and crisis management;
-
supply chain security, including security-related aspects concerning the relationships between each entity and its direct suppliers or service providers;
-
security in network and information systems acquisition, development and maintenance, including vulnerability handling and disclosure;
-
policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk-management measures;
-
basic cyber hygiene practices and cybersecurity training;
-
policies and procedures regarding the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption;
-
human resources security, access control policies and asset management;
-
[and] the use of multi-factor authentication or continuous authentication solutions, secured voice, video and text communications and secured emergency communication systems within the entity, where appropriate” (Art. 21(2)).
When EU Member States supervise the implementation of such measures by essential and important entities, they shall take into account “the degree of the entity’s exposure to risks, the entity’s size and the likelihood of occurrence of incidents and their severity, including their societal and economic impact” (Art. 21(1)) to ensure a proportionate application. Pursuant to the Cybersecurity Act (Regulation 2019/881), essential and important entities may be required to “demonstrate compliance” with this provision by exclusively “us[ing] particular ICT products, ICT services or ICT processes [...] that are certified under European cybersecurity certification schemes” (Art. 24(1)).
Reporting
The NIS 2 Directive puts in place reporting obligations for essential and important entities to report when they become subject to a “significant incident” (Art. 23). To determine an incident’s significance, the directive lists two elements that can give rise to a significant incident:
-
a) the incident “has caused or is capable of causing severe operational disruption of the services or financial loss for the entity concerned;” or
-
b) the incident “has affected or is capable of affecting other natural or legal persons by causing considerable material or non-material damage” (Art. 23(3)).
In reporting a significant incident to the national CSIRT or competent authority, the following specific timelines apply for essential and important entities:
Table 14: Reporting Deadlines and Actions Pursuant to the NIS 2 Directive
|
I. Action to be taken by essential or important entity |
|||
|---|---|---|---|
|
(a) Without undue delay, >24 hours of “becoming aware” of a significant incident |
(b) Without undue delay, > 72 hours of “becoming aware” of a significant incident |
(c) Upon request by national CSIRT or competent authority |
(d) <1 month after (b) has been submitted |
|
Submission of an early warning. The warning shall “where applicable, [...] indicate whether the significant incident is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious acts or could have a cross-border impact.” (Art. 23(4), point (a)) |
Submission of an incident notification. Where applicable, the notification shall update the information provided in the warning of step (a) and “indicate an initial assessment of the significant incident, including its severity and impact, as well as, where available, the indicators of compromise.” (Art. 23(4), point (b)) |
Submission of an intermediate report outlining “relevant status updates.” (Art. 23(4), point (c)) |
Submission of a final report. If the incident is still ongoing at the time, essential and important entities must submit a progress report instead. In the latter case, a final report must also be provided “within one month of their handling of the incident” (Art. 23(4), point (d) and (e)). [The final report is supposed to include (i) “a detailed description of the incident, including its severity and impact”, (ii) “the type of threat or root cause that is likely to have triggered the incident”, (iii) “applied and ongoing mitigation measures”, and (iv) “where applicable, the cross-border impact of the incident” (Art. 23(4), point (d))] |
|
II. Action to be taken by national CSIRT or competent authority |
|
|---|---|
|
(a) Without undue delay and, where possible, within 24 hours of receiving the early warning |
(b) No specified timeline |
|
Response to notifying entity that “includ[es] initial feedback on the significant incident and, upon request of the entity, guidance or operational advice on the implementation of possible mitigation measures.” (Art. 23(5)) |
|
When essential or important entities report an incident, EU Member States shall guarantee that the information submitted allows “determin[ing] any cross-border impact of the incident” (Art. 23(1)).
Upon assessing an incident’s significance, EU Member States – acting via their national CSIRT, competent authority, or SPOC – shall, “where appropriate,” inform other EU Member States and ENISA of the incident, especially when the “significant incident concerns two or more Member States” (Art. 23(6)). In any case, national SPOCs must share a “summary report” with ENISA every three months (Art. 23(9)). This report shall include “anonymised and aggregated data on significant incidents, incidents, cyber threats and near misses notified” (Art. 23(9)). In turn, ENISA is tasked with briefing the NIS Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs Network “about its findings on notifications” twice a year (Art. 23(9)). To increase the comparability of the national summary reports, ENISA “may adopt technical guidance on the parameters of the information to be included in the summary report” (Art. 23(9)). On a national level, either the CSIRT or competent authority shall also ensure that “information about significant incidents, incidents, cyber threats and near misses notified [...] by entities [that the CER Directive] identified as critical entities” are shared with the national competent authorities designated under that Directive (Art. 23(10)).
The responsibility of essential and important entities to report incidents not only extends to the respective national authorities, but also to the “recipients of their services that are potentially affected by a significant cyber threat” (Art. 23 (2)). “Where applicable,” essential and important entities shall provide them with “any measures or remedies [they] are able to take in response to that threat” (Art. 23(2)).
In addition to mandatory reporting obligations laid out in Article 23, Member States must ensure that entities can also voluntarily report relevant information in this respect. For essential and important entities, this relates to “incidents, cyber threats and near misses” (Art. 30). EU Member States shall also provide the basis for any other entity, specifically also those not “fall[ing] within the scope of this Directive” to be able to notify national CSIRTs or competent authorities of “significant incidents, cyber threats and near misses” (Art. 30(1), point (b)). The subsequent actions to be taken by national CSIRT or competent authority are the same as outlined in table 14 above. Yet, Member States can decide to take care of mandatory notifications received first.
|
Who |
What |
When |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Member State SPOC |
Submission of summary report of notifications received in accordance with Art. 23 (1) and Art. 30 -> ENISA |
Every three months |
Art. 23(9) |
|
ENISA |
Briefing about “findings on notification” -> NIS Cooperation Group and CSIRTs Network |
Every six months |
Art. 23(9) |
Information-Sharing
EU Member States shall encourage the voluntary exchange of information 39 among essential and important entities “through cybersecurity information-sharing arrangements in respect of the potentially sensitive nature of the information shared” (Art. 29(2)). The information-sharing is particularly envisioned for scenarios in which the information transmitted, for instance, helps to “prevent, detect, respond to or recover from incidents or to mitigate their impact” or “limit[s...] or imped[es] the ability of [...] threats to spread” (Art. 29(1), point (b)). Essential and important entities shall inform their competent authorities of their participation in or withdrawal from such arrangements (Art. 29(4)). To promote the uptake of such arrangements, ENISA is tasked with assisting their formation through “exchanging best practices and providing guidance” (Art. 29(5)).
Union-Level Cooperation and State of the Union Report
NIS 2 also foresees the voluntary participation in peer reviews where representatives from at least two other EU Member States review, for instance, “the level of implementation of the cybersecurity risk-management measures and reporting obligations laid down in Articles 21 and 23,” “the level of capabilities, including the available financial, technical and human resources, and the effectiveness of the exercise of the tasks of the competent authorities,” or “the operational capabilities of the CSIRTs” of one EU Member State (Art. 19(1)). The Commission and ENISA are involved as observers in individual peer reviews (Art. 19(2)). 40 The NIS Cooperation Group is entrusted with developing a “methodology and [the] organisational aspects of peer reviews” together with the Commission, ENISA, and the CSIRTs Network where helpful (Art. 19(1)).
Every two years, ENISA shall draft a “report on the state of cybersecurity in the Union” for submission and presentation to the European Parliament (Art. 18). This report “shall include particular policy recommendations, with a view to addressing shortcomings and increasing the level of cybersecurity across the Union” and must provide assessments on the
-
“Union-level cybersecurity risk;”
-
the “development of cybersecurity capabilities in the public and private sectors;”
-
the “general level of cybersecurity awareness and cyber hygiene among citizens and entities;”
-
and a “summary of the findings [...] from the EU Cybersecurity Technical Situation Reports on incidents and cyber threats” (Art. 18(1) points, (a)-(c) and Art. 18 (2)).
On an aggregated basis, the report shall also assess “the outcome of the peer reviews” as well as “the level of maturity of cybersecurity capabilities and resources across the Union [... and] the extent to which the Member States’ national cybersecurity strategies are aligned” (Art. 18(1) points (d) and (e)).
|
Who |
What |
When |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
|
NIS Cooperation Group |
Development of a methodology for peer reviews |
17 January 2025 |
Art. 19(1) |
|
ENISA |
Adoption of a biennial report on the state of cybersecurity in the Union -> European Parliament |
Every two years |
Art. 18(1) |
Supervision and Enforcement
To some extent, the supervisory and enforcement powers of EU Member States vary depending on whether an entity is designated as an essential or important entity. In principle, the pursuit of enforcement measures shall be based on “detailed reasoning” (Art. 32(8)). Before pursuing them, a competent authority shall share respective “preliminary findings” with the entity concerned and provide them with a window for submitting their view (the latter except for “duly substantiated cases [requiring] immediate action”) (Art. 32(8)). Member States shall ensure that their supervisory and enforcement measures, as well as the imposition of administrative fines, are “effective, proportionate and dissuasive, taking into account the circumstances of each individual case” (Art. 32(1), Art. 33 (1) and Art. 34 (1)).
The NIS 2 Directive foresees at least the following supervisory and enforcement powers for national competent authorities:
Table 15: Supervision and Enforcement Powers
|
Supervision |
|
|---|---|
|
Essential or important entity |
|
|
Art. 32(2) & Art. 33(2)
|
|
|
Essential entity |
Important entity |
|
Art. 32(2)
|
Art. 33(2)
|
|
Enforcement |
|
|---|---|
|
Essential or important entity |
|
|
Art. 32(4) & Art. 33(4)
|
|
|
Essential entity |
Important entity |
|
Art. 32(4), Art. 32(5) & Art. 34(4)
Ultima ratio enforcement powers [1]:
[1] A Member State shall provide for these powers in cases where particular previous enforcement measures did not produce the desired outcome and an entity has also not complied with requested actions in a subsequently specified timeframe (Art. 32(5)). |
Art. 33(4) & Art. 34(5)
|
When an essential entity is also designated as a critical entity under the CER Directive, the competent authorities under the NIS 2 Directive shall cooperate and inform those designated under the CER Directive of their intent to pursue supervisory or enforcement measures (Art. 32(9)). In addition, with respect to both essential and important entities, the national competent authorities under the NIS 2 Directive and the DORA Regulation shall cooperate and exchange information (Art. 32(10) and Art. 33(6)). For instance, when an essential or important entity classified under NIS 2 also represents a critical ICT third-party service provider under the DORA Regulation, Member States must ensure that they inform the Oversight Forum established in the latter regulation “when exercising their supervisory and enforcement powers” (Art. 33(6)). In cases where an entity is the provider of services in at least one Member State or uses “network and information systems” that are located in more than one Member State, the NIS 2 Directive mandates the respective national competent authorities to cooperate with each other (Art. 37). This cooperation involves the sharing of information when supervisory or enforcement activities, the provision of mutual assistance 41 , and “joint supervisory actions” (Art. 37(2)) at the end of the spectrum.
|
Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Member State |
Notification of rules on penalties applicable to infringements -> Commission |
17 January 2025 |
Notification of any subsequent amendment to these rules must be notified without delay |
Art. 36 |
Implementing and Delegated Acts
The NIS 2 Directive outlines various areas where the Commission either shall or may adopt implemented or delegated acts to specify particular provisions further. Areas for such subsequent non-legislative acts relate to:
Table 16: Implementing and Delegated Acts Foreseen Under the NIS 2 Directive
|
Implementing Acts |
Delegated Acts [1] |
|---|---|
|
|
|
[1] The NIS 2 Directive initially foresees that the Commission can exercise this power until 16 January 2028. Either the Council or the European Parliament may withdraw the delegation of power “at any time” (Art. 38(3)). In such a scenario, any delegated acts adopted before the withdrawal remain valid. When drafting a delegated act, the Commission shall consult with Member State representatives. The European Parliament or the Council may object to the entry into force of a particular delegated act (see further Art. 38). [2] These entities are DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, providers of online market places, of online search engines and of social networking services platforms, and trust service providers. [3] When drafting either implementing act B or C, the Commission shall “to the extent possible, follow European and international standards, as well as relevant technical specifications” (Art. 21(5)) and collaborate with both the NIS Cooperation Group and ENISA. [4] These entities are DNS service providers, TLD name registries, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, providers of online market places, of online search engines and of social networking services platforms, and trust service providers. [5] When drafting either implementing act E or F, the Commission shall collaborate with the NIS Cooperation Group (Art. 24(11)). |
|
Review
|
Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Commission |
Review of NIS 2 functioning and report to “be accompanied, where necessary, by a legislative proposal” -> European Parliament and Council |
17 October 2027 |
Every 36 months thereafter |
Art. 40 |
— Regulation on ENISA and on Information and Communications Technology Cybersecurity Certification (Cybersecurity Act)
|
📄 Regulation on ENISA and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification (2019/881) |
|---|
|
Entry into force: 27 June 2019 Date of application: 28 June 2021 |
|
Previous legislation: Repealed Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 since 27 June 2019 |
|
Subsequent documents of relevance:
|
|
Objective (Art. 1): “ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market while aiming to achieve a high level of cybersecurity, cyber resilience and trust within the Union” |
|
Subject matter (Art. 1): “This Regulation lays down:
|
|
Actors established/regulated by the Cybersecurity Act:
|
Provisions setting out the mandate and objectives as well as the organization of ENISA (Art. 3-45) are discussed in the actor profile of ENISA.
The Cybersecurity Act sets up a European cybersecurity certification framework. The framework’s objective is to provide for a “harmonised approach at Union level [...] with a view to creating a digital single market for ICT products 42 , ICT services 43 and ICT processes 44 ” (Art. 46(1)) by putting in place a procedure for European cybersecurity certification schemes. 45 In general, these schemes are voluntary for manufacturers and providers of ICT products, services, and processes unless a particular EU legal act stipulates them as binding in order to “demonstrate the presumption of conformity with [the legislation’s] requirements” (Art. 54(3)). Once issued in any Member State, certificates and statements of conformity are valid in all Member States for their respectively foreseen duration.
The Commission adopts a “rolling work programme” identifying “strategic priorities for future European cybersecurity certification schemes,” to be updated at least every three years (Art. 47). In drafting the work programme, the Commission shall consider the views of the European Cybersecurity Certification Group (ECCG) and the Stakeholder Certification Group (SCCG) (Art. 47(4)). The current work programme can be found here.
Work programmes shall propose the inclusion of particular ICT products, ICT services, or ICT processes, for instance, based on at least one of the following considerations:
-
(a) whether a national cybersecurity certification scheme on the specific category already exists or is being developed;
-
(b) “relevant Union or Member State law or policy;”
-
(c) “market demand;”
-
and (d) “developments in the cyber threat landscape” (Art. 47(3)).
The standard procedure then foresees that the Commission can either request the preparation of a candidate scheme or the review of an existing European scheme when it falls inside the scope laid out in the work programme. When the particular schemes do not form part of the work programme, the Commission or ECCG may request preparation or review only in exceptional cases. ENISA may refuse preparing a scheme upon request by the ECCG but must provide reasons for doing so.
The establishment of a European cybersecurity certification scheme ensues from the following steps:
Table 17: Adoption Steps of a European Cybersecurity Certification Scheme
|
Step 1 |
Step 2 |
Step 3 |
Step 4 |
Step 5 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Request of preparation or review of a (candidate) certification scheme by the Commission or ECCG (Art. 48) |
Preparation of a candidate scheme by ENISA, including
(Art. 49(1)-(5)) |
Submission of a candidate scheme by ENISA -> Commission (Art. 49(6)) |
Adoption of implementing act by Commission stipulating the provision of a particular European cybersecurity certification scheme [2] (Art. 49(7)) |
Review of adopted European cybersecurity certification schemes every five years by ENISA (Art. 49(8)) |
|
[1] The composition of ad hoc working groups includes “experts from Member States’ competent authorities” (Art. 20(4)). [2] The first scheme adopted concerns Common Criteria (Commission Implementing Regulation laying down rules for the application of Regulation 2019/881 as regards the adoption of the European Common Criteria-based cybersecurity certification scheme (EUCC) (2024/482)). Other schemes currently under review relate to Cloud Services and 5G (ENISA: Developing Certification Schemes). |
||||
Upon the Commission’s adoption of an implementing act specifying a particular European certification scheme, any existing national certification schemes on the same matter shall cease to exist (Art. 57(1)). 46 If a Member State aims to establish any new national cybersecurity certification scheme, it shall inform the Commission and the ECCG of its intention (Art. 57(4)).
In order to make it to stage four and be adopted as a European cybersecurity certification scheme, any scheme must specify particular elements. These elements include
-
“evaluation criteria and methods [...] to demonstrate [achievement of…] security objectives;”
-
information on whether the scheme assigns any assurance level and whether a scheme permits conformity self-assessments;
-
a specification on how long issued certificates under the scheme are valid;
-
and “rules concerning how previously undetected cybersecurity vulnerabilities in ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes are to be reported and dealt with” (see further Art. 54(1)).
Among a scheme’s minimum security objectives feature:
-
the protection of “stored, transmitted or otherwise processed data against accidental or unauthorised storage, processing, access or disclosure [and “accidental or unauthorised destruction, loss or alteration or lack of availability”] during the entire life cycle of the ICT product, ICT service or ICT process;”
-
the “identif[ication] and document[ation] of known dependencies and vulnerabilities;”
-
the “verif[ication] that ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes do not contain known vulnerabilities;”
-
and that ICT products, services, or processes are “secure by default and by design” (see Art. 51 for a complete list).
In addition, a scheme can include the provision of assurance levels, which the Cybersecurity Act defines as “a basis for confidence that an ICT product, ICT service or ICT process meets the security requirements of a specific European cybersecurity certification scheme” (Art. 2, point (21)). An assurance level specifies the degree of evaluation at a given time. Yet, it does not and does not aim to “measure the security of the ICT product, ICT service or ICT process concerned” (Art. 2, point (21)).
The Cybersecurity Act stipulates the following three assurance levels, which shall be assigned in proportion “with the level of the risk associated with the intended use of the ICT product, ICT service or ICT process, in terms of the probability and impact of an incident” (Art. 52(1)):
Table 18: Overview of Assurance Levels
|
‘basic’ Art. 52(5) |
‘substantial’ Art. 52(6) |
‘high’ Art. 52(7) |
|---|---|---|
|
Minimum evaluation: |
||
|
review of technical documentation |
“review [...] the absence of publicly known vulnerabilities and testing to demonstrate [...] correct[...] implement[ation of] the necessary security functionalities” |
“testing to demonstrate that the ICT products, ICT services or ICT processes correctly implement the necessary security functionalities at the state of the art; and an assessment of their resistance to skilled attackers, using penetration testing” |
|
Requirements: “meet the corresponding security requirements, including security functionalities” |
||
|
+ “evaluat[ion] at a level intended to minimise the known basic risks of incidents and cyberattacks” |
+ “evaluat[ion] at a level intended to minimise the known cybersecurity risks, and the risk of incidents and cyberattacks carried out by actors with limited skills and resources” |
+ “evaluat[ion] at a level intended to minimise the risk of state-of-the-art cyberattacks carried out by actors with significant skills and resources” |
For ICT products, services or processes that fall in the category of the ‘basic’ assurance level, the Cybersecurity Act also foresees an exception by providing the (voluntary unless legally provided for) opportunity for conformity self-assessments by the manufacturer (Art. 53). It is the responsibility of the manufacturer to share the EU statement of conformity and relevant documentation with its national cybersecurity certification authority. A copy of the statement must also be submitted to ENISA.
As part of seeking certification under a European cybersecurity certification scheme, an ICT product, service, or process manufacturer/provider must also provide additional information publicly, including, for instance, “the period during which security support will be offered to end users, in particular as regards the availability of cybersecurity related updates” (Art. 55(1), point (b)). An ICT product, service, or process manufacturer/provider must also, either toward the respective national cybersecurity certification authority or the conformity assessment body, forward information on “any subsequently detected vulnerabilities or irregularities concerning the security of the certified ICT product, ICT service or ICT process that may have an impact on its compliance with the requirements related to the certification” (Art. 56(8)).
To implement the Cybersecurity Act, each EU Member State must designate at least one national cybersecurity certification authority for the purposes of issuing certificates and supervising a scheme’s compliance (Art. 58). To ensure compliance, a national cybersecurity certification authority may, for instance, “carry out investigations, in the form of audits, of conformity assessment bodies, 47 European cybersecurity certificates’ holders and issuers of EU statements of conformity” (Art. 58(8), point (b)). National cybersecurity certification authorities shall actively participate in the ECCG (Art. 58(6)). National cybersecurity certification authorities must share a report outlining actions on specific activities with ENISA and the ECCG on an annual basis (Art. 58(7), point (g)). On the Union level, national cybersecurity certification authorities shall collaborate with their counterparts in other Member States as well as the Commission, especially in relation to “exchanging information, experience and good practices” (Art. 58(9)). To contribute to a harmonious application of European cybersecurity certification schemes, the activities and processes of a national cybersecurity certification authority may be reviewed by their peers (at least two national cybersecurity certification authorities of other Member States, Art. 59). A year after the adoption of a European cybersecurity certification scheme, the Commission is tasked with publishing a list of all EU-wide conformity assessment bodies (Art. 61(2)).
On a regular basis and at least every two years, the Commission shall “assess the efficiency and use of the adopted European cybersecurity certification schemes” (Art. 56(3)). This should also include evaluating “whether a specific European cybersecurity certification scheme is to be made mandatory through relevant Union law to ensure an adequate level of cybersecurity of ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes in the Union and improve the functioning of the internal market” (Art. 56(3)). 48
Review
|
Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Commission |
Evaluation of
|
28 June 2024 |
Every five years thereafter |
Art. 67(1) |
|
Commission |
Submission of a report on the evaluation, with the findings to be publicized -> European Parliament, Council and ENISA’s Management Board |
28 June 2024 |
Every five years thereafter
|
Art. 67(4) |
Electronic Communications Networks
— 5G-Related Policies
In March 2019, the Commission published its 📄 Recommendation on the cybersecurity of 5G networks 49 , inter alia, recommending the establishment of a dedicated NIS Cooperation Group work stream and laying the basis for the adoption of subsequent EU policies in the area of 5G. In October 2019, the NIS Cooperation Group published an EU coordinated risk assessment of the cybersecurity of 5G networks, which builds upon prior national risk assessments shared by EU Member States. The 5G risk assessment identifies five main risk categories and nine related particular risk scenarios:
Table 19: Risks and Risk Scenarios Relating to 5G [this table reproduces Table 1 contained within the EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures (p. 5)]
|
Category of Risk |
Risk Scenario |
|---|---|
|
Insufficient security measures |
1: Misconfiguration of networks |
|
2: Lack of access controls |
|
|
5G supply chain |
3: Low product quality |
|
4: Dependency on any single supplier within individual networks or lack of diversity on nation-wide basis |
|
|
Modus operandi of main threat actors |
5: State interference through 5G supply chain |
|
6: Exploitation of 5G networks by organised crime or organised crime group targeting end-users |
|
|
Interdependencies between 5G networks and other critical systems |
7: Significant disruption of critical infrastructures or services |
|
8: Massive failure of networks due to interruption of electricity supply or other support systems |
|
|
End user devices |
9: Exploitation of IoT, handsets or smart devices |
In December 2019, the Council adopted 📄 Conclusions on the significance of 5G to the European Economy and the need to mitigate security risks linked to 5G, which call upon “Member States and the Commission with the support of ENISA to take all necessary measures within their competences to ensure the security and integrity of electronic communication networks, in particular 5G networks” (p. 9). Subsequently, in January 2020, the NIS Cooperation Group adopted a 📄 “EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures” in relation to the cybersecurity of 5G networks. 50 The Toolbox was subsequently endorsed by both the Commission and the European Council. Building upon the risks identified in the coordinated risk assessment, the Cybersecurity 5G Toolbox outlines a catalog of 19 either strategic or technical mitigation measures, which are complemented by ten supporting actions. 51 Strategic measures, inter alia, include the expansion of national regulatory powers and the strengthening of domestic resilience. 52 On a technical level, the Toolbox stipulates concrete measures that involve, for example, the “application of baseline security requirements”, an “evaluati[on of] the implementation of security measures in existing 5G standards” and the enhancement of “software integrity, update and patch management” (p. 12). 53 The measures are particularly aimed at mobile network operators and telecom equipment manufacturers and are envisioned for implementation by both Member State entities and EUIBAs. It is at a Member State’s discretion “to assess whether it has the resources to enforce the measure or if there is a need to cooperate with other Member States or at EU level” (p. 16). The Toolbox comprises two aspects: First, it describes the various measures, specifies which of the nine identified risk scenarios it serves to mitigate and designates which actors 54 may be involved in their implementation (see further Table 1 in Annex 1). In the second step, the Toolbox draws up risk mitigation plans for each of the nine risk scenarios. Such a risk mitigation plan stipulates each, which of the 19 measures are “most relevant/high-impact,” evaluates their “expected effectiveness” ranging from very high to low, includes potential positive and negative “implementation factors,” and concludes with an “indicative timeframe” for the implementation of each measure (see further Table 3 on page 15 and Table 2 in Annex 1).
In June 2023, the Commission followed up with a 📄 Communication on the implementation of the 5G cybersecurity toolbox. In its Communication, the Commission, inter alia, highlights that it “considers [...] decisions adopted by Member States to restrict or exclude Huawei and ZTE [as] justified and compliant with the 5G Toolbox” (p. 3), since these suppliers would “in fact [represent] materially higher risks than other 5G suppliers” (p. 3). In taking stock of the status quo of the Toolbox’s implementation, the Commission “urges Member States that have not yet implemented the Toolbox to adopt urgently relevant measures as recommended in the EU Toolbox” (p. 4). Looking inward, the Commission also announced that it would itself initiate measures to “avoid exposure of its corporate communications to mobile networks using Huawei and ZTE as suppliers”, for instance, by “mak[ing] sure that those suppliers are progressively phased out from existing connectivity services of the Commission sites” (p. 4). Further, the Commission recommends other EUIBAs to do the same.
— Radio Equipment Directive
📄 Commission Delegated Regulation 2022/30 supplements the 📄 Radio Equipment Directive (RED, 2014). The Directive “establishes a regulatory framework for the making available on the market and putting into service in the Union of radio equipment” 55 (Art. 1(1) RED), and the Delegated Regulation further specifies particular essential requirements for radio equipment. Their specification is of cybersecurity relevance, as the “protection of the network or its functioning from harm [Art. 3(3), point (d) RED], protection of personal data and privacy of the user [Art. 3(3), point (e) RED] and of the subscriber and protection from fraud [Art. 3(3), point (f) RED] are [considered as] elements that support protection against cybersecurity risks” (recital (1), Commission Delegated Regulation 2022/30). Against this backdrop, the Delegated Regulation extends the scope of these requirements to “any radio equipment that can communicate itself over the internet, whether it communicates directly or via any other equipment” (Art. 1(1)). The essential requirements contained in the RED create obligations for economic operators. For instance, manufacturers must guarantee that both their design and radio equipment manufacturing comply with these requirements (Art. 10(1) RED). Member States, in turn, are tasked with “tak[ing] appropriate measures to ensure that radio equipment is made available on the market only if it complies with this Directive” (Art. 6 RED) when implementing and applying the RED.
— Electronic Communications Code
The 📄 Directive on the European Electronic Communications Code (2018) outlines rules for electronic communication networks and services. Among other things, it establishes that Member States must “ensure that providers of public electronic communications networks or of publicly available electronic communications services take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to appropriately manage the risks posed to the security of networks and services” (Art. 40(1)). 56 Such measures should mainly aim at “prevent[ing] and minimi[zing] the impact of security incidents 57 on users and on other networks and services” (Art. 40(1)). To contribute to the similarity of specific requirements throughout the EU, ENISA is tasked with supporting coordination among Member States. In addition to taking risk management measures, the providers in the scope of the Electronic Communications Code must also, “without undue delay,” notify a Member State’s respective competent authority of a “security incident that has had a significant impact on the operation of networks or services” (Art. 40(2)). To decide whether a security incident is significant, the Directive lists five parameters for consideration:
-
the “number of users affected;”
-
“duration;”
-
“geographical spread of the area affected;”
-
“extent to which the functioning of the network or service is affected;”
-
and “extent of impact on economic and societal activities” (Art. 40(2)).
Member States, via their competent authorities, shall inform each other and ENISA of such incidents if necessary. On an annual basis, the competent authorities must share with the Commission and ENISA a “summary report [...] on the notifications received and the action taken” (Art. 40(2)). To ensure supervision and compliance with this Directive, Member States shall, inter alia, equip their competent authorities with the powers to “issue binding instructions” to providers, for instance, on “measures required to remedy a security incident” (Art. 41(1)), requiring the provision of information by providers (Art. 41 (2)) and receiving support from the national CSIRT (Art. 4(4)). Competent authorities designated under both the Electronic Communications Code and the NIS 2 Directive shall “consult and cooperate” with each other “where appropriate” (Art. 41(5)).
Product Safety and Market Surveillance
— Regulation on General Product Safety
The 📄 Regulation on general product safety (2023) “lays down essential rules on the safety of consumer products placed or made available on the market” (Art. 1(2)). Its objective is to ensure a “high level of consumer protection” (Art. 1(1)). As a general rule, “only safe products 58 ” may be placed or made available in the internal market (Art. 5). In order to be considered safe, a product must “under normal or reasonably foreseeable conditions of use, including the actual duration of use, [...] not present any risk or only the minimum risks compatible with the product’s use, [be] considered acceptable and consistent with a high level of protection of the health and safety of consumers” (Art. 3, point (2)). With respect to cybersecurity, the determination of a product’s safety may include assessing whether, “when required by the nature of the product, the appropriate cybersecurity features necessary to protect the product against external influences, [...] where such an influence might have an impact on the safety of the product” (Art. 6(1), point (g)) were accommodated. The Regulation further notes in its recital that “specific cybersecurity risks affecting the safety of consumers [...] can be dealt with by sectoral legislation” (recital (26)).
— Regulation on Machinery
The 📄 Regulation on machinery (2023) defines “health and safety requirements for the design and construction of machinery [...] to allow them to be made available on the market or put into service while ensuring a high level of protection of the health and safety of persons” (Art. 1). In relation to cybersecurity, the Regulation establishes links with EU cybersecurity certification schemes, as these may be used to demonstrate conformity with the requirements specified in the Regulation (Art. 20(9)). At the same time, the Regulation stresses in its recital that it “does not preclude the application to products within the scope of this Regulation of other Union legal acts specifically addressing cybersecurity aspects” (recital (25)).
— Regulation on Medical Devices & Regulation on in Vitro Diagnostic Medical Devices
The 📄 Regulation on medical devices (2017) and the 📄 Regulation on in vitro diagnostic medical devices (2017) “lay[...] down rules concerning [their] placing on the market, making available on the market or putting into service [...] in the Union” (Art. 1(1), Regulation 2017/746 and Art. 1(1) Regulation 2017/745). Both, inter alia, specify safety requirements for “electronic programmable systems”, defined as “devices that incorporate electronic programmable systems and software that are devices in themselves” (Annex I). In this respect, the regulations stipulate that “the software shall be developed and manufactured in accordance with the state of the art taking into account the principles of development life cycle, risk management, including information security, verification and validation” (Annex I, 16 Regulation 2017/746 and Annex I, 17 Regulation 2017/745). In addition, manufacturers must comply with “set[ting] out minimum requirements concerning [...] IT security measures” (Annex I, 16.4 Regulation 2017/746 and Annex I, 17.4 Regulation 2017/745). The Regulation on medical devices mandated the development of a European database on medical devices (Euramed), on whose rules the Commission adopted 📄 Implementing Regulation 2021/2078. The Implementing Regulation stipulates that in relation to IT security and as a general rule, Euramed must adhere to Commission Decision 2017/46. 59 Inter alia, the Commission must provide a document that specifies “information security requirements for data exchange” (Art. 10(1)). Moreover, the Implementing Regulation lays out that when faced with a potentially harmful IT security incident, risk, or threat, the Commission may decide to suspend access to or functionalities of Euramed (Art. 10(3) and (4)).
— Regulation on Vehicle Type-Approval
The 📄 Regulation on vehicle type-approval (2020) determines that particular categories of vehicles must meet outlined requirements, for instance, when it comes to “on-board instruments, electrical system, vehicle lighting and [their] protection against unauthorised use including cyberattacks” (Art. 4(5) (d)). In the area of cybersecurity, vehicle manufacturers must meet the requirements specified in UN Regulation No 155, setting out “uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regards to cybersecurity and cybersecurity management system”.
Electronic Identification
— eIDAS Regulation
The 📄 Regulation on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market (eIDAS Regulation, 2014) together with a 📄 2024 Regulation establishing the European Digital Identity Framework and a complementing 📄 Commission Implementing Regulation 2015/1502 provide rules for attaining “an adequate level of security of electronic identification 60 means 61 and trust services 62 used across the Union” (Art. 1). To this end, the Regulation, inter alia, lays down rules for European Digital Identity Wallets 63 and electronic identification schemes. Such schemes are “system[s] for electronic identification under which electronic identification means are issued to natural or legal persons or natural persons representing other natural persons or legal persons” (Art. 3, point (4)) 64 which shall specify levels of assurance levels, such as low, substantial or high (Art. 8). As part of an electronic identification scheme, the Regulation foresees the creation of European Digital Identity Wallets. The Regulation tasks Member States to “provide at least one European Digital Identity Wallet” within a specified timeframe (following the adoption of implementing acts by the Commission) in order to “ensur[e] that all natural and legal persons in the Union have secure, trusted and seamless cross-border access to public and private services, while having full control over their data” (Art. 5a(1)). In addition to use cases for users and technical specifications, the Regulation stipulates that “European Digital Identity Wallets shall ensure security-by-design” (Art. 5a(12)) and “Member State shall inform users, without delay, of any security breach that could have entirely or partially compromised their European Digital Identity Wallet or its contents” (Art. 5a(6)). When they concern cybersecurity, European Digital Identity Wallets shall be certified in the framework of European cybersecurity certification schemes as provided for by the Cybersecurity Act (Art. 5c(2)). In cases such a scheme(s) “do not, or only partially, cover those cybersecurity requirements [...] Member States shall establish national certification schemes” (Art. 5c(3)). The Commission is tasked with “establish[ing] a list of reference standards and, where necessary, establish specifications and procedures for the certification of European Digital Identity Wallets” (Art. 5c(6)) by 21 November 2024. In terms of review, the Regulation mandates the Commission to assess, “within 24 months after deployment of the European Digital Identity Wallets,” the “demand for, and the availability and usability of, European Digital Identity Wallets” (Art. 5f(5)). The Regulation determines that not only the European Digital Identity Wallets but also the “conformity of electronic identification schemes to be notified with the cybersecurity requirements laid down in this Regulation [...] shall be certified by conformity assessment bodies designated by Member States” (Art. 12a(1)). In principle, such certification “shall be carried out under a relevant cybersecurity certification scheme pursuant to [the Cybersecurity Act] or parts thereof, insofar as the cybersecurity certificate or parts thereof cover those cybersecurity requirements” (Art. 12a(3)). Once provided, respective certifications shall have a temporal validity of five years, on the condition that “a vulnerability assessment is carried out every two years” (Art. 12a(3)). 65
The Regulation further designates how Member States have to act in instances of security breaches for electronic identification schemes 66 in general and European Digital Identity Wallets in particular 67 .
Table 20: Actions to Be Taken by Member States Following Security Breaches
|
|
Electronic Identification Schemes (Art. 10) |
European Digital Identity Wallet (Art. 5e) |
|---|---|---|
|
When |
“breached or partly compromised in a manner that affects the reliability of the cross-border authentication of that scheme” (Art. 10(1)) |
“breached or partly compromised in a manner that affects their reliability or the reliability of other European Digital Identity Wallets” (Art. 5e(1)) |
|
General |
|
Art. 5e (1):
|
|
No remediation within three months of suspension/revocation |
|
Art. 5e (2):
|
|
Remediated breach or incident |
|
Art. 5e (3):
|
The Regulation also defines security requirements for trust service providers. In accordance, both “qualified and non-qualified trust service providers shall take appropriate technical and organisational measures to manage the risks posed to the security of the trust services they provide” (Art. 19(1)) referencing the cybersecurity risk management measures contained in the NIS 2 Directive (Art. 19a(1), point (a) and Art. 20(1), see further Art. 21 Directive).
The Regulation further specifies reporting requirements on these trust service providers when “any breach of security or loss of integrity that has a significant impact on the trust service provided or on the personal data maintained therein” (Art. 19(2)) occurs. The Regulation foresees the following actions to be taken by trust service providers and supervisory authorities:
Table 21: Reporting Requirements by Trust Service Providers and Notified Supervisory Authorities
|
Tasks to Be Undertaken by Trust Service Providers |
Tasks to Be Undertaken by Notified Supervisory Authorities |
|---|---|
|
Art. 19(2):
|
|
Member States are required to publicize, inter alia, statistics on “significant security incidents, data breaches and affected users of European Digital Identity Wallets or of qualified trust services” in “an open and commonly used, machine-readable format” (Art. 48a(2), point (e)).
With regard to governance, the Regulation directs Member States to designate supervisory authorities for the supervision of the European Digital Identity Framework and trust services (Art. 46a and 46b). Among their tasks is informing the competent authorities designated pursuant to the NIS 2 Directive “of the Member States concerned of any significant security breaches or loss of integrity of which they become aware in the performance of their tasks” and, “in the case of a significant security breach or loss of integrity which concerns other Member States,” informing the respective SPOCs designated pursuant to the NIS 2 Directive and this Regulation in the Member States affected (Art. 46a(4), point (c) and Art. 46b(4), point (a)). Member States shall further determine a “single point of contact [SPOC] for trust services, European Digital Identity Wallets and notified electronic identification schemes” (Art. 46c). This SPOC is tasked with “exercis[ing] a liaison function to facilitate cross-border cooperation between the supervisory bodies for trust service providers and between the supervisory bodies for the providers of European Digital Identity Wallets and, where appropriate, with the Commission and European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and with other competent authorities within its Member State” (Art. 46c(2)). The Regulation also provides a legal basis for the provision of mutual assistance among Member States (Art. 46d) and establishes the European Digital Identity Cooperation Group 68 (Art. 46e).
Data Protection and Data Economy
— General Data Protection Regulation
The 📄 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR, 2016) outlines conditions and limits for the lawfulness of processing data. It creates obligations for controllers and processors of data located within the EU “regardless of whether the processing [itself] takes place in the Union or not” (Art. 3(1)). As one of its six overarching general principles, the Regulation stipulates that personal data must be “processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures (‘integrity and confidentiality’)” (Art. 5(1), point (f)). In further detail, the GDPR also includes a provision outlining security requirements for the processing of data (Art. 32). Accordingly, controllers and processors of personal data must “implement appropriate technical and organisational measures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk” (Art. 32(1)). As examples of such measures, the GDPR lists:
-
“the pseudonymisation and encryption of personal data;”
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“the ability to ensure the ongoing confidentiality, integrity, availability and resilience of processing systems and services;”
-
“the ability to restore the availability and access to personal data in a timely manner in the event of a physical or technical incident;”
-
and “a process for regularly testing, assessing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical and organisational measures for ensuring the security of the processing” (Art. 32(1)).
When a controller experiences a breach in relation to the personal data it processes, it “shall without undue delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become aware of it” report it to its respective supervisory authority, “unless the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons” (Art. 33). EU Member States are, inter alia, responsible for monitoring the application and compliance of controllers and processors with the GDPR and are tasked with “promot[ing] public awareness and understanding of the risks, rules, safeguards and rights in relation to processing” (Art. 57).
— Data Governance Act
The 📄 Regulation on European data governance (Data Governance Act, 2022), inter alia, establishes the European Data Innovation Board. Tasks of the Board comprise “advis[ing] and assist[ing] the Commission with regard to developing consistent guidelines for cybersecurity requirements for the exchange and storage of data” (Art. 30, point (e)) and “propos[ing] guidelines for common European data spaces, namely purpose- or sector-specific or cross-sectoral interoperable frameworks of common standards and practices to share or jointly process data [...] addressing [...] adherence to cybersecurity requirements in accordance with Union law” (Art. 30, point (h)). ENISA is among the Board’s members. Further, in relation to non-personal data, the Regulation specifies that “data intermediation services provider[s] shall take necessary measures to ensure an appropriate level of security for the[ir] storage, processing and transmission” and, concerning “competitively sensitive information,” highlights that “data intermediation services provider[s] shall [...] ensure the highest level of security for the[ir] storage and transmission” (Art. 12).
General Rules
— Chips Act
The 📄 Chips Act (2023) provides “a framework for strengthening the semiconductor ecosystem at Union level” (Art. 1(1)). It addresses cybersecurity considerations in so far that the established Chips for Europe Initiative also includes the construction of chips based upon security-by-design principles among its operational objective 1 (“building up advanced design capacities for integrated semiconductor technologies,” Art. 5(a), point (ii)), as this can “provide protection against cybersecurity threats” (Art. 4(1)).
— Digital Markets Act
The 📄 Digital Markets Act (2022) specifies “harmonised rules ensuring for all businesses, contestable and fair markets in the digital sector across the Union where gatekeepers are present, to the benefit of business users and end users” (Art. 1(1)). To this end, it lays down obligations for so-called gatekeepers, which are defined as “an undertaking providing core platform services” (Art. 2, point (a)) and further meet specific characteristics such as having “a significant impact on the internal market” (Art. 3(1), point (a) and further specified in Art. 3(2)). Gatekeepers shall, inter alia, ensure that when meeting their obligations under the Digital Markets Act Articles 5-7, the “implementation of those measures complies with [...] legislation on cyber security” (Art. 8(1)). The power to “monitor the effective implementation and compliance with [these] obligations” (Art. 26(1)) rests with the Commission.
Council Conclusions and Resolutions
— Council Conclusions on ICT Supply Chain Security
The 📄 Council conclusions on ICT supply chain security (October 2022) highlight various cross-sectoral and cyber-specific instruments as well as supporting mechanisms to increase the security of ICT supply chains, inter alia, in an effort to seek “strategic autonomy while preserving an open economy” (p. 5). The Conclusions note the need for an “all-hazard approach [...] in securing ICT assets” (p. 4). It classifies ICT supply chain security to include the “protection of ICT products and services produced, delivered, procured and used in ICT supply chains, including by means of protecting individual components and transmitted data” (p. 4). Among the cross-sectoral instruments and approaches, Member States delineate the “avoidance of vendor lock-in and the diversification of ICT suppliers as one of the important components for ensuring stability and security of the internal market” (p. 7) and take further note that the “EU’s Foreign Direct Investment Screening mechanism 69 [...] could also be applied as a useful tool for safeguarding security and resilience of the ICT supply chain” (p. 8). The Conclusions also refer to public procurement as a possible tool and therefore invite the Commission, inter alia, to “develop methodological guidelines [...] to encourage the contracting authorities to put appropriate focus on the cybersecurity practices of tenderers and their subcontractors” (p. 7). As part of the cyber-specific instruments, Member States refer to the EU 5G Toolbox, 70 existing horizontal and sector-specific legislation, respective legislative initiatives such as the Cyber Resilience Act and efforts underway to develop cybersecurity certification schemes. EU Member States further encourage ENISA to perform three specific tasks: conducting a best practices stocktaking exercise on supply chain risk management (supported by the NIS Cooperation Group), developing “methodological guidelines” on that basis, as well as “monitor[ing of] investments in the ICT supply chain security of the entities regulated under the forthcoming NIS 2 Directive” (p. 11). EU Member States further express the invitation to the NIS Cooperation Group (supported by the Commission and ENISA) “to develop a toolbox of measures for reducing critical ICT supply chain risks” on the basis of “strategic threat scenarios identified for ICT supply chains” (p. 13) – the ICT Supply Chain Toolbox. With respect to the mandate of other actors at EU level, the Conclusions “invite[...] the ECCC to take into account the ICT supply chain security aspects, including, for instance, secure software development, into their Strategic Agenda” (p. 14). Finally, as so-called supporting mechanisms, the Conclusions, for example, list “boosting financial support incentives related to measures aimed at strengthening ICT supply chain security” (p. 15), for instance, in the framework of Digital Europe 71 or Horizon Europe 72 and leveraging, at the global level, “digital partnerships, cyber dialogues and other relevant EU initiatives, [...] for the promotion of risk-based evaluations of ICT product suppliers and ICT services providers” (p. 16).
— Council Conclusions on the Cybersecurity of Connected Devices
The 📄 Council conclusions on the cybersecurity of connected devices (December 2020), inter alia, stress the necessity of “a high level of complementarity and comparability of security functionalities of ICT systems and ICT components, which are used in many different sectors of the Digital Single Market” (p. 4) and take positive note of “current developments at Union level to raise the level of cybersecurity of connected devices” (p. 4), for instance, via the Radio Equipment Directive or the development of cybersecurity certification schemes. In order to elevate the level of cybersecurity across connected devices, the Conclusions “call [...] for coordination and close cooperation with all relevant public and private stakeholders, also in view of a possible future horizontal legislation” (p. 5). Specifically with respect to cybersecurity certification, EU Member States underline “the need to establish cybersecurity norms, standards or technical specifications for connected devices” (p. 5) and encourage further respective activities by European Standards Organisations, such as the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). The Conclusions further invite “the Commission to consider a request for a candidate cybersecurity certification schemes for connected devices and related services” (p. 6) and note their appreciation for “a discussion on how the goal of cybersecurity could be anchored in a future horizontal legislation that covers cybersecurity risks related to connected devices” (p. 6).
— Council Resolution on Encryption
The 📄Council Resolution on Encryption (November 2020) calls for adherence to “the principle of security through encryption and security despite encryption [...] in its entirety” (p. 4). The Resolution highlights the need for striking a balance on the basis of “necessity, proportionality and subsidiarity” between “protecting the privacy and security of communications through encryption” on the one and “upholding the possibility for competent authorities in the area of security and criminal justice to lawfully access relevant data for legitimate, clearly defined purposes in fighting serious and/or organized crimes and terrorism, including in the digital world, and upholding the rule of law” on the other hand (p. 4). The Resolution further notes the possibility of exploring the development of a dedicated EU-wide regulatory framework in this regard (p. 5). EU Member States also stress their support for further promoting and developing encryption as “an anchor of confidence in digitalisation and in protection of fundamental rights” (p. 4), for instance, by engaging in “active discussion” (p. 4) and cooperation with the tech industry.
Policy Area 3: Economic, Monetary and Commercial Policy
Deep Dive: Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA)
|
📄 Regulation on digital operational resilience for the financial sector (2022/2554) |
|---|
|
Entry into force: 16 January 2023 Date of application: 17 January 2025 |
|
Previous legislation: NA |
|
Subsequent documents of relevance [for other non-legislative acts under preparation pursuant to DORA, see further Chapter 14]: |
|
Objective (Art. 1(1)): “achieve a high common level of digital operational resilience” |
|
Subject matter (Art. 1): “This Regulation lays down uniform requirements concerning the security of network and information systems supporting the business processes of financial entities as follows:
|
|
Actors established/regulated by the DORA Regulation:
|
|
Deep Dive Structure -> Scope -> Competent Authorities -> ICT Risk Management by Financial Entities -> ICT-related Incident Management, Classification and Reporting -> Digital Operational Resilience Testing -> ICT Third-Party Risk Management -> Supervision and Enforcement -> Regulatory and Implementing Technical Standards -> Review |
Scope
DORA places information and cybersecurity-related obligations on financial entities, for instance, credit institutions, payment institutions, or investment firms, to attain a “high common level of digital operational resilience” (Art. 1(1)). 73 The Regulation defines digital operational resilience as “the ability of a financial entity to build, assure and review its operational integrity and reliability by ensuring, either directly or indirectly through the use of services provided by ICT third-party service providers, the full range of ICT-related capabilities needed to address the security of the network and information systems which a financial entity uses, and which support the continued provision of financial services and their quality, including throughout disruptions” (Art. 3, point (1)). It applies the NIS 2 Directive’s definition of security of network and information systems. For financial entities that are also designated as essential or important entities under the NIS 2 Directive, DORA functions as “a sector-specific Union legal act” (Art. 1(2)). The DORA Regulation lays down a ‘proportionality principle,’ according to which the implementation of rules on ICT risk management (Chapter II) and the application of provisions on (a) ICT-related incident management, classification and reporting (Chapter III); (b) digital operational resilience testing (Chapter IV); and (c) ICT-third party risk management (Chapter V, Section I) shall either “take into account” or “be proportionate” to the financial entities’ “size and overall risk profile, and the nature, scale and complexity of their services, activities and operations” (Art. 4(1) and (2)).
Competent Authorities
The competent authorities for supervising compliance with the DORA Regulation depend on the type of financial entity and further applicable legal bases. They shall closely cooperate with each other (Art. 48(1)). For instance, for credit institutions, this is the competent authority designated under Directive 2013/36 (for a complete list of entities and their competent authorities see Art. 46). To ensure cooperation, both the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) 74 and the competent authorities “may participate in the activities of the [NIS] Cooperation Group for matters that concern their supervisory activities in relation to financial entities” and “may request to be invited to participate in the activities of the [NIS] Cooperation Group for matters in relation to essential or important entities [...] that have also been designated as critical ICT third-party service providers” within the DORA Regulation (Art. 47(1)). Article 47 also provides a basis for consultations and information-sharing among the DORA’s competent authorities with the SPOCs and CSIRTs designated under the NIS 2 Directive (Art. 47(2)). Competent authorities under the DORA Regulation “may request any relevant technical advice and assistance” on the part of NIS 2’s competent authority and both may formalize their cooperation through “cooperation agreements” (Art. 47(3)). Furthermore, the competent authorities shall engage in close cooperation and “exchange information to carry out their duties pursuant to Articles 47 to 54” with the ESAs and the European Central Bank (ECB) (Art. 48(2)). To ensure cooperation across the financial sector, the DORA Regulation foresees that the ESA Joint Committee (JC) together with the Member States’ competent authorities and other actors may “establish mechanisms to enable the sharing of effective practices across financial sectors to enhance situational awareness and identify common cyber vulnerabilities and risks across sectors” as well as “develop crisis management and contingency exercises involving cyber-attack scenarios with a view to developing communication channels and gradually enabling an effective coordinated response at Union level” (Art. 49(1)).
ICT Risk Management by Financial Entities
The DORA Regulation defines ICT risk as “any reasonably identifiable circumstance in relation to the use of network and information systems which, if materialised, may compromise the security of the network and information systems, of any technology dependent tool or process, of operations and processes, or of the provision of services by producing adverse effects in the digital or physical environment” (Art. 3, point (5)). To counter respective circumstances, financial entities are required to have an “internal governance and control framework that ensures an effective and prudent management of ICT risk” (Art. 5(1)), for whose development and implementation a financial entity's management body holds responsibility (Art. 5(2)). In addition to ensuring compliance with these governance-related ICT risk management requirements, DORA further requires that financial entities have a “sound, comprehensive and well-documented ICT risk management framework [in place] as part of their overall risk management system, which enables them to address ICT risk quickly, efficiently and comprehensively and to ensure a high level of digital operational resilience” (Art. 6(1)). This comprises, inter alia, at least “strategies, policies, procedures, ICT protocols and tools that are necessary to duly and adequately protect all information assets and ICT assets” (Art. 6(2)), which must be documented. In relation to strategies, financial entities must adopt a digital operational resilience strategy “setting out how the framework shall be implemented” (Art. 6(8)). As part of the strategy, financial entities shall, for instance, specify “clear information security objectives, including key performance indicators and key risk metrics” and elaborate on “different mechanisms put in place to detect ICT-related incidents, prevent their impact and provide protection from it” (Art. 6(8), points (c) and (e)). Financial entities shall review the framework annually or upon major incidents, supervisory instructions, or other relevant information (Art. 6(5)).
The ICT risk management framework further encompasses the following elements:
Table 22: Overview of ICT Risk Management Framework Elements
|
Elements |
Examples |
|---|---|
|
ICT systems, protocols, and tools (Art. 7) |
|
|
Identification (Art. 8) |
|
|
Protection and prevention (Art. 9) |
|
|
Detection (Art. 10) |
|
|
Response and recovery (Art. 11) |
|
|
Backup policies and procedures, restoration and recovery procedures and methods (Art. 12) |
|
|
Learning and evolving (Art. 13) |
|
|
Communication (Art. 14) |
|
For specific types of entities, the requirement of a “simplified ICT risk management framework” applies (see further Art. 16). As a contribution to the harmonization of ICT risk management tools, methods, processes and policies as part of the ICT risk management framework, DORA tasks the ESAs together with ENISA to “develop common draft regulatory technical standards” in various areas and elements of the simplified framework by 17 January 2024 (Art. 15 and 16). 75 DORA further provides a foundation for financial entities to “exchange amongst themselves cyber threat information and intelligence” when such exchange meets specific objectives and is conducted based on “information-sharing arrangements” (Art. 45(1)). Financial entities shall inform their competent authority of their participation or withdrawal from these arrangements (Art. 45(3)).
ICT-Related Incident Management, Classification and Reporting
In order to “detect, manage and notify ICT-related incidents”, financial entities must put in place an “ICT-related incident management process” and ensure a recording of “all ICT-related incidents and significant cyber threats” (Art. 17). The Regulation defines an ICT-related incident as “a single event or a series of linked events unplanned by the financial entity that compromises the security of the network and information systems, and have an adverse impact on the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of data, or on the services provided by the financial entity” (Art. 3, point (8)). A significant cyber threat is defined as a “cyber threat the technical characteristics of which indicate that it could have the potential to result in a major ICT-related incident 76 or a major operational or security payment-related incident” (Art. 3, point (13)). 77 Requirements of Articles 17-22 are also applicable to “operational or security payment-related incidents and to major operational or security payment-related incidents, where they concern credit institutions, payment institutions, account information service providers, and electronic money institutions” 78 (Art. 23).
A financial entities’ ICT-related incident management process, shall include the following elements:
-
existence of “early warning indicators;”
-
establishment of “procedures to identify, track, log, categorise and classify ICT-related incidents according to their priority and severity and according to the criticality of the services impacted;”
-
designation of “roles and responsibilities that need to be activated for different ICT-related incident types and scenarios;”
-
development of communication plans as specified in Article 14 and plans for client notification, “internal escalation procedures” and information-sharing with counterparts;
-
guarantee that “relevant senior management” are reported to and the management board is being informed of “at least major ICT-related incidents [...] explaining [to them] the impact, response and additional controls to be established as a result of such ICT-related incidents;”
-
and establishment of “ICT-related incident response procedures to mitigate impacts and ensure that services become operational and secure in a timely manner” (Art. 17(3)).
Moreover, financial entities are required to classify ICT-related incidents and evaluate their impact, inter alia, based on these considerations:
-
“number and/or relevance of clients or financial counterparts affected;”
-
“duration of the ICT-related incident;”
-
“geographical spread;”
-
involved “data losses [...] in relation to availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of data;”
-
“criticality of the services affected;”
-
and “economic impact” (Art. 18(1)).
The ESAs, upon consultation with the ECB and ENISA, are tasked with further specifying these criteria, among other aspects, by “develop[ing] common draft regulatory technical standards” (Art. 18(3)).
When a major ICT-related incident occurs, financial entities shall notify them to their respective competent authority (Art. 19(1)). 79
Table 23: Overview of DORA’s Incident Reporting Obligations
|
I. Action to be taken by financial entity |
|
|---|---|
|
(a) “without undue delay as soon as they become aware” |
(b) “within the time limits [...] laid down in” common draft regulatory technical standards |
|
Notification of clients about major ICT-related incidents and the “measures that have been taken to mitigate the adverse effects of such incident” (Art. 19(3)) |
-> competent authority (Art. 19(4)) [1]:
|
|
[1] The Regulation also foresees the possibility that “Member States may additionally determine that some or all financial entities shall also provide the initial notification and each report [...] to the competent authorities or the computer security incident response teams (CSIRTs) designated or established” under the NIS 2 Directive (Art. 19(1)). A similar possibility is specified in relation to the voluntary notification of significant cyber threats (Art. 19(2)). |
|
|
II. Action to be taken by competent authority |
|
|---|---|
|
(a) Upon receipt of initial notification and each report “in a timely manner” |
(b) Upon notification by EBA, ESMA or EIOPA [as specified in III] |
|
“Where appropriate, take all of the necessary measures to protect the immediate stability of the financial system” (Art. 19(7)) |
|
[2] In particular, this may involve the “making available any relevant anonymised information and intelligence on similar threats” or “discuss remedies applied at the level of the financial entity and ways to minimise and mitigate adverse impact across the financial sector” (Art. 22(1)). |
|
|
III. Action to be taken by “EBA, ESMA, or EIOPA and the ECB, in consultation with ENISA and in cooperation with the relevant competent authority” |
|
|---|---|
|
“following receipt of information” by competent authority [as specified in II (a)] |
|
|
Assessment “whether the major ICT-related incident is relevant for competent authorities in other Member States” and notification of relevant competent authorities in other Member States “as soon as possible” (Art. 19(7)) |
Irrespective of any feedback received by the respective competent authority (II (a)), “financial entities shall remain fully responsible for the handling and for consequences of the ICT-related incidents reported” (Art. 22(1)). Voluntarily, financial entities can also share “significant cyber threats to the relevant competent authority when they deem the threat to be of relevance to the financial system, service users or clients” with their competent authorities (Art. 19(2)). The ESAs are tasked to
-
with the involvement of ENISA and the ECB:
-
draft “common draft regulatory technical standards [RTS],” inter alia, “establish[ing] the content of the reports for major ICT-related incidents” and “determin[ing] the time limits for the initial notification and for each report referred to in Article 19(4)” (Art. 20, point (a)) [1];
-
draft “common draft implementing technical standards” (ITS) on “standard forms, templates and procedures for financial entities to report a major ICT-related incident and to notify a significant cyber threat” (Art. 20, point (b));
-
and compile a “joint report assessing the feasibility of further centralisation of incident reporting through the establishment of a single EU Hub for major ICT-related incident reporting by financial entities” (Art. 21),
-
-
through the Joint Committee, “report yearly on major ICT-related incidents [...] setting out at least the number of major ICT-related incidents, their nature and their impact on the operations of financial entities or clients, remedial actions taken and costs incurred” (Art. 22(2));
-
“issue warnings and produce high-level statistics to support ICT threat and vulnerability assessments” (Art. 22(2)).
[1] In the drafting of these RTS, the ESAs shall maintain “a consistent approach to ICT-related incident reporting” (Art. 20, point (a)) that is in line with the NIS 2 Directive (or otherwise justify any related deviations). Furthermore, in relation to DORA’s particular scope, the ESAs “shall take into account the size and the overall risk profile of the financial entity, and the nature, scale and complexity of its services, activities and operations, and in particular, [...] different time limits may reflect, as appropriate, specificities of financial sectors” (Art. 20, point (a)).
|
Who |
What |
When |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
|
ESAs |
Submission of a joint report on the “feasibility of further centralisation of incident reporting through the establishment of a single EU Hub for major ICT-related incident reporting by financial entities” -> European Parliament, Council and Commission |
17 January 2025 |
Art. 21(3) |
|
ESAs |
Report on major ICT-related incidents through Joint Committee |
On an annual basis |
Art. 22(2) |
Digital Operational Resilience Testing
Financial entities shall “establish, maintain and review a sound and comprehensive digital operational resilience testing programme as an integral part of the[ir] ICT risk-management framework” (Art. 24(1)), with tests to be conducted “on all ICT systems and applications supporting critical or important functions” at least once a year (Art. 24(6)) by internal or external independent testers. Tests may include “vulnerability assessments and scans, open source analyses, network security assessments, gap analyses, physical security reviews, questionnaires and scanning software solutions, source code reviews where feasible, scenario-based tests, compatibility testing, performance testing, end-to-end testing and penetration testing” (Art. 25(1)). Specific provisions apply to microenterprises, central securities depositories, and central counterparties. Competent authorities must identify which financial entities are subject to “advanced testing by means of [threat-led penetration testing] TLPT” 80 (Art. 26(1)). Entities to which the requirement of a simplified ICT risk management framework (see further Art. 16(1)) applies and microenterprises are exempt from this identification exercise as a whole. In addition to taking the proportionality principle (Art. 4(2)) into account, competent authorities shall identify entities that are required to carry out TLPT based on the following considerations:
-
“impact-related factors, in particular the extent to which the services provided and activities undertaken by the financial entity impact the financial sector;”
-
“possible financial stability concerns, including the systemic character of the financial entity at Union or national level;”
-
and “specific ICT risk profile, level of ICT maturity of the financial entity or technology features involved” (Art. 26(8)).
The identified financial entities shall conduct TLPT at a minimum every three years. Depending on a financial entity’s “risk profile [...and] operational circumstances”, competent authorities hold power to request “reduc[ing] or increas[ing] this frequency” (Art. 26(1)). Every TLPT test “shall cover several or all critical or important functions of a financial entity, and shall be performed on live production systems supporting such functions” (Art. 26(2)). Competent authorities shall validate the “precise scope” of a TLPT test based on a prior assessment of the financial entity, outlining “critical or important functions [which] need to be covered by the TLPT” (Art. 26(2)). Specific provisions apply in cases where ICT third-party service providers are involved. The Regulation leaves it at a Member State’s discretion to “designate a single public authority in the financial sector to be responsible for TLPT-related matters in the financial sector at national level” (Art. 26(9)). The ESAs, “in agreement with the ECB”, are tasked with further clarifying, for instance, the identification criteria through developing joint draft RTS. Article 27 lays out requirements for TLPT testers. For every TLPT testing, financial entities shall share a summarized version of their “relevant findings, the remediation plans and the documentation demonstrating that the TLPT has been conducted in accordance with the requirements” with the responsible national authority (Art. 26(6)). As part of their digital operational resilience testing programme, all financial entities (except microenterprises) “shall establish procedures and policies to prioritise, classify and remedy all issues revealed throughout the performance of the tests and shall establish internal validation methodologies to ascertain that all identified weaknesses, deficiencies or gaps are fully addressed” (Art. 24(5)).
ICT Third-Party Risk Management
For purposes of managing ICT third-party risk, which DORA defines as “an ICT risk that may arise for a financial entity in relation to its use of ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers or by subcontractors of the latter” (Art. 3, point (18)), the Regulation specifies “key principles for [their] sound management” (Chapter five, section I) and establishes an “oversight framework of critical ICT third-party service providers” (Chapter five, section II).
As part of the principles, the Regulation stipulates that ICT third-party risk shall be managed by financial entities as part of their ICT risk management framework. In cases where financial entities have third-party contractual arrangements in place, they nevertheless “shall, at all times, remain fully responsible for compliance with, and the discharge of, all obligations under this Regulation and applicable financial services law” (Art. 28(1), point (a)). The following table provides a non-exhaustive list of measures to be implemented by financial entities in this respect (for a comprehensive list, see Articles 28 and 29):
|
Measures by Financial Entities |
|
|---|---|
|
Art. 28(2) [1] |
[1] Applicable for all financial entities, except for those financial entities to whom the simplified ICT risk management framework applies and microenterprises. |
|
Art. 28(3) |
|
|
Art. 28(4) |
|
|
Art. 28(5) |
|
|
Art. 28(7) |
|
|
Art. 28(8) |
|
Article 30 lists “key contractual provisions”, for instance, “provisions on availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality in relation to the protection of data” (Art. 30(2), point (c)), which shall be included in any contractual arrangement between financial entities and ICT third-party service providers (see Art. 30(2) and (3) for further elements of these provisions).
DORA also specifies an “oversight framework of critical ICT third-party service providers” (Chapter Five, Section Two). Such critical ICT third-party service providers shall be designated through the ESA’s Joint Committee and “upon recommendation of the Oversight Forum”. 81 The Regulation lists the following elements for consideration to determine whether an ICT third-party service provider providing ICT services is critical 82 :
-
“the systemic impact on the stability, continuity or quality of the provision of financial services in the event that the relevant ICT third-party service provider would face a large scale operational failure to provide its services, taking into account the number of financial entities and the total value of assets of financial entities to which the relevant ICT third-party service provider provides services;”
-
“the systemic character or importance of the financial entities that rely on the relevant ICT third-party service provider;”
-
“the reliance of financial entities on the services provided by the relevant ICT third-party service provider in relation to critical or important functions of financial entities that ultimately involve the same ICT third-party service provider;”
-
and “the degree of substitutability of the ICT third-party service provider” (Art. 31(2)).
The ESA Joint Committee shall notify the respective ICT third-party service provider of their status as a critical ICT third-party service provider and the date from which onwards they “will effectively be subject to oversight activities” (Art. 31(5)). The period in between shall be no longer than one month. Upon notification of their designation as critical, the concerned ICT third-party service providers must inform the recipients of their services that are financial entities (Art. 31(5)). The ESA Joint Committee is tasked with publishing and maintaining a list of critical ICT third-party service providers within the EU (Art. 31(9)). The ESA Joint Committee shall only decide on respective designations once the Commission adopts a Delegated Act, further clarifying the criteria on whose basis such a designation takes place (Art. 31(6) and (7)).
In addition, the ESAs shall assign a ‘Lead Overseer’ amongst them for each of the critical ICT third-party service providers (Art. 31(1), point (b)). They shall cooperate and coordinate in the framework of a Joint Oversight Network (JON). Each Lead Overseer shall be responsible for the oversight of these providers and also acts as their “primary point of contact” (Art. 33(1)). The Lead Overseer is mandated to “assess whether each critical ICT third-party service provider has in place comprehensive, sound and effective rules, procedures, mechanisms and arrangements to manage the ICT risk which it may pose to financial entities” (Art. 33(2)). On that basis, the “Lead Overseer shall adopt a clear, detailed and reasoned individual oversight plan describing the annual oversight objectives and the main oversight actions planned for each critical ICT third-party service provider” (Art. 33(4)) upon coordination with the JON, which is to be made available to the respective critical ICT third-party service provider. Article 33(3) further specifies the components of such an assessment, one of which is the existence of “ICT requirements to ensure, in particular, the security, availability, continuity, scalability and quality of services which the critical ICT third-party service provider provides to financial entities” (Art. 33(3), point (a)). If necessary, the Lead Overseers can request the ECB or ENISA “to provide technical advice, share hands-on experience or join specific [JON] coordination meetings” (Art. 34(3)). Member States’ competent authorities and the Lead Overseer “shall, in a timely manner, mutually exchange all relevant information concerning critical ICT third-party service providers which is necessary for them to carry out their respective duties” (Art. 48(2)).
To ensure compliance, DORA entrusts the Lead Overseers with the following powers (Art. 35):
-
requesting information (see further Article 37);
-
carrying out general investigations and inspections (see further Article 38 and 39);
-
issuing recommendations on issues covered by the assessment scope specified in Article 33(3) (see further Article 35(1), point (d)) [2];
-
and “request[ing], after the completion of the oversight activities, reports specifying the actions that have been taken or the remedies that have been implemented by the critical ICT third-party service providers in relation to the[se] recommendations” (Art. 35(1), point (c)).
[2] Critical ICT third-party service providers have 60 days to “either notify the Lead Overseer of their intention to follow the recommendations or provide a reasoned explanation for not following such recommendations” (Art. 42(1)).
When engaging in related activities, the Lead Overseer shall “take due account of the framework established by [the NIS 2 Directive] and, where necessary, consult the relevant competent authorities designated or established in accordance with that Directive, in order to avoid duplication of technical and organisational measures that might apply to critical ICT third-party service providers pursuant to that Directive” (Art. 35(2), point (b)). In specified circumstances of non-compliance (see further Art. 35(6)-(11)), the Lead Overseer can impose a “periodic penalty payment” on critical ICT third-party service providers. 83 All of the “Lead Overseer’s necessary expenditure in relation to the conduct of oversight” must be paid for by the critical ICT third-party service providers (Art. 42). 84
To support the Lead Overseer and the ESA Joint Committee in relation to ICT third-party risk, DORA establishes the Oversight Forum as a subcommittee within the ESA Joint Committee (Art. 32(1)). 85 The Lead Overseer shall also consult the Oversight Forum before exercising any of its granted powers (Art. 35(3)). As an additional support mechanism for the Lead Overseer in fulfilling its oversight tasks, DORA foresees assistance from a joint investigation team (see further Article 40). Every five years, the ESAs shall provide the European Parliament, Council, and Commission with a “joint confidential report [...] summarising the findings of relevant discussions [on fostering international cooperation on ICT third-party risk across different financial sectors, Art. 44(1)] held with the third countries’ authorities” (Art. 44(2)).
Supervision and Enforcement
To monitor compliance with DORA, national competent authorities shall be equipped with “supervisory, investigatory and sanctioning powers” (Art. 50(1)), comprising, for instance, the ability to “carry out on-site inspections or investigations” (Art. 50(2), point (b)) and imposing “appropriate administrative penalties and remedial measures for breaches” (Art. 50(3)). As part of the latter, Member States shall ensure that their competent authorities are capable of, for example, “requir[ing] the temporary or permanent cessation of any practice or conduct that the competent authority considers to be contrary to the provisions of this Regulation and prevent repetition of that practice or conduct” or “issu[ing] public notices, including public statements indicating the identity of the natural or legal person and the nature of the breach” (Art. 50(4)). The Regulation further specifies circumstances to be taken into consideration when contemplating “type and level of an administrative penalty or remedial measure,” such as “the extent to which the breach is intentional or results from negligence” or the “materiality, gravity and the duration of the breach” (Art. 51(2)). With respect to criminal penalties, the Regulation grants Member States some flexibility as it stipulates the possibility for not “lay[ing] down rules for administrative penalties or remedial measures for breaches that are subject to criminal penalties under their national law” (Art. 52).
|
Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
Member States |
Notification of laws, regulations, and administrative provisions laid down for implementing DORA Chapter VII -> Commission and ESAs |
17 January 2025 |
Notification of subsequent amendments “without undue delay” |
Art. 53 |
Regulatory and Implementing Technical Standards
In many of its provisions, DORA provides for developing RTS or ITS for adoption by the Commission through delegated/implementing acts. An overview:
|
Who |
What |
When |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
|
ESAs (through Joint Committee) in consultation with ENISA |
Submission of draft regulatory technical standards on ICT risk management tools, methods, processes and policies -> Commission |
17 January 2024 |
Art. 15 |
|
ESAs (through Joint Committee) in consultation with ENISA |
Submission of draft regulatory technical standards on simplified ICT risk management framework -> Commission |
17 January 2024 |
Art. 16 |
|
ESAs (through Joint Committee) in consultation with the ECB and ENISA |
Submission of draft regulatory technical standards relating to the classification of ICT-related incidents and cyber threats -> Commission |
17 January 2024 |
Art. 18 |
|
ESAs (through Joint Committee) in consultation with ENISA and the ECB |
Submission of draft regulatory and draft implementing technical standards relating to incident reporting content and templates -> Commission |
17 July 2024 |
Art. 20 |
|
ESAs (in agreement with ECB) |
Submission of TLPT-related draft regulatory technical standards -> Commission |
17 July 2024 |
Art. 26(11) |
|
ESAs (through Joint Committee) |
Submission of draft implementing technical standards regarding a register of information in relation to all contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers -> Commission |
17 January 2024 |
Art. 28(9) |
|
ESAs (through Joint Committee) |
Submission of draft regulatory technical standards specifying the detailed content of the policy regarding contractual arrangements on the use of ICT services supporting critical or important functions provided by ICT third-party service providers -> Commission |
17 January 2024 |
Art. 28(10) |
|
ESAs (through Joint Committee) |
Submission of draft regulatory technical standards on specific contractual arrangements “to determine and assess when subcontracting ICT services supporting critical or important functions” -> Commission |
17 July 2024 |
Art. 30(5) |
|
ESAs (through Joint Committee) |
Submission of draft regulatory technical standards relating to the on the conduct of oversight activities -> Commission |
17 July 2024 |
Art. 41 |
Review
|
Who |
What |
When |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Commission (upon consultation of ESAs and ESRB) |
Review and submission of a report “accompanied, where appropriate, by a legislative proposal” (Art. 58 (1) points (a)-(e) further specify aspects to be considered for review) -> Council and European Parliament |
17 January 2028 |
Art. 58(1) |
|
Commission (upon consultation of ESAs and the Committee of European Auditing Oversight Bodies) |
Review and submission of a report “accompanied, where appropriate, by a legislative proposal, on the appropriateness of strengthened requirements for statutory auditors and audit firms as regards digital operational resilience” -> Council and European Parliament |
17 January 2026 |
Art. 58(3) |
Digital Finance
— Regulation on Markets in Crypto-Assets
The 📄 Regulation on markets in crypto-assets (MiCA) from 2023, inter alia, lays down “requirements for crypto-asset service providers” 86 (Art. 1(1)), of which some are also of cybersecurity relevance. For instance, in order for particular entities to receive the authorization to provide specific crypto-asset services, they must, among other aspects, share “technical documentation of the ICT systems and security arrangements, and a description thereof in non-technical language” with the competent authority of their “home Member State” (Art. 60(7). The same applies to entities seeking authorization as a crypto-asset service provider (Art. 62(2)). Furthermore, the Regulation mandates crypto-asset service providers to “take all reasonable steps to ensure continuity and regularity in the performance of their crypto-asset services,” also by ensuring compliance with the respective provisions set out in the DORA (Art. 68(7)). Additionally, a custody policy to be included in the framework of an agreement between clients and “crypto-asset service providers providing custody and administration of crypto-assets on behalf of [these] clients” shall “minimise the risk of a loss of clients’ [...] access to the crypto-assets due to [...] cyber threats” (Art. 75(3)). By 31 December 2025, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), “in close cooperation with the [European Banking Authority] EBA,” must share its first public “report [...] on the application of this Regulation and developments in markets in crypto-assets” with the Parliament and the Commission, to be continued on an annual basis (Art. 141). In its report, the ESMA shall also shed light on “the number and value of [...] hacks [as well as] the use of crypto-assets for payments related to ransomware attacks [and] cyber-attacks [...] reported in the Union” (Art. 141, point (k)). The Commission shall also include information on these numbers and values as part of its reports – an interim report by 30 June 2025 and a final report by 30 June 2027 – on the MiCA application, “accompanied, where appropriate, by a legislative proposal” (Art. 140). The Commission shall consult the EBA and ESMA when drafting these reports.
Export Controls
— Regulation Setting up a Union Regime for the Control of Exports, Brokering, Technical Assistance, Transit and Transfer of Dual-Use Items
In September 2021, the 📄 Regulation setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit and transfer of dual-use items (2021/821) entered into force. The Regulation defines dual-use items as “items, including software and technology, which can be used for both civil and military purposes” (Art. 2, point (a)). As a particular category of these dual-use items, the Regulation includes ‘cyber-surveillance items,’ which constitute “dual-use items specially designed to enable the covert surveillance of natural persons by monitoring, extracting, collecting or analysing data from information and telecommunication systems” (Art. 2, point (20)). As a general rule, all items contained in Annex I of the Regulation require prior authorization. Annex I specifies ten categories of items in detail, one titled telecommunications and information security (category five). Concerning cyber-surveillance items not included in Annex I, authorization is required “if the exporter has been informed by the competent authority that the items in question are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for use in connection with internal repression and/or the commission of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law” (Art. 5(1)). Exporters themselves shall notify their respective competent authority, if they are “aware, according to [their] due diligence findings” that the proposed export of such items may “in their entirety or in part” serve any of the above mentioned use cases (Art. 5(2)). On that basis, Member States via their competent authorities “shall decide whether or not to make the export concerned subject to authorisation” (Art. 5(2)). To help exporters make such determinations, the Commission and Council are tasked with publishing a guideline to that effect. 87 The Regulation does not preclude Member States to “adopt or maintain national legislation imposing an authorisation requirement on the export of cyber-surveillance items not listed in Annex I if the exporter has grounds for suspecting that those items are or may be intended, in their entirety or in part, for any of the uses referred to” (Art. 5(3)). The Commission shall report annually on implementing this Regulation. 88 Concerning the export of cyber-surveillance items, the Commission is instructed to “include [...] the number of applications received by item, the issuing Member State and the destinations concerned by those applications, and on the decisions taken on those applications” (Art. 26(2)).
Investments and Financing
— Recovery and Resilience Facility
📄 Regulation establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (2021/241) created the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), which is implemented by the Commission and provides funding to Member States, inter alia, to “promote the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion by improving the resilience, crisis preparedness, adjustment capacity and growth potential of the Member States, by mitigating the social and economic impact of [the COVID-19 crisis]” (Art. 4(1)). The Facility runs until the end of 2026. Investments supporting digital transformation are included as one of its six pillars. To be eligible for the Facility’s financial support, Member States must share with the Commission a national recovery and resilience plan (Art. 17 and 18), in which they must allocate at least 20% of all measures to reaching digital objectives. The Commission shall report annually to the Council and Parliament on the implementation of the Facility, for instance, on its contribution to achieving the EU’s digital targets (Art. 31). Among the many types of intervention foreseen under the Facility that may contribute to the objective of digital transformation, the following have a cybersecurity dimension (see further Annex VII):
Table 24: Overview of Cybersecurity-Related RRF Types of Intervention
|
Policy Field |
Type of Intervention |
|---|---|
|
E-government, digital public services (including digitalisation of transport) and local digital ecosystems |
|
|
Digital capacities and deployment of advanced technologies |
|
The Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard offers the opportunity to track specific measures implemented by Member States in the framework of the Facility. 89
— Regulation Establishing a Framework for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments Into the Union
In April 2019, the 📄 Regulation establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union (2019/452) entered into force. The Regulation institutes “a framework for the screening by Member States of foreign direct investments [FDI] into the Union on the grounds of security or public order” (Art. 1(1)). 90 To determine whether a particular foreign direct investment in any sector “is likely to affect security or public order,” the Regulation enumerates factors to be considered by the Member States or the Commission. Among others, it lists the “potential effects on [...] critical technologies and dual use items as defined in [the EU’s export control regime] 91 , including [...] cybersecurity” (Art. 4(1), point (b)). Screening may also encompass, for instance, an assessment of the degree of direct or indirect control of foreign governments on the particular investor (Art. 4(2), point (a)). On an annual basis, Member States shall report to the Commission and the Commission to the Council and Parliament “aggregated information on foreign direct investments that took place in their territory,” among other aspects, and on the status quo of the Regulation’s implementation respectively (Art. 5). Under the Regulation, the Commission is competent to issue an opinion addressed to a specific Member State when it “considers that a foreign direct investment is likely to affect projects or programmes of Union interest on grounds of security or public order” (Art. 8). For instance, this relates to Horizon 2020, “including actions [...] relating to Key Enabling Technologies such as [...] cybersecurity” (Annex).
Payment Services
— Directive on Payment Services in the Internal Market
📄 Directive 2015/2366 establishes rules for payment services “provided within the Union” in the framework of the internal market, which was amended by 📄 Directive 2022/2556 to ensure compliance with relevant provisions of DORA. 92 In order to apply for authorization as a payment institution, entities shall, with respect to cyber and IT security, provide their home Member State’s competent authority with descriptions of
-
“the applicant’s [...] arrangements for the use of ICT services in accordance with” the DORA (Art. 5(1), point (e));
-
“the procedure in place to monitor, handle and follow up a security incident and security related customer complaints, including an incident reporting mechanism which takes account of the notification obligations of the payment institution laid down in” DORA (Art. 5(1), point (f));
-
“effective ICT business continuity policy and plans and ICT response and recovery plans and a procedure to regularly test and review the adequacy and efficiency of such plans in accordance with” DORA (Art. 5(1), point (h));
-
and “security control and mitigation measures taken to adequately protect payment service users against the risks identified” (Art. 5(1), point (j)), “indicat[ing] how they ensure a high level of digital operational resilience in accordance with [DORA], in particular in relation to technical security and data protection, including for the software and ICT systems used by the applicant or the undertakings to which it outsources the whole or part of its operations” (Art. 5(1)).
For entities subject to both DORA and Directive 2015/2366, only the DORA’s incident reporting requirements apply as they supersede similar provisions from Directive 2015/2366 (recital (23), DORA).
Policy Area 4: Internal Security, Justice and Law Enforcement
Deep Dive: Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER)
|
📄 Directive on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114 (2022/2557) |
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Entry into force: 16 January 2023 Deadline for national transposition: 17 October 2024, measures to apply from 18 October 2024 |
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Previous legislation: Repeals Directive 2008/114 from 18 October 2024 onwards |
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Subsequent documents of relevance: |
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Objective (Art. 1):
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Subject matter (Art. 1): “This Directive:
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Actors established/regulated by CER Directive:
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Deep Dive Structure -> Scope -> Competent Authorities, Single Points of Contact and Cooperation Between EU -> Member States -> National Frameworks on the Resilience of Critical Entities -> Resilience Measures by Critical Entities -> Review |
Scope
Subject matter of the CER Directive forms critical entities, which are defined as a “public or private entity” (Art. 2, point (1)) that were identified by an EU Member State to fall under specified categories outlined in the CER Directive’s Annex. The CER Directive notes the importance for its “implement[ation] in a coordinated manner” with the NIS 2 Directive “in light of the relationship between the physical security and cybersecurity of critical entities” (Art. 1(2). In terms of substance, the CER Directive specifies that it “shall not apply to matters covered by [the NIS 2] Directive [...], without prejudice to Article 8 of this Directive” (Art. 1(2)). 93
Examples of the entities in scope of the CER Directive are (the sectors and subsectors also specified in the NIS 2 Directive for essential entities are assigned a ◇. Those for important entities are marked with a △. ○ indicates sectors which are covered by the CER Directive, but not by the NIS 2 Directive):
Table 25: Sectors, Subsectors and Categories of Entities in the Scope of the CER Directive
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“Sectors, subsectors and categories of entities” (Annex) |
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◇ Energy |
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◇ Transport |
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◇ Banking |
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◇ Financial market infrastructure |
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◇ Health |
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◇ Drinking water |
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◇ Waste water |
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◇ Digital infrastructure |
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◇ Public administration |
[The Directive excludes from its scope “public administration entities that carry out their activities in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement, including the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences” (Art. 1(6)). “Member States may [further] decide that Article[s] 11[-18, 21 and 22], in whole or in part, do not apply to specific critical entities which carry out activities in the areas of national security, public security, defence or law enforcement, including the investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences, or which provide services exclusively to the public administration entities” (Art. 1(7)) as stipulated in the first sentence.] |
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△ Production, processing and distribution of food |
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EU Member States must “identify the critical entities for the sectors and subsectors set out in the annex” by 17 July 2026 (Art. 6(1)). The CER Directive lays out the following criteria for EU Member States to determine whether an entity is critical:
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(a) it provides “one or more essential services;”
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(b) it is located and operates from the territory of the EU Member States undertaking the determination;
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and (c) an “incident would have significant disruptive effects” (Art. 6(2)).
Whether an effect is deemed to be significantly disruptive, for instance, depends on
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the “number of users relying on the essential service provided;”
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the “geographic area that could be affected;”
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or the “entity’s market share in the market for the essential service or essential services concerned” (see Article 7(1) for further criteria).
Upon consultation with the CERG, the Commission shall “adopt non-binding guidelines to facilitate the [significant disruptive effect] criteria” (Art. 7(3)). Additionally, together with EU Member States, the Commission shall compile “recommendations and non-binding guidelines to support Member States in identifying critical entities” (Art. 6(6)). Following the identification of critical entities, EU Member States must share additional information comprising
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“a list of essential services in that Member State where there are any additional essential services as compared to the list of essential services” included in the Commission’s delegated act;
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“the number of critical entities identified for each sector and subsector set out in the Annex and for each essential service;”
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and, if applicable, “any thresholds applied to specify” the criteria for assessing whether an incident amounts to a significant disruptive effect (Art. 7(2))
with the Commission in due time. They must do so “whenever necessary and at least every four years” (Art. 7(2)).
EU Member States must inform identified critical entities within one month of their designation as such (Art. 6(3)). They must also inform critical entities of their obligations under Chapters 3 and 4, as well as the date from which they take effect for them. 94
In terms of domestic information-sharing, EU Member States must ensure that the entities identified under the CER Directive are shared with the competent national authority under the NIS 2 Directive (Art. 6(4)) within a month of the identification.
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Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
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Member States |
Identification of the critical entities for the sectors and subsectors set out in the Annex |
17 July 2026 |
Every four years, at least |
Art. 6(1) |
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Member States |
Submission a list of essential services, the number of critical entities identified for each sector and subsector set out in the Annex and for each essential service and any thresholds applied to specify the criteria for assessing whether an incident amounts to a significant disruptive effect -> Commission |
Whenever necessary, at least every four years |
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Art. 7(2) |
In addition to critical entities, the CER Directive specifies a second set of actors that must meet particular obligations: “critical entities of particular European significance” (Chapter Four). An entity previously designated as critical is of such significance when it “provides the same or similar essential services to or in six or more Member States” (Art. 17(1)). The determination of critical entities of particular European significance is made by the Commission. The Commission does so upon receipt of respective information by EU Member States, followed by consultations with the relevant national competent authorities in which the critical entity operates and the critical entity itself. The critical entity to which these conditions apply is only finally designated as such once the Commission, via a competent authority, notified the critical entity in question of its designation. The entity will be bound by the obligations of the CER Directive’s Chapter Four (Art. 17 and 18) from the day following the notification.
The CER Directive also foresees the possibility for the Commission to organize so-called ‘advisory missions’ “to assess the measures that [a critical entity of particular European significance 95 ] has put in place to meet its obligations under Chapter III” (Art. 18(1)). 96 Such advisory missions can be requested by one or more Member States or be conducted at the Commission’s initiative. The CERG shall be notified when an advisory mission is carried out (Art. 18(10)). The team of an advisory mission “consist[s] of experts from the Member State in which the critical entity of particular European significance is located, experts from the Member States to or in which the essential service is provided, and Commission representatives” (Art. 18 (5)). Any resulting costs in relation to participating in advisory missions will be covered by the Commission (Art. 18(5)). The CER Directive further specifies that “Member States shall ensure that critical entities of particular European significance provide advisory missions with access to information, systems and facilities relating to the provision of their essential services necessary” (Art. 18(5)). Findings of any advisory mission shall be shared with the “Commission, to the Member State that has identified a critical entity of particular European significance as a critical entity [...], to the Member States to or in which the essential service is provided and to the critical entity concerned within three months of [its] conclusion” (Art. 18(4)), which, in turn, are tasked, inter alia, with analyzing and reviewing the report with respect to the critical entities compliance. In terms of information-sharing, the “Member State in which the advisory mission took place and the Commission shall also inform the Critical Entities Resilience Group of the main findings of the advisory mission and the lessons learned” (Art. 18(10)).
Competent Authorities, Single Points of Contact and Cooperation Between EU Member States
To apply and, if required, enforce the Directive, EU Member States must “designate or establish one or more competent authorities” and a “single point of contact [SPOC] to exercise a liaison function” with other EU Member States and the CERG (Art. 9). Member States must notify the Commission within three months of their designation. The Commission is entrusted with “mak[ing] a list of the single points of contact publicly available” (Art. 9(8)). For critical entities in the banking and financial market infrastructure sectors, the competent authorities designated nationally in the context of the CER Directive should “in principle” be the same, as those designated under DORA (Art. 9(1)). Similarly, for the digital infrastructure sector, it should be the competent authority also designated to this effect under the NIS 2 Directive (Art. 9(1)). In any case, designated national competent authorities under the NIS 2 and CER Directives shall “cooperate[...] and exchange[...] information [...] on cybersecurity risks, cyber threats and cyber incidents and non-cyber risks, threats and incidents affecting critical entities” (Art. 9(6)). Competent authorities are also instructed to “exchange[...] information and good practices” with critical entities under their jurisdiction (Art. 10(2)).
To guarantee the CER Directive’s application “in a consistent manner,” Member States are supposed to consult each other, especially in cases where critical entities “use critical infrastructure which is physically connected between two or more Member States,” “are part of corporate structures that are connected with, or linked to, critical entities in other Member States,” and/or “have been identified as critical entities in one Member State and provide essential services to or in other Member States” (Art. 11(1) points (a)-(c)). The Commission is delegated to “facilitate information exchange among Member States and experts across the Union” (Art. 20(1)).
National Frameworks on the Resilience of Critical Entities
In transposing the CER Directive, EU Member States are required to establish a national framework for the resilience of critical entities. The CER Directive defines resilience as a “critical entity’s ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, resist, mitigate, absorb, accommodate and recover from an incident” (Art. 2, point (2)). In addition to identifying critical entities, this framework comprises adopting a national strategy (Art. 4) and conducting a risk assessment (Art. 5). The strategy shall contain, among other elements,
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a governance framework to achieve [...] strategic objectives and priorities;”
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describe “measures necessary to enhance the overall resilience of critical entities;”
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and outline “the process supporting critical entities” (Art. 4(2)).
To ensure consistent implementation with the NIS 2 Directive, national strategies should also include a “policy framework for coordination” at the domestic level between the authorities respectively designated as competent to ensure effective supervision and the sharing of information (Art. 4(2), point (g)). The CER Directive states that the strategy development, for both initial and updated versions, should be “to the extent practically possible, open to relevant stakeholders” (Art. 4(2)).
In addition to the strategy, and based on a delegated act adopted by the Commission in July 2023 proposing a “non-exhaustive list of essential services”, EU Member States must carry out a risk assessment, accounting for “the relevant natural and man-made risks, including those of a cross-sectoral or cross-border nature, accidents, natural disasters, public health emergencies and hybrid threats or other antagonistic threats, including terrorist offences” (Art. 5(1)). In particular, the risk assesment shall consider interdependencies between sectors and the “impact that a significant disruption in one sector may have on other sectors” (Art. 5(2), point (c)). “Relevant elements” of these risk assessments should be shared by Member States with the identified critical entities, for instance, to support the carrying out of critical entity risk assessments (Art. 5(3)).
EU Member States must communicate their strategy and risk assessment findings with the Commission at the latest three months after their adoption/completion (Art. 4(3) and Art. 5(4)). Concerning the later provision of information, the Commission is tasked with compiling a “voluntary common reporting template” together with EU Member States (Art. 5(5)). EU Member States must update the strategy, risk assessment, as well as the identification of critical entities at least every four years (Art. 4(1) and Art. 5(1)).
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Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
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Member States |
Adoption of a strategy for enhancing the resilience of critical entities |
17 January 2026 |
Update at least every four years |
Art. 4(1) |
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Member States |
Conduct of risk assessment |
17 January 2026 |
Update at least every four years |
Art. 5(1) |
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Commission |
Provision of a summary report of the information provided by the Member States on their strategies and risk assessments -> CERG |
17 January 2027 |
Update at least every four years |
Art. 19(7) |
Resilience Measures by Critical Entities
Critical entities must carry out
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a risk assessment to “assess all relevant risks that could disrupt the provision of their essential services” (Art. 12);
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“take appropriate and proportionate technical, security and organisational measures to ensure their resilience” (Art. 13);
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and notify competent authorities of “incidents that significantly disrupt or have the potential to significantly disrupt the provision of essential services” (Art. 15).
These obligations apply to critical entities ten months after they are notified of designation as critical entities (Art. 6(3)). 97 Obligations contained in Articles 11-18, 21 and 22 do not apply to critical entities that Member States have identified within the banking, financial market infrastructure, and digital infrastructure sectors (Art. 8).
Once notified by an EU Member State as a critical entity falling under the CER Directive, entities have nine months “to assess all relevant risks that could disrupt the provision of their essential services” as part of their own risk assessment (Art. 12(1)). The risk assessment shall include an evaluation as to what degree other sectors, as specified in the annex, “depend on the [provision of its] essential service” and examine “the extent to which [... it] depends on essential services provided by other entities” (Art. 12(2)).
Resilience measures by critical entities shall, inter alia, support
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“prevent[ing] incidents from occurring;”
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“ensur[ing] adequate physical protection of [...] premises and critical infrastructure;”
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“respond[ing] to, resist[ing] and mitigat[ing] the consequences of incidents;”
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as well as “recover[ing] from incidents” (Art. 13(1)) [1].
[1] Entities in the banking, financial market infrastructure, and digital infrastructure sectors are exempt from these obligations and Chapter Four “unless national measures provide otherwise” (Art. 6(3)).
To account for the application of these measures, critical entities must have and enforce a “resilience plan or equivalent document” (Art. 13(2)). The entities must also assign a liaison officer as a point of contact for communication with the national competent authority (Art. 13(3)). The Commission is instructed to consult with the CERG on the development “non-binding guidelines to further specify the technical, security and organisational measures that may be taken” by critical entities to comply with the obligations under this provision (Art. 13(5)).
The CER Directive also establishes reporting obligations for critical entities to notify when they become subject to “incidents that significantly disrupt or have the potential to significantly disrupt the provision of essential services” (Art. 15(1)).
To determine the significance of a disruption, the directive lists three elements for consideration:
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“the number and proportion of users affected by the disruption;”
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“the duration of the disruption;”
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and “the geographical area affected by the disruption” (Art. 15(1)).
In notifying such an incident to the competent authority, the following specific timelines apply for critical entities:
Table 26: Overview of the CER Directive’s Incident Reporting Obligations
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I. Action to be taken by critical entity |
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(a) Without undue delay, within >24h after “becoming aware” of an incident “unless operationally unable to do so” |
(b) Where relevant, no later than one month thereafter |
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Submission of an initial notification (Art. 15(1)) |
Submission of a detailed report (Art. 15(1)) |
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II. Action to be taken by competent authority/SPOC |
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(a) As soon as possible upon receipt of notification |
(b) No specified timeline |
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The SPOC must “submit a summary report to the Commission and the CERG [...] on the notifications they have received, [...] the nature of notified incidents and the actions taken in accordance with Article 15(3)” 98 (Art. 9(3)). For these summary reports, the Commission shall, together with the CERG, “develop a common reporting template” for voluntary use by competent authorities (Art. 9(3)).
As part of Member States’ supervision of critical entities’ compliance with their obligations under the CER Directive, competent authorities shall be equipped with the “powers and means to
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(a) conduct on-site inspections of the critical infrastructure [...] and off-site supervision of measures taken by critical entities in accordance with Article 13, and
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(b) conduct or order audits in respect of critical entities” (Art. 21(1)).
National competent authorities under the CER Directive shall inform their NIS 2 counterparts when “assesses[ing] the compliance of a critical entity pursuant to this Article” (Art. 21(5)).
To ensure the Directive’s application, Member States may require critical entities to provide information and evidence documenting their compliance or “order [them] to take the necessary and proportionate measures to remedy any identified infringement of this Directive” (Art. 21(3)).
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Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
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Member States |
Notification of the rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the national measures adopted pursuant to this Directive -> Commission |
17 October 2024 |
Notify without delay if any amendment takes place |
Art. 22 |
In addition to supervising the application of the CER Directive by critical entities, Member States also shall commit to supporting the latter in this respect. Such support may involve providing guidance resources, advice, training up until financial assistance 99 (Art. 10(1)). Amongst critical entities, Member States shall also “facilitate voluntary information sharing [...] in relation to matters covered by [the CER] Directive” (Art. 10(3)). The CER Directive tasks the Commission with complementing Member States’ supportive efforts through the development of “best practices, guidance materials and methodologies, and cross-border training activities and exercises” (Art. 20(2)). Further, the Directive instructs the Commission to “prepare a Union-level overview of cross-border and cross-sectoral risks to the provision of essential services” (Art. 20(1)).
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Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
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Member States SPOC |
Submission of a summary report on received notifications -> Commission and CERG |
17 July 2028 |
Biannually thereafter |
Art. 9(3) |
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Critical Entities |
Conduct of risk assessment |
Within nine months after being notified of designation as critical entity |
Update at least every four years |
Art. 12(1) |
Review
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Who |
What |
When |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
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Commission |
Submission of a report on Member States’ compliance with the CER Directive -> European Parliament and Council |
17 July 2027 |
Art. 25 |
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Commission |
Periodic review report on the functioning of the CER Directive -> European Parliament and Council |
First report by 17 June 2029 |
Art. 25 |
Cybercrime
— Directive on Attacks Against Information Systems
In September 2013, the 📄 Directive on attacks against information systems (2013/40) entered into force, which “establishes minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of attacks against information systems” (Art. 1). Moreover, it seeks to “facilitate the prevention of such offences and to improve cooperation between judicial and other competent authorities” (Art. 1). The Directive includes provisions specifying the illegal access to information systems (Art. 3), illegal system interference (Art. 4), illegal data interference (Art. 5), and illegal interception (Art. 6) as criminal offenses. For these purposes, the Directive defines information systems as “a device or group of inter-connected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a programme, automatically processes computer data, as well as computer data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by that device or group of devices for the purposes of its or their operation, use, protection and maintenance” (Art. 2, point (a)) and data as “a representation of facts, information or concepts in a form suitable for processing in an information system, including a programme suitable for causing an information system to perform a function” (Art. 2, point (b)). They are considered a criminal offense, “at least for cases which are not minor,” when the following circumstances are applicable:
Table 27: Punishable Offenses under Directive 2013/40
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Punishable Offense |
Definition |
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Art. 4: illegal access to information systems |
“the [intentional] access without right [1], to the whole or to any part of an information system, [...] where committed by infringing a security measure” [1] ‘Without right’ is defined as “conduct [...] including access, interference, or interception, which is not authorised by the owner or by another right holder of the system or of part of it, or not permitted under national law” (Art. 2, point (d)). |
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Art. 5: illegal system interference |
“seriously hindering or interrupting the functioning of an information system by inputting computer data, by transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing such data, or by rendering such data inaccessible, intentionally and without right” |
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Art. 6: illegal data interference |
“deleting, damaging, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data on an information system, or rendering such data inaccessible, intentionally and without right” |
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Art. 7: illegal interception |
“intercepting, by technical means, non-public transmissions of computer data to, from or within an information system, including electromagnetic emissions from an information system carrying such computer data, intentionally and without right” |
Moreover, “the intentional production, sale, procurement for use, import, distribution or otherwise making available, of [...] [a computer programme, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of committing any of the offences referred to in Articles 3 to 6, or a computer password, access code, or similar data by which the whole or any part of an information system is capable of being accessed] without right and with the intention that it be used to commit any of the offences” (Art. 7) may be punishable as a criminal offence. Also, the “incitement, or aiding and abetting” in committing any of these offences can constitute a criminal offence (Art. 8). Already the “attempt to commit” illegal system or data interference (Art. 4 and 5) may be “punishable as a criminal offence” (Art. 9(2)). Member States “shall take the necessary measures” to ensure the punishability of these offences by means of “effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties” (Art. 9(1)). Under the Directive, Member States can also hold legal persons liable (Art. 10) and sanction them via “effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions” of a criminal or non-criminal nature (Art. 11). The Directive specifies particular penalties for the specific criminal offences (Art. 9). For instance, a penalty of a higher degree (maximum term of at least five years) shall be applied when illegal system or data interference are “committed within the framework of a criminal organisation,” “cause serious damage,” or “are committed against a critical infrastructure information system” (Art. 9(4)). A Member State can establish jurisdiction over a specific offence when the offence has either been committed “in whole or in part within their territory” or “by one of their nationals” (Art. 12(1)), further specified in Art. 12(2) and (3). To comply with their obligations under the Directive, Member States must also designate an “operational national point of contact” and use the network of operational points of contact for purposes of offense-related information-sharing (Art. 13(1)). Member States shall also ensure that they have procedures in place for responding to “urgent requests for assistance” (Art. 13(1) in a timely fashion.
IT Systems of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Over the past years, a multitude of IT systems was set up to support the AFSJ. 📄 Regulation 2018/1726 specifies the mandate and the activities to be undertaken by the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA). For instance, eu-LISA performs cybersecurity-related tasks in relation to the following systems 100 :
— Joint Investigation Teams Collaboration Platform
The 📄 Regulation establishing a collaboration platform to support the functioning of joint investigation teams (2023/969) institutes a voluntary Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) collaboration platform in an effort “to facilitate the cooperation of competent authorities participating in joint investigation teams” (Art. 1, point (b)), for instance, in the area of combating cybercrime. In implementing and managing the collaboration platform, eu-LISA “shall take the necessary technical and organisational measures to ensure a high level of cybersecurity of the JITs collaboration platform and the information security of data within the JITs collaboration platform, in particular in order to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of operational and non-operational data stored in the centralised information system” (Art. 19(1)). To this end, eu-LISA is tasked with developing both a “security plan and a business continuity and disaster recovery plan” and concluding a “working arrangement” with CERT-EU (Art. 19(3)). The Commission shall further specify security requirements through implementing acts (Art. 6, point (b)).
— e-Justice Communication via Online Data Exchange (e-CODEX)
The 📄 Regulation on a computerised system for the cross-border electronic exchange of data in the area of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters (2022/850) establishes a “computerised system for the cross-border electronic exchange of data in the area of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters,” the so-called e-CODEX system. eu-LISA is “responsible for maintaining a high level of security when carrying out its tasks, including the security of the hardware and software IT infrastructure” (Art. 11(1)). Among other measures, this includes the adoption of a security plan and due regard to the security by design principle. The responsibility for the secure operation of e-CODEX access points rests with their respective operating entities. Furthermore, they shall, “without delay,” notify eu-LISA, and, if applicable, Member States/EUIBAs of any security incident (Art. 11(4)). Either upon detection of vulnerabilities/incidents or upon notification of such by others, “eu-LISA shall analyse the security incident and inform the entities operating authorised e-CODEX access points impacted by it [...] without delay” (Art. 11(5)). In addition, eu-LISA shall “develop security rules and guidance regarding authorised e-CODEX access points,” whose compliance must be demonstrated by the entities operating them (Art. 11(6)). On an annual basis, both Member States and the Commission must share with eu-LISA the “number and type of incidents encountered by entities operating authorised e-CODEX access points [...] which have impacted the security of the e-CODEX system,” either “for the connected systems within their territory” (Member States) or when the operating entity is an EUIBA (Commission) (Art. 15(1), point (b) and (2), point (b)). 101 eu-LISA shall report to the Commission every two years on the e-CODEX’s security, among other factors (Art. 16(1)).
— European Travel and Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)
In October 2018, the 📄 Regulation establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) (2018/1240) entered into force. ETIAS allows determining “whether the presence of [...] third-country nationals [who are exempt from having a visa when crossing the external borders] in the territory of the Member States would pose a security, illegal immigration or high epidemic risk” (Art. 1(1)). Among other tasks, eu-LISA “shall take the necessary measures to ensure the security of the ETIAS Information System” (Art. 59(2)). eu-LISA, the ETIAS Central Unit (hosted within the European Border and Coast Guard Agency) and Member State competent authorities (the ETIAS National Units) are tasked to implement specific security measures, for instance, to “deny unauthorised persons access to the secure web service” (Art. 59(3)). The Regulation also imposes notification requirements for Member States, eu-LISA, and Europol in instances of security incidents, which are defined as “any event that has or may have an impact on the security of ETIAS and may cause damage or loss to the data stored in ETIAS” (Art. 60).
Judicial and Police Cooperation
— Internal Security Fund
Until 2027, 📄 Regulation 2021/1149 from July 2021 provides the legal basis for establishing the EU’s Internal Security Fund (ISF). The ISF aims to support “a high level of security in the Union, in particular by preventing and combating [...] cybercrime, by assisting and protecting victims of crime, as well as by preparing for, protecting against and effectively managing security-related incidents, risks and crises” (Art. 3(1)). Financial support of the Fund can, for instance, be used for increasing “cooperation with the private sector, for example in the fight against cybercrime, in order to build trust and improve coordination, contingency planning and the exchange and dissemination of information and best practices” and to contribute to “projects which aim to prevent and fight cybercrime, in particular child sexual exploitation online, and crimes where the internet is the primary platform for evidence collection” (Annex II and IV). Implementing measures under the ISF can also encompass activities supporting operational actions in line with the EU Policy Cycle/European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT). Beneficiaries of ISF funding can, for instance, be Member State entities in the areas of police or law enforcement, but also “legal entities created under Union law or any international organisation relevant for the purposes of the Fund” (Art. 19). Additionally, ISF funding may also – upon the Commission’s initiative – be used to “finance Union actions related to the objectives of the Fund” (Art. 20).
Council Conclusions
— Council Conclusions on the Permanent Continuation of the EU Policy Cycle for Organised and Serious International Crime: EMPACT 2022+
In February 2021, the Council decided to extend the mandate of the EU Policy Cycle for organised and serious international crime – now renamed European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) – permanently via its 📄 Council conclusions on the permanent continuation of the EU Policy Cycle for organised and serious international crime: EMPACT 2022+. EMPACT serves as an “instrument for structured multidisciplinary cooperation to fight organised and serious international crime driven by the Member States and supported by EU institutions, bodies and agencies in line with their respective mandates” (p. 6), operating on four-year-long cycles. EMPACT, inter alia, includes the following elements:
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“policy development on the basis of a European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU SOCTA)” (p. 6);
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an interim report by Europol (in cooperation with Member States and relevant EU agencies) on “new, changing or emerging threats” to be shared with the Council (p. 6);
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a “General Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (G-MASP) containing Common Horizontal Strategic Goals (CHSGs)”, complemented by biennial operational action plans (OAPs) for each “prioritised threat” (p. 6);
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and an “independent evaluation” (p. 6) following each EMPACT cycle (see further EMPACT Terms of Reference).
As part of the current cycle from 2022 to 2025, “cyber attacks,” i.e. the “target[ing of] the criminal offenders orchestrating cyber-attacks, particularly those offering specialised criminal services online,” are considered as one of the cycle’s ten priorities (see further p. 6, 📄 Council conclusions setting the EU’s priorities for the fight against serious and organised crime for EMPACT 2022-2025). Specific actions and objectives in relation to this priority are outlined in the dedicated biennial EMPACT OAP on “cyber attacks”. The Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) is responsible for “policy setting, implementation and monitoring” (p. 16, 8975/23) in relation to EMPACT and the implementation of the EMPACT’s OAPs. Every Member State shall designate a national EMPACT coordinator (NEC) who is in charge of the EMPACT’s implementation within the respective Member State (for specific tasks, see further EMPACT Terms of Reference). All NECs meet every six months. The EUIBAs also appoint an EMPACT coordinator. Europol supports EMPACT by providing the EMPACT Support Team (EST), among other tasks.
— Council Conclusions on Improving Criminal Justice in Cyberspace
In June 2016, the Council adopted 📄 Conclusions on improving criminal justice in cyberspace. Via these Conclusions, EU Member States agreed that “the development of a common EU approach on improving criminal justice in cyberspace should be treated as a matter of priority” (p. 3) and formulated “guidelines [...] to improve the enforcement of the rule of law in cyberspace and obtaining e-evidence in criminal proceedings” (p. 3). Among other components, these guidelines emphasize the importance of full respect for “data protection and fundamental rights frameworks,” consider “enhancing cooperation with service providers or any other comparable solution that allows for quick disclosure of data,” stress the need for “accelerated and streamlined” “Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) procedures related to electronic data,” and call for the efficient use of “mutual recognition procedures [...] of e-evidence” (all p. 3). To this end, the Conclusions, inter alia, request the Commission (in coordination with various actors respectively) to
-
develop “a common framework for cooperation with service providers for the purpose of obtaining specific categories of data” (p. 3);
-
draft “recommendations on how to adapt, where appropriate, existing standardised forms and procedures to request the securing and obtaining of e-evidence” (p. 4);
-
set up “a secure online portal for electronic requests and responses concerning e-evidence and the corresponding procedures, [...] as well as for their tracking and tracing” (p. 4);
-
provide “guidelines and dedicated training modules [...] on the efficient use of the current frameworks that are used for securing and obtaining e-evidence” (p. 4);
-
and “explore possibilities for a common EU approach on enforcement jurisdiction in cyberspace in situations[1] where existing frameworks are not sufficient” (p. 5).
[1] The Conclusions provide the following examples for such situations: “situations where a number of information systems are used simultaneously in multiple jurisdictions to commit one single crime, situations where relevant e-evidence moves between jurisdictions in short fractions of time, or where sophisticated methods are used to conceal the location of e-evidence or the criminal activity” (p. 5).
Member States, on the other hand, are requested to take the following actions, among others:
-
ratification and full implementation of the Budapest Convention;
-
“ensur[ing] sufficient capacity for handling MLA requests related to investigations in cyberspace and to provide relevant training to the staff on how to handle such requests;”
-
and “optimi[zing] the use of the existing 24/7 points of contact and to increase the use of joint investigation teams” (all p. 4).
Policy Area 5: Energy, Transport and Health Policy
Energy
— Directive on Energy Efficiency
The 📄 Directive on energy efficiency (2023) establishes “a common framework of measures to promote energy efficiency within the Union in order to ensure that the Union’s targets on energy efficiency are met and enables further energy efficiency improvements” (Art. 1(1)), which also addresses cybersecurity considerations. Specifically, regarding the billing and consumption information for heating, cooling and domestic hot water, Member States shall “promote cybersecurity and ensure the privacy and data protection of final users in accordance with applicable Union law” (Art. 18(2) (d)). By 11 October 2025, the Directive will repeal 📄 Directive 2018/2002, which includes the same cybersecurity-related considerations.
— Directive on Common Rules for the Internal Market for Electricity
In June 2019, the European Parliament and the Council adopted the 📄 Directive on common rules for the internal market for electricity, establishing “rules for the generation, transmission, distribution, energy storage and supply of electricity” (Art. 1). For instance, in relation to the deployment of smart metering systems, the Directive requires Member States to have “due regard of the best available techniques for ensuring the highest level of cybersecurity protection while bearing in mind the costs and the principle of proportionality” (Art. 20). Furthermore, the Directive designates that each transmission system operator 102 must maintain responsibility for “data management, including the development of data management systems, cybersecurity and data protection” (Art. 40).
— Regulation on the Internal Market for Electricity
The 📄 Regulation on the internal market for electricity (2019) sets out “fundamental principles for well-functioning, integrated electricity markets” (Art. 1, point (b)), inter alia, in an effort to ensure the EU’s competitiveness in the global market. The Regulation establishes the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) 103 and an entity of distribution system operators in the Union (EU DSO entity) 104 . Tasks of both include the promotion of cybersecurity and the engagement with “relevant authorities and regulated entities” in this regard (Art. 30(1), point (n) and Art. 55 (1), point (e)). The Regulation is complemented by 📄 Commission Implementing Decision 2020/1479, which established a new priority list for harmonizing electricity rules. The Commission’s priority lists identify the areas to be included in the development of network codes 105 , which are established every three years for the electricity sector and every year for the gas sector. The list for 2020 to 2023 includes “sector-specific rules for cyber security aspects of cross-border electricity flows, including rules on common minimum requirements, planning, monitoring, reporting and crisis management” (Art. 1(a)), 106 which is in line with the provisions set out in the 📄 Regulation on risk-preparedness in the electricity sector (2019). The recital of the latter Regulation also further stresses that it complements the NIS Directive “by ensuring that cyber-incidents are properly identified as a risk, and that the measures taken to address them are properly reflected in the risk-preparedness plans” (recital (7), Regulation 2019/941).
— Commission Recommendation on Cybersecurity in the Energy Sector
The 📄 Commission Recommendation 2019/553 on cybersecurity in the energy sector identifies key cybersecurity challenges within the energy sector and offers guidance on corresponding cybersecurity preparedness measures. Member States are encouraged to “ensure that the relevant stakeholders, notably energy network operators and technology suppliers, and in particular operators of essential services identified under the NIS Directive, implement the relevant cybersecurity preparedness measures” (p. 3f.) across different facets of the energy sector. Specifically, as part of these measures, the Commission recommends that Member States make sure that energy network operators:
-
adhere to the latest security standards for new installations and “consider complementary physical security measures” (p. 3);
-
adopt international cybersecurity standards and relevant technical standards for “secure real-time communication” (p. 3);
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set up a “communication framework with all key stakeholders to share early warning signs and cooperate on crisis management” (p. 3);
-
“establish design criteria and an architecture for a resilient grid” (p. 4) capable of preventing cascading effects [1];
-
“establish an automated monitoring and analysis capability” (p. 4) for security-events (e.g. unsuccessful log-in attempts) across both “legacy and [I]nternet of Things [IoT] environments” (p. 4) and operators shall conduct regular “cybersecurity risk analysis on all legacy installations” (p. 4);
-
and formulate tenders in a way that prioritizes cybersecurity considerations by requesting information on “security features” (p. 4), compliance with existing standards, and “continuous alerting, patching, and mitigation proposals” (p. 4) for discovered vulnerabilities by potential vendors.
[1] An example are potential cascading effects in the energy sector, where a malicious cyber operation on one part of the system could lead to widespread disruptions in other parts of that system due to the strong interconnection of electricity grids and gas pipelines across Europe (see further pp. 3-4 Commission Recommendation 2019/553).
Member States should report on the implementation of their cybersecurity preparedness measures to the Commission through the NIS Cooperation Group within 12 months of their adoption and every two years after that (p. 5). Subsequently, the Commission will assess the reported information in consultation with Member States and relevant stakeholders to determine whether further measures are necessary (p. 5).
Civil Aviation
— Regulation on Common Rules in the Field of Civil Aviation and Establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency
📄 Regulation 2018/1139 provides legally binding, comprehensive rules governing civil aviation across the EU. It is directly applicable in all Member States and seeks to “establish and maintain a high uniform level of civil aviation safety in the Union” (Art. 1(1)). It also establishes the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) 107 with the purpose of “ensuring the proper functioning and development of civil aviation in the Union” (Art. 75(2)). Concerning cyber and information security, the Regulation stipulates that the Commission, EASA, and Member States “shall cooperate on security matters related to civil aviation, including cyber security” (Art. 88(1)). Furthermore, aircrafts must also be designed to withstand “reasonably probable threats, including information security threats” (Annex II) and are “subject to certification” (Art. 14) by the EASA. 108
The Commission subsequently adopted various implementing and delegated acts to achieve the objectives set out in the Regulation. The following address cyber and information security in the civil aviation sector:
-
📄 Commission Implementing Regulation 2023/1769 supplements Delegated Regulation 2023/1768 by specifying various requirements concerning the EASA’s “administration and management systems” (Annex I) for the execution of its duties and obligations. For instance, the EASA “shall implement a system to appropriately collect, analyse, and disseminate information related to information security incidents and vulnerabilities with a potential impact on aviation safety [...]” in coordination with Member States’ “relevant authorities responsible for information security or cybersecurity” (Annex I).
-
📄 Commission Implementing Regulation 2023/203 lays down “requirements for the management of information security risks with a potential impact on aviation safety” for organizations (e.g., maintenance organizations and air operators) and competent authorities (e.g., EASA). To identify, manage, detect, respond to, and recover from information security risks or incidents, these organizations and authorities are required to undertake various measures, such as setting up “information security management systems (ISMS)” and performing “information security risk assessments” (Annex I & II).
-
📄 Commission Delegated Regulation 2020/2148 addresses runway safety and aeronautical data and amends Regulation 139/2014, laying down “requirements and administrative procedures related to aerodromes” [1]. According to the amendments of the Delegated Regulation, aerodrome operators shall “establish a security management system to ensure the security of operational data it receives, or produces, or otherwise employs, so that access to that operational data is restricted only to those authorised” (Annex). Aerodrome operators should also “take the necessary measures to protect its aeronautical data against cyber security threats” (Annex). [1] Aerodromes refer to “defined area[s] (including any buildings, installations and equipment) on land or water or on a fixed, fixed offshore or floating structure intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and surface movement of aircraft” (Art. 2(1), Regulation 139/2014).
-
📄 Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/947 sets out “detailed provisions for the operation of unmanned aircraft systems [UAS] as well as for personnel, including remote pilots and organisations involved in those operations” (Art. 1). In taking the necessary measures to address safety issues concerning UAS operations, Member States’ competent authorities and the EASA shall consider “interdependencies between the different domains of aviation safety, and between aviation safety, cyber security and other technical domains of aviation regulation” (Art. 19(4)).
-
📄 Commission Implementing Regulation 2017/373 lays down the requirements for “the provision of air traffic management and air navigation services (‘ATM/ANS’) and other air traffic management network functions (‘ATM network functions’) for general air traffic” (Art. 1(1)) as well as their oversight. For instance, ANS and air traffic flow management providers shall “take the necessary measures to protect their systems, constituents in use and data and prevent compromising the network against information and cyber security threats which may have an unlawful interference with the provision of their service” (Annex III).
— Other Implementing/Delegated Acts
📄 Commission Delegated Regulation 2020/2034 establishes the “common European risk classification scheme (ERCS)” (Art. 1), used to assess “the risk posed by an occurrence to civil aviation” (Art. 2 (1)). The Delegated Regulation complements Regulation 376/2014 on the reporting, analysis and follow-up of occurrences in civil aviation. Within the Delegated Regulation, the Commission identified various key risk areas, including “security” (Annex). Security-related risks encompass “an act of unlawful interference against civil aviation”, which may arise from “both physical and cyber security events” (Annex). The ERCS should “allow for the identification of rapid actions needed in reply to high-risk safety occurrences” and “facilitate an integrated and harmonised approach to risk management across the European aviation system,” enabling Member States’ competent authorities and the EASA to “focus on safety improvement efforts [...] as part of the European Plan for Aviation Safety” (recital (4)).
📄 Commission Implementing Regulation 2019/1583 (complementing Regulation 300/2008 on common rules in the field of civil aviation security) has the objective of “support[ing] Member States in ensuring full compliance with the most recent amendment [...] of the Convention on International Civil Aviation” (recital (3)), which introduced new standards relating to preventive cybersecurity measures. In accordance, the Implementing Regulation stipulates that Member States’ appropriate authorities shall make sure that airport operators, air carriers, and entities “identify and protect their critical information and communications technology systems and data from cyber-attacks which could affect the security of civil aviation” and “detail the measures to ensure the protection from, detection of, response to and recovery from cyber-attacks” (Annex) in their respective security programmes.
Health
— eHealth Network
The 📄 Directive 2011/24 establishes “rules for facilitating the access to safe and high-quality cross-border healthcare” and encouraging “cooperation on healthcare between Member States” (Art. 1). According to Article 14, the EU “shall support and facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information among Member States working within a voluntary network connecting national authorities responsible for eHealth” 109 (Art. 14(1)). Building upon this Directive, 📄 Commission Implementing Decision 2019/1765 provides Member States with “rules for the establishment, the management and the functioning of the eHealth Network of national authorities responsible for eHealth” (Art. 1). 110 It stipulates that one of the eHealth Network’s functions may involve “provid[ing] guidance to the Members on security of the eHealth Digital Service Infrastructure for Cross-Border eHealth Information Services 111 or other shared European eHealth Services” (Art. 4(1)) while taking into account relevant EU legislation, documents, and recommendations concerning security, particularly cybersecurity. To fulfill this role, the eHealth Network shall cooperate closely with the NIS Cooperation Group and ENISA. As the data processor for the eHealth Digital Service Infrastructure for Cross-Border eHealth Information Services, the Commission shall “[s]et up and ensure a secure and reliable communication infrastructure that interconnects networks of the Members” (Annex), also known as the Central Secure Communication Infrastructure. The Commission is also responsible for its security, for instance, by regularly controlling the “integrity of system files, security parameters and granted authorisations” (Annex).
— Commission Recommendation on a European Electronic Health Record Exchange Format
In February 2019, the Commission adopted 📄 Commission Recommendation 2019/243, providing a framework for the development of a “European electronic health record exchange format” to facilitate the secure cross-border exchange of electronic health data within the EU. As the “secure access to electronic health record systems” (p. 4) within each Member State constitutes a prerequisite for such exchange, the Commission encourages Member States to uphold rigorous standards for protecting health data and securing the network and information systems supporting these electronic health record systems. In line with the obligations derived from the GDPR and NIS Directive, the Commission also stresses that Member States must implement specific security measures when developing solutions that facilitate the access to and cross-border exchange of electronic health data. These include protecting against “unauthorised or unlawful processing of health data,” preventing “accidental loss, destruction, or damage,” and ensuring that the personnel of Member States’ entities involved in the exchange of electronic health records must be “properly aware of cybersecurity risks and adequately trained” (p. 7). Each Member State should also set up a digital health network at the national level comprising relevant national and regional authorities responsible for digital healthcare, electronic health record interoperability, network and information system security, and data protection. These national digital health networks should focus their discussions on improving the “interoperability and security of national health systems” and facilitating the “secure exchange of health data across borders” (p. 4). The outcomes of these discussions shall be shared with the eHealth Network and the Commission.
— Communication on Enabling the Digital Transformation of Health and Care in the Digital Single Market
In April 2018, the Commission adopted 📄 Communication (2018) 233, which addresses the digital transformation of health and care services in the EU. It identifies various areas for further action, including ensuring “citizens’ secure access to and sharing of health data across borders” (p. 6). In this regard, the Commission holds out the prospect of a “Commission recommendation on the technical specifications for a European electronic health record exchange format” (p. 8). Another area for further EU action is the generation of “better data to advance research, disease prevention and personalised health and care” (p. 8). In this respect, the Commission, inter alia, aims to “connect national initiatives with European networks of scientific and clinical expertise” in order to “help European research and industry remain at the forefront” while emphasizing that such initiatives “should take full account of EU policy and technological developments in the field of cybersecurity [...]” (p. 9).
— Council Conclusions on Health in the Digital Society
In its 📄 Council conclusions on Health in the Digital Society from December 2017, the Council emphasizes the importance of enabling citizens to “better understand and manage their own health with easier access to information and digital tools” (p. 4) in the digital age. With data protection and information security having “utmost importance [in] maintain[ing] public trust in digital health services” (p. 5), the Council calls for Member States’ prompt implementation of relevant EU legal frameworks, including the NIS Directive and eIDAS Regulation. The Conclusions also invite Member States and the Commission to “improve data security” by “exchanging information on available technical tools and methodologies for secure data exchange” (p. 7) regarding personal health data, as well as to “develop common approaches to ensure safety, quality, security and interoperability of mobile health tools and applications” (p. 8).
Policy Area 6: Education, Research and Space Policy
Education
— Council Recommendations on Digital Education and Digital Skills
In November 2023, the Council issued a 📄 Recommendation on improving the provision of digital skills and competences in education and training (C/2024/1030). In its Recommendation, the Council encourages Member States to adopt initiatives that “support a two-way exchange and collaboration between education and training institutions and the private sector” (p. 7). This approach aims to enable professionals in the digital sector to assist educators while educators can acquire expertise in areas such as cybersecurity. Member States should also undertake measures to “attract more learners to vocational programmes in areas such as AI, cybersecurity and software development” (p. 8) and “support higher education institutions in encouraging students, and particularly women” (p. 8) to pursue subjects that emphasize skill development in domains such as cybersecurity. In “develop[ing] a strategic and systematic approach to addressing the shortage of ICT professionals”, Member States should consider incorporating programs aimed at alleviating “digital skills shortages”, for instance, in the area of cybersecurity, also in light of the Commission’s Cybersecurity Skills Academy initiative (p. 10).
On the same day, the Council also issued a 📄 Recommendation on the key enabling factors for successful digital education and training (C/2024/1115). The Recommendation addresses the opportunities brought by emerging technologies and potential risks, like cybersecurity threats. Against this backdrop, the Council recommends Member States to take “comprehensive measures to address cybersecurity in all education and training institutions,” encourage “all staff to undertake cybersecurity training,” and raise “cybersecurity awareness among students and their families” (p. 6).
— Cybersecurity Skills Academy
The 📄 Communication on the Cybersecurity Skills Academy by the Commission from April 2023 addresses the “cybersecurity professional talent gap” (p. 4) in the EU. It aims to enhance the Union’s “competitiveness, growth and resilience” (Communication title). To achieve this goal, the Commission puts forward the Cybersecurity Skills Academy, designed to serve as a central hub for cybersecurity education and training opportunities, funding avenues, and initiatives supporting cybersecurity skills development. The Academy’s four pillars, their respective objectives, and a non-exhaustive overview of exemplary activities and measures under each pillar are explained in the table below:
Table 28: Objectives and Activities of the Cybersecurity Skills Academy
|
Pillars |
Specific Objectives |
Examples of Activities and Measures |
|---|---|---|
|
(1) “Knowledge generation and training: establish a common EU approach to cybersecurity training”
|
p. 7:
|
|
|
(2) “Stakeholder involvement: committing to close the cybersecurity skills gap” |
|
|
|
(3) “Funding: build synergies to maximise the impact of spending for developing cybersecurity skills” |
p. 13:
|
|
|
(4) “Measuring progress: built-in accountability” |
|
|
Research
— European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre and Network of National Coordination Centres
In June 2021, the 📄 Regulation establishing the European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre [ECCC] and the Network of National Coordination Centres (2021/887) entered into force. Relevant provisions on the ECCC are covered in its actor profile [see further Chapter 13]. In addition to the ECCC, the Regulation establishes a Network of National Coordination Centres (or NCCs) and a Cybersecurity Competence Community. The NCC Network comprises national NCCs, to be designated/established by every Member State. 112 The NCCs shall conduct, inter alia, the following activities:
-
“acting as points of contact at national level for the Community to support the Competence Centre in fulfilling its mission and objectives;”
-
“providing expertise and actively contributing to the [ECCC’s] strategic tasks set out in Article 5(2), taking into account relevant national and regional challenges for cybersecurity in different sectors;”
-
“promoting, encouraging and facilitating the participation of civil society, industry, in particular start-ups and SMEs, the academic and research communities and other stakeholders at national level in cross-border projects and in cybersecurity actions funded by relevant Union programmes;”
-
“providing technical assistance to stakeholders by supporting them in the application phase for projects managed by the Competence Centre in relation to its mission and objectives;”
-
and “seeking to establish synergies with relevant activities at national, regional and local level, such as national policies on research, development and innovation in the area of cybersecurity” (Art. 7(1)).
In specified circumstances, Member States “may receive a grant from the Union [...] in relation to carrying out the[ir NCC-related] tasks” (Art. 7(3)).
The role of the concurrently established Cybersecurity Competence Community is to
-
provide support to the ECCC “in fulfilling its mission and objectives” and, “where relevant”, to the ECCC and the NCCs in the “promoti[on of] specific projects,” and
-
“where relevant, participate in formal or informal activities and in [community working groups] to carry out specific activities as provided by the annual work programme” (Art. 9).
In terms of membership, the Regulation specifies that the “Community shall bring together the main stakeholders with regard to cybersecurity technological, industrial, academic and research capacities in the Union” (Art. 8(2)), encompassing “SMEs, academic and research organisations, other relevant civil society associations as well as, as appropriate, relevant European Standardisation Organisations, public entities and other entities dealing with cybersecurity operational and technical matters” (Art. 8(2)) that are “established within the Member States” (Art. 8(3)). Following the request of an entity to join the Community, its registration as a community member is subject to an assessment by its respective NCC. Similarly, the ECCC assumes these functions in case EUIBAs seek community membership. The ECCC’s Strategic Advisory Group comprises a maximum of 20 nominated experts out of the community membership pool.
— Horizon Europe
In May 2021, the Council established Horizon Europe via its 📄 Council Decision establishing the Specific Programme implementing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2021/764). In the framework of Horizon Europe, €95.5 billion can be allocated until 2027. 113 Cybersecurity is given a dedicated focus in the Programme’s cluster “civil security for society” (Art. 3(b)). In this respect, the Council notes that “it is in the Union’s interest to ensure that it develops and retains essential cybersecurity strategic capacities in order to secure the Digital Single Market and, in particular, to ensure the protection of critical networks and information systems and to provide key cybersecurity services” (Annex I). According to the Horizon Europe Work Programme (2023-2025) for the cluster Civil Security for Society, the ECCC is entrusted with implementing the call for proposals for cybersecurity projects. 114 Projects shall, inter alia, aim at attaining the following impacts: “strengthened EU cybersecurity capacities and European Union sovereignty in digital technologies,” “increased software, hardware and supply chain security,” and a “reinforced awareness and a common cyber security management and culture” (p. 100).
Space
— Secure Connectivity Programme
In addition to the Space Programme, the Union Secure Connectivity Programme was established through the 📄 Regulation establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027 (2023/588) in March 2023. The Union Secure Connectivity Programme, inter alia, aims to “ensure the provision and long-term availability within the Union’s territory and worldwide uninterrupted access to secure, autonomous, high-quality, reliable and cost-effective satellite governmental communication services to government-authorised users” (Art. 3(1), point (a)). The programme is based on two types of infrastructures, having a governmental and commercial designation respectively (Art. 5(1)). As one of its 10 specific objectives, the Secure Connectivity Programme shall “increase [...] the cyber resilience of the Union, by developing redundancy, passive, proactive and reactive cyber protection and operational cybersecurity and protective measures against cyber threats” (Art. 3(2), point (e)). The “annual number and severity of impact of cybersecurity incidents [...] related to the secure connectivity system” (see Annex 7.2) shall serve as one of the indicators for evaluating the attainment of this specific objective. Similar to the Space Programme, the Commission shall, “in its field of competence” and supported by the EUSPA, inter alia, “ensure a high degree of security with regard [...] to the protection of infrastructure, both ground and space, and of the provision of services, particularly against physical or cyber-attacks, including interference with data streams” (Art. 30(1), point (a)). For the governmental side of the programme, the Commission is tasked with conducting a “risk and threat analysis” (Art. 30(3)).
— Space Programme
📄 Regulation 2021/696 establishes the Union Space Programme until 2027 to, among other objectives, “enhance the safety and security of the Union and its Member States and reinforce the autonomy of the Union” (Art. 4(1), point (c)) and specifies the mandate of the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA). Said programme consists of five components:
-
(a) Galileo, “an autonomous civil global navigation satellite system (GNSS) under civil control;”
-
(b) the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), “a civil regional satellite navigation system;”
-
(c) Copernicus, “an operational, autonomous, user-driven, civil Earth observation system under civil control;”
-
(d) Space Situational Awareness, including, for instance, “a space surveillance and tracking system aiming to improve, operate and provide data, information and services related to the surveillance and tracking of space objects that orbit the Earth;”
-
(e) and GOVSATCOM, a “satellite communications service under civil and governmental control enabling the provision of satellite communications capacities and services to Union and Member State authorities managing security critical missions and infrastructures” (Art. 3(1)).
In terms of the programme’s security, the Commission shall, “in its field of competence” and supported by the EUSPA, inter alia, “ensure a high degree of security with regard [...] to the protection of infrastructure, both ground and space, and of the provision of services, particularly against physical or cyber-attacks, including interference with data streams” (Art. 34(1), point (a)). Every component is managed by a particular entity, which holds responsibility “for the operational security of that component [... and] carry[ing] out risk and threat analysis and all the necessary activities to ensure and monitor the security of that component” (Art. 34(3)). For Galileo and EGNOS, the EUSPA assumes all management functions and the Commission does so for Copernicus. The Commission holds the “overall responsibility” to implement the Union Space Programme (Art. 28(1)). To account for instances in which “the security of systems and services deployed, operated and used under the Union Space Programme” may pose a threat to the Union’s security, the Council adopted Council Decision 2021/698 specifying particular procedures for handling such situations.
Policy Area 7: Foreign and Security Policy
Strategic Documents
— Council Conclusions on the Development of the European Union’s Cyber Posture
In May 2022, the Council adopted its 📄 Conclusions on the development of the European Union’s cyber posture. According to the Conclusions, “the cyber posture aims to combine the various initiatives that concur in EU actions consolidating peace and stability in the cyberspace and in favour of an open, free, global, stable and secure cyberspace, while better coordinating short, medium and long term actions to prevent, discourage, deter and respond to cyber threats and attacks and leveraging cyber capabilities” (p. 5). The posture comprises the following five objectives, which are further specified as follows:
Table 29: Overview of Council Conclusions on the Development of the European Union’s Cyber Posture
|
Objectives |
Overview of Provisions |
|---|---|
|
1: “strengthen[ing the EU’s] cyber resilience and capacities to protect” |
Vis-à-vis EUIBAs:
Vis-à-vis Member States:
General:
|
|
2: “enhanc[ing] solidary and comprehensive crisis management” |
Vis-à-vis EUIBAs:
General:
|
|
3: “promot[ing the EU’s] vision of cyberspace” |
Vis-à-vis EUIBAs:
Vis-à-vis Member States:
General:
|
|
4: “enhanc[ing] cooperation with partner countries and international organisations” |
Vis-à-vis EUIBAs:
General:
|
|
5: “prevent[ing], defend[ing] against and respond[ing] to cyber-attacks” |
Vis-à-vis Member States and EUIBAs:
Vis-à-vis EUIBAs:
Vis-à-vis Member States:
General:
|
— Strategic Compass
In March 2022, the Council approved the 📄 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence: For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security. Based on an “EU Threat Analysis,” the Compass starts by outlining threats implicating the EU’s strategic environment. With respect to cyber and IT security, the Strategic Compass emphasizes that “cyberspace has become a field for strategic competition, at a time of growing dependence on digital technologies” and that the EU “increasingly fac[es] more sophisticated cyberattacks” (p. 12). It notes Russia’s “readiness to use the highest level of military force, [...] combined with [...] cyberattacks” (p. 7) with respect to its armed aggression against Ukraine, China’s pursuit of “its policies [...] by using cyber tools” (p. 8), and the endangerment of “regional and international peace and security, through [...] cyberattacks” (p. 10) emanating from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Regarding EU action in the area of security and defense to address the resulting challenges, the Strategic Compass is centered around four work strands under which particular measures are subsumed. The overall objectives of the work strands are to:
-
“be able to act rapidly and robustly whenever a crisis erupts, with partners if possible and alone when necessary” (act, p. 3);
-
“enhance [the EU’s] ability to anticipate threats, guarantee secure access to strategic domains and protect our citizens” (secure, p. 3);
-
“invest more and better in capabilities and innovative technologies, fill strategic gaps and reduce technological and industrial dependencies” (invest, p. 4);
-
and “strengthen [EU] cooperation with partners to address common threats and challenges” (partner, p. 4).
The table below provides an exemplary overview of the measures within the work strands which are of relevance to cybersecurity policy:
Table 30: Objectives and Exemplary EU Actions Specified in the EU’s Strategic Compass
|
Work Strand |
Area/Objective of EU Action |
Exemplary Actions |
|---|---|---|
|
1. Act |
“Acting together” |
|
|
2. Secure |
“Strengthening our early warning, intelligence picture and secure communications” |
|
|
“Hybrid threats, cyber diplomacy and foreign information manipulation and interference” |
|
|
|
“Securing our access to strategic domains” |
|
|
|
3. Invest |
“Strategic orientations” |
|
|
“Coherent and ambitious capabilities” |
|
|
|
“Innovation, disruptive technologies and reducing strategic dependencies” |
|
|
|
4. Partner |
“Multilateral and regional partners” |
|
|
“Tailored bilateral partnerships” |
|
Cyber Diplomacy
— Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox
In its 2017 📄 Council conclusions on a Framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities, the Council of the EU notes “that measures within the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including, if necessary, restrictive measures, adopted under the relevant provisions of the Treaties, are suitable for a Framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities and should encourage cooperation, facilitate mitigation of immediate and long-term threats, and influence the behavior of potential aggressors in a long term” (p. 4). The Council further specifies that the framework shall be guided by the following considerations as guiding principles:
-
“serv[ing] to protect the integrity and security of the EU, its Member States and their citizens;”
-
“tak[ing] into account the broader context of the EU external relations with the State concerned;”
-
“provid[ing] for the attainment of the CFSP objectives as set out in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the respective procedures provided for their attainment”;
-
“be based on a shared situational awareness agreed among the Member States and correspond to the needs of the concrete situation in hand;”
-
“be proportionate to the scope, scale, duration, intensity, complexity, sophistication and impact of the cyber activity;”
-
and “respect[ing] applicable international law and must not violate fundamental rights and freedoms” (p. 4).
To follow through on the objective of establishing such a framework, the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, Member States have since approved the implementing guidelines for this Toolbox in 📄 2017 and subsequently revised them in 📄 2023. Both sets of guidelines reiterate the above-listed guiding principles. A revision of the implementing guidelines was deemed necessary against the backdrop of “a significant corrosion of international security, including in cyberspace” (p. 2, 2023), requiring the EU and its Member States to “step up their ability to strengthen situational awareness, prevent, discourage, deter and respond to malicious cyber activities, ensure solidarity and mutual assistance and enforce the United Nations framework for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace” (p. 3, 2023). As a consequence, the revised guidelines seek to add to the 2017’s “incident-based approach” by setting out “the development of sustained, tailored, coherent and coordinated strategies towards persistent cyber threat actors, to ensure a more strategic, gradual and long-term approach” (p. 11, 2023).
The measures included within the Toolbox are meant to be “complementary to existing and continuous cyber diplomacy engagement to advance conflict prevention, cooperation and stability in cyberspace” (p. 5, 2023) and can be carried out “individually or jointly, in coordination or in parallel, and where appropriate in cooperation with international partners” (p. 10, 2023). The Toolbox may further be “used in tandem with other Union measures” (p. 6, 2023), such as the EU Hybrid Toolbox or the EU Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox (p. 22, 2023). With regard to crisis management, “the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox can be implemented as part of, or in parallel and in complementarity of [EU] crisis management mechanisms” (p. 22, 2023), including, for example, the IPCR mechanism, the EEAS Crisis Management Response Mechanism, or the EEAS Situation Room. The 2023 implementing guidelines underscore the “key importance” of “ongoing and regular exchanges on the cyber threat landscape and thematic briefings in the HWPCI” for developing a “baseline understanding and shared awareness of the cyber threat landscape [which can] serve as the basis for assessments following a malicious cyber activity or cyber incident” (further specified on p. 12f., 2023).
The Toolbox, inter alia, comprises the following measures:
Table 31: Components of the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox
|
Category of Measures |
Specific Tools |
|---|---|
|
Preventive measures (p. 6, 2017) |
|
|
Cooperative measures (p. 7, 2017) |
|
|
Stability measures (p. 7f., 2017) |
|
|
Restrictive measures (p. 9, 2017) |
|
|
Possible EU support to Member States’ lawful responses (p. 9f., 2017) |
|
|
2023 additions (p. 10, 2023) |
The 2023 guidelines identified the following measures, among others [the guidelines refer to a full list contained in a classified separate annex]
|
To implement the Toolbox “in response to a large-scale cross border malicious cyber activity [... or] a situation of an accumulation of malicious cyber activities” (p. 22, 2023), the 2023 guidelines specify a 9-step-process 115 :
Table 32: Implementation of the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox
|
Step |
Specification |
|
|---|---|---|
|
1 |
Start discussions on the use of measures part of the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox (p. 15, 2023) |
|
|
2 |
Exchange of shared situational awareness (p. 15, 2023) |
|
|
3 |
Exploration of a possible joint EU diplomatic response (p. 15f., 2023) |
|
|
4 |
Deliberations on a possible joint EU diplomatic response (p. 16, 2023) |
|
|
5 |
Decision-making on the use of EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox (p. 16f., 2023) |
|
|
6 |
Implementation of the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox (p. 17, 2023) |
|
|
7 |
Cooperation with international partners (p. 17, 2023) |
|
|
8 |
Evaluation of the impact of the joint EU diplomatic response (p. 17f., 2023) |
|
|
9 |
Continued discussion about maintaiingn a sustained engagement (p. 18, 2023) |
|
In relation to attribution 116 , the 2023 guidelines note the possibility of pursuing “coordinated political attribution at EU level” (p. 18, 2023) while emphasizing that “political attribution is a sovereign political decision of Member States taken on a case-by-case basis” (p. 18, 2023) and “not all measures require attribution” (p. 18, 2023). The guidelines note seven objectives for carrying out political attributions, among them “expos[ing] the specific malicious cyber activity or specific actor,” “promot[ing] the UN framework for responsible state behaviour,” and “discourag[ing] future malicious cyber activities” (p. 18, 2023). The guidelines further list ten elements for consideration by states when “discussing the appropriateness of coordinating political attribution, and [...] deciding whether and how to communicate about coordinated attribution, either privately or publicly” (p. 19, 2023). These elements, for instance, include the “ability to influence the behaviour of malicious actors in cyberspace,” the “impact on the ongoing work of services such as law enforcement or intelligence services,” the “likelihood and impact of a counter-response by any actor” and the “reputation and credibility of the EU” (p. 19, 2023).
The 2023 guidelines further note the importance of employing strategic (public) communication on EU action for attaining the EU’s objectives and amplifying the effect of EU responses (p. 20f., 2023) and the added value of further exploring strengthened cooperation with non-EU countries, private sector entities, and international organisations (pp. 24-26, 2023). Concerning EU-NATO cooperation 117 , the 2023 guidelines stress “possible coordinated responses to malicious cyber activities [... and] seek[ing] potential synergies between the respective crisis management frameworks in the field of cybersecurity,” among other fields for inter-institutional collaboration (p. 25, 2023). Once a year, Member States and involved EUIBAs commit to “test[ing their] response to scenarios developed on the basis of regular EU risk assessment” in the framework of an “annual dedicated Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox exercise” (p. 26, 2023).
— Council Conclusions on Malicious Cyber Activities
In its 2018 📄 Council conclusions on malicious cyber activities, the Council “firmly condemns the malicious use of information and communications technologies (ICTs), including in Wannacry and NotPetya, which have caused significant damage and economic loss in the EU and beyond” (p. 2). EU Member States further stressed that “States must not use proxies to commit internationally wrongful acts using ICTs, and should seek to ensure that their territory is not used by non-state actors to commit such acts” (p. 3).
— Council Conclusions on Cyber Diplomacy
In February 2015, the Council adopted 📄 Council Conclusions on cyber diplomacy. EU Member States agreed that “the further development and implementation of a common and comprehensive EU approach for cyber diplomacy at global level” is “essential and crucial” (p. 4). The Conclusions lay out the following objectives and exemplary measures:
Table 33: Overview of Council Conclusions on Cyber Diplomacy
|
Objectives |
Exemplary Specifications |
|---|---|
|
Promotion and protection of human rights in cyberspace |
|
|
Norms of behaviour and application of existing international law in the field of international security |
|
|
Internet Governance |
|
|
Enhancing competitiveness and the prosperity of the EU |
|
|
Cyber capacity building and development |
|
|
Strategic engagement with key partners and international organisations |
|
Sanctions Regime
— Restrictive Measures Against Cyber-Attacks Threatening the Union or Its Member States
The European Union’s sanctions regime 118 for “targeted restrictive measures to deter and respond to cyber-attacks 119 with a significant effect which constitute an external threat 120 to the Union 121 or its Member States 122 ” (recital (2), Regulation 2019/796) is based on two components: First, the Council of the EU decides to list particular natural or legal persons (provided for in 📄 Council Decision 2019/797). Second, EU Member States implement the consequences of that listing within their jurisdiction (as provided for in 📄 Regulation 2019/796). Sanctioned natural and legal persons are listed in the Council Decision’s and Regulation’s Annex.
The determination of whether an effect is deemed significant shall be guided by the following factors:
-
“the scope, scale, impact or severity of disruption caused, including to economic and societal activities, essential services, critical State functions, public order or public safety;
-
the number of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies affected;
-
the number of Member States concerned;
-
the amount of economic loss caused [...];
-
the economic benefit gained by the perpetrator [...];
-
the amount or nature of data stolen or the scale of data breaches; or
-
the nature of commercially sensitive data accessed” (Art. 3 Decision 2019/797 and Art. 2 Regulation 2019/796).
EU Member States may decide to list:
-
(a) natural persons who are responsible for cyber-attacks or attempted cyber-attacks;
-
(b) natural persons who provide financial, technical or material support for or are otherwise involved in cyber-attacks or attempted cyber-attacks;”
-
or (c) other natural persons associated with persons of type (a) and (b) (Art. 4(1) Decision 2019/797).
Member States or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy may propose an initial listing or amend an existing listing. In turn, the Council must unanimously agree on any listing or amendment to it. Apart from specific proposals, the Council shall regularly review the list included in Annex I, at least annually. Any listing shall explicitly not be understood to constitute an “attribution of responsibility for cyber-attacks to a third State,” as this would remain “a sovereign political decision taken on a case-by-case basis” (recital (9) Decision 2019/797).
The consequences of a listing may be travel restrictions as well as implications for the funds and economic resources of these persons. Specifically, EU Member States shall
-
(i) “prevent the entry into, or transit through, their territories” (Art. 4 Decision 2019/797);
-
(ii) freeze “all funds and economic resources belonging to, owned, held or controlled by” the listed persons or entities (Art. 5(1) Decision 2019/797);
-
and (iii) not make “available directly or indirectly [of funds or economic resources] to or for the[ir] benefit” (Art. 5(2) Decision 2019/797).
Certain exceptions exist to the application of these measures (see further Art. 4(2), (3), (4), (6), (7) and Art. 5(3) and (4) Decision 2019/797 and Art. 4, 5, 6, 7 Regulation 2019/796) that permit derogation from Member States in particular instances. 123 To enforce these measures, Member States must designate competent authorities at the national level. Union-level cooperation shall be ensured so that Member States and the Commission share with each other when any of such measures are taken.
The sanctions regime also has an external dimension, as the Decision formulates the Union’s objective to “encourage third States to adopt [similar] restrictive measures” (Art. 9 Council Decision 2019/797).
Cyber Defence
— Council Decision on a European Union Partnership Mission in Moldova
In April 2023, the Council, via its 📄 Decision 2023/855, decided to establish a European Union Partnership Mission in the Republic of Moldova (EUPM Moldova) as a civilian mission under the umbrella of the CSDP upon request by the Moldovan Prime Minister. The EUPM Moldova predominantly comprises seconded experts of Member States, EUIBAs, or the EEAS. The EUPM Moldova’s objective is “enhancing the resilience of the security sector of the Republic of Moldova in the areas of crisis management and hybrid threats, including cybersecurity” (Art. 2(1)). Of relevance to cybersecurity, the EUPM Moldova’s mandate includes the support of crisis management structures and strategic advice “on the development of strategies and policies [...] for enhancing cybersecurity and for the protection of classified information” (Art. 2(2)).
— EU Policy on Cyber Defence
In November 2022, the Commission and the HR/VP put forward a 📄 Joint Communication on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence with the aim of boosting the EU’s cyber defence capabilities to enhance the Union’s ability to prevent, detect, defend against, recover from, and deter malicious cyber activities aimed at the EU and its Member States. The Joint Communication builds on the EU Cyber Defence Policy Framework (CDPF) from 2018 (as well as its predecessor from 2014). The 2018 CDPF had for the first time elevated cyberspace to being “the fifth domain of operations” (p. 2). Via its 📄 Council Conclusions on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence, adopted in May 2023, the Council reacted to the Commission’s and HR Joint Communication.
In a general vein, the Council encourages Member States to “further develop their own capabilities to conduct cyber defence operations, including when appropriate proactive defensive measures to protect, detect, defend and deter against cyberattacks” (p. 10) and note “the need to invest in our mutual assistance under Article 42(7) TEU as well as the solidarity clause under Article 222 TFEU” (p. 7). In accordance, the Council regards the EU Policy on Cyber Defence as an enabler for “the EU and its Member States to strengthen their ability to protect, detect, defend and deter, making appropriate use of the whole range of defensive options available to the civilian and military communities for the broader security and defence of the EU, in accordance with international law, including human rights law and international humanitarian law” (p. 3).
The Joint Communication and Council Conclusions are both built on four pillars. Table 34 provides a non-exhaustive overview of specific objectives and exemplary activities and measures as contained in each document:
Table 34: Overview of Joint Communication and Council Conclusions on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence
|
Pillar |
Document |
Exemplary Provisions |
|---|---|---|
|
Act together for a stronger cyber defence |
Joint Communication |
(i) Strengthening common situational awareness and coordination within defence community:
(ii) Enhancing coordination with civilian communities:
|
|
Council Conclusions |
|
|
|
Secure the EU defence ecosystem |
Joint Communication |
(i) Enhancing the cyber resilience of the defence ecosystem:
(ii) Ensure EU cyber defence interoperability and coherence of standards:
|
|
Council Conclusions |
|
|
|
Invest in cyber defence capabilities |
Joint Communication |
(i) Develop full-spectrum state-of-the-art cyber defence capabilities:
(ii) Agile, competitive and innovative European defence industry:
(iii) EU cyber defence workforce:
|
|
Council Conclusions |
|
|
|
Partner to address common challenges |
Joint Communication |
(i) Cooperation with NATO:
(ii) Cooperation with like-minded partners:
(iii) Cyber defence capacity building support for partner countries:
|
|
Council Conclusions |
|
In July 2023, the Council approved an Implementation Plan for the EU Policy on Cyber Defence, which remains confidential. The Commission and the HR/VP submit an annual report to the Council to “monitor and assess the progress” (p. 22, Joint Communication). of implementing the policy. The Council Conclusions invite Member States to report in this respect from the second quarter of 2024 onwards.
— European Peace Facility
In December 2021, the Council decided on establishing the European Peace Facility (EPF) via 📄 Council Decision 2021/509. The EPF permits the “financing by Member States of Union actions under the [...] CFSP to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security” (Art. 1(1)). Until 2027, more than 12 billion euros can be spent under the EPF. In particular, EPF actions relate to “common costs of Union operations [... that have] military or defence implications and which [...] cannot be charged to the Union budget” and “assistance measures” (Art. 1(2)). The latter can be “actions to strengthen the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters” as well as “support to military aspects of peace support operations led by a regional or international organisation or by third States” (Art. 1(2), point (b)). There are exceptions, but the standard way of initiating an EPF action is through the adoption of a Council decision. The management of the EPF rests with its Facility Committee, in which each Member State is represented. A few assistance measures financed under the EPF also include cyber defence components. For instance, EPF assistance measures directed toward Georgia and the Republic of Moldova finance “cyber-defence equipment” (Art. 1(3), point (e), Decision 2023/921 and Art. 1(3), point (d), Decision 2023/920), among other types of equipment. In support of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an EPF assistance measure funds the delivery of “cyber defence units” (Art. 1(3), point (d), Decision 2021/2135). 124
— European Union Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations
In 2021, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) agreed on a 📄 “European Union Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations”. Among the document’s objectives are “set[ting] the framework conditions and describ[ing] the ends, ways and means needed to use cyberspace as a domain of operations in support of EU CSDP military operations and missions” and “integrat[ing] cyberspace into all aspects of EU CSDP military operations and missions” (p. 5). The elaborated EU vision on cyberspace as a domain of operations is comprised of three ambitions: the EU
-
“is able to accomplish its objectives in the cyberspace domain as effectively as it does in the other domains in order to execute EU CSDP military operations and missions;”
-
“has effectively integrated cyberspace into EU CSDP military operations and missions planning and conduct, established an effective and consistent cyber resilience and cyber deterrence against potential adversaries, including international cooperation with partners in support of CD [cyber defence] of EU military CSDP;”
-
and “has achieved effective civil-military synergies in EU CSDP” (p. 10).
The document identifies 21 means in terms of capabilities and capacities to put the vision and strategic objectives into action:
Table 35: Means and Exemplary Actions As Specified in the European Union Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations
|
Mean |
Exemplary Actions |
|---|---|
|
1: Cyberspace Cultural Adoption |
|
|
2: Implementation of Cyberspace Operations (CO) Capabilities |
|
|
3: Integration of Cyberspace into Advance and Crisis Planning |
|
|
4: Cyber Defence Management & Evaluation Regime |
|
|
5: NIS Directive for the Military Domain |
|
|
6: Strong EU Cyberspace Skills Base |
|
|
7: Information Sharing |
|
|
8: Cyberspace Situational Awareness and Situational Understanding (CSASU) |
|
|
9: Cyber Resilience |
|
|
10: Protection and Defence of Military Networks and Systems |
|
|
11: Military Organizational Structures |
|
|
12: Interoperability |
|
|
13: Cyber Deterrence |
|
|
14: Cyber Incident Reporting and Response |
|
|
15: Cyberspace Personnel |
|
|
16: Cooperation with International Partners |
|
|
17: Military Conceptual Framework |
|
|
18: Civil-Military Cooperation and Harmonization |
|
|
19: Collaboration with industry, academia and the cybersecurity Market in EU |
|
|
20: Research and Technology |
|
|
21: Capability Development |
|
The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) shall regularly report to the EUMC about the implementation of the vision and strategy.
— Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)
In December 2017, the Council decided to establish the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) via its 📄 Decision 2017/2315. The PESCO aims to “jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations.” 125 Art. 42(6) and Art. 46 of the Treaty of the EU provide PESCO’s legal basis. PESCO projects offer participating EU Member States the opportunity to collaboratively plan, develop, and invest in shared capability projects. Relevant capabilities are identified based on the Capability Development Plan (CDP) 126 and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). 127 Once Member States are involved in particular PESCO projects, resulting commitments are legally binding. Each participating Member State must annually provide co-participating Member States with a National Implementation Plan. The financing of particular PESCO projects may be provided by the European Defence Fund (EDF). 128 Examples of PESCO-projects in the area of cyber defense are:
|
Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security (CRRTs) |
The goal of the CRRT project is the development of a cyber capability that could be deployed “as a response to cyber incidents and crises as well as a preventative measure [...] in time of need” (Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security: About). The CRRT PESCO project is coordinated by Lithuania, with Belgium, Croatia, Estonia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Denmark as participating Member States. Finland, France, Greece, Italy, and Spain are observers. |
|
Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform (CTIRISP) |
The CTIRISP PESCO project works on the “sharing of cyber threat intelligence through a networked Member State platform” (Permanent Structured Cooperation: Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform (CTIRISP)). The project is coordinated by Greece, with the further participation of Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Italy and Portugal. |
|
Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Center (CIDCC) |
The CIDCC project seeks to develop a permanent, multinational military element in which situational pictures from cyber and information space can be compared and evaluated. On that basis, it develops its own analyses and recommendations, which can be introduced in the planning and management of EU operations and missions. The project will be completed in 2026 upon its transfer into a standing European CIDCC. The project is coordinated by Germany, with the participation of France, Netherlands, and Hungary. Belgium, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Czech Republic, Cyprus, and Ireland are observers. [For further information see Permanent Structured Cooperation: Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Center (CIDCC) and German Federal Ministry of Defence (2023): Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre (CIDCC)] |
|
EU Cyber Academia and Innovation Hub (EU CAIH) |
The EU CAIH project seeks to “add value by enhancing the creation of an innovative web of knowledge for cyber defence and cyber security education and training” (Permanent Structured Cooperation: EU Cyber Academia and Innovation Hub (EU CAIH)). Inter alia, it is envisioned to provide a “coordination point for future cyber education, training and exercises” (ibid.). It is coordinated by Portugal, with the participation of Spain and Romania. |
|
Cyber Ranges Federations (CRF) |
The objective of the CRF PESCO project is to “federat[e] existing national Cyber Ranges [1] into a larger cluster with more capacity and unique services” to strengthen the “European Cyber Ranges capability” (Permanent Structured Cooperation: Cyber Ranges Federations (CRF)). The project is coordinated by Estonia, with the participation of Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Italy, Latvia, and Luxembourg. [1] The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines a cyber range as a “Realistic simulation of the internet, systems, applications, and devices in a training environment” (U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (2018): Cyber Ranges). |
Hybrid Threats and Campaigns
— Council Conclusions on a Framework for a Coordinated EU Response to Hybrid Campaigns
EU policies about hybrid threats also, in part, address issues of relevance to cybersecurity. In its 2022 📄 Council conclusions on a Framework for a coordinated EU response to hybrid campaigns, the Council stresses that “malicious cyber activities are often a key element of hybrid campaigns” (paragraph 19). With respect to the EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox, EU Member States underline “the need for relevant Council bodies, the High Representative and the Commission to encourage cooperation and synergies in the implementation of measures and actions decided on under this Framework [...] when and where appropriate” (paragraph 19).
— Joint Communication “Increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid threats”
Cybersecurity considerations play a role in three areas of action of the Commission’s and the HR/VP’s 2018 📄 Joint Communication “Increasing resilience and bolstering capabilities to address hybrid threats”. In the area of situational awareness, the Communication notes the expansion of the EU Hybrid Fusion Cell with “cyber analytical components” by the HR/VP (p. 5). In relation to strategic communication, the Communication highlights the Commission’s efforts to “hold high-level events [...] with Member States and relevant stakeholders, [...] to promote best practices and guidelines on how to prevent, mitigate and respond to cyber-enabled and disinformation threats to elections” (p. 7). The Communication includes a dedicated cybersecurity-related area of action, namely “building resilience and deterrence in the cybersecurity sector” (p. 7). In this context, the Communication, inter alia, underlines close cooperation by the Commission and the HR/VP to “advance the cyber aspects of EU-wide crisis management and response mechanisms” (p. 9). The Communication invites Member States to “continue their work on attribution of cyber-attacks and the practical use of the cyber diplomacy toolbox to step up the political response to cyber-attacks” (p. 9).
— Joint Communication “Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats”
In 2016, the Commission and the High Representative issued a 📄 Joint Communication “Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats”. The Communication describes hybrid threats as a “mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare” (p. 2). Concerning cybersecurity, the Communication, inter alia, addresses the need for enhanced CSIRT cooperation (p. 10), cooperation with industry “to develop and test technologies to better protect users and infrastructures against cyber aspects of hybrid threats” (p. 11), issuing “guidance to smart grid asset owners to improve cybersecurity of their installations” (p. 11), “promot[ing] and facilitat[ing] threat information-sharing platforms and networks” (p. 12) in the financial sector, and “examin[ing] how to respond to hybrid threats, in particular those concerning cyber-attacks across the transport sector” (p. 12).
Development Cooperation and Cyber Capacity-Building
— EU Global Gateway
Via the 📄 EU Global Gateway (2021), the EU seeks to “channel EU spending on global infrastructure development” in a “security-focused” manner, among other principles (p. 4). To this end, “Global Gateway projects will invest in infrastructure to plug vulnerabilities [...] and build capacity in the face of [...] cyber or hybrid threats” (p. 4).
— Global Europe
In June 2021, the EU established the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (Global Europe) until 2027 via 📄 Regulation 2021/947. The Global Europe Instrument can implement programmes of a geographic or thematic nature and provides funding for rapid response actions (Art. 4(1)). While not representing a particular focus of the instrument, both types of programmes also include cybersecurity considerations:
-
Geographic programmes shall facilitate “country and multi-country cooperation” in the following regions: the European Neighbourhood [1], Sub-Saharan Africa, the Asia-Pacific, Americas and the Caribbean. In the context of the objective of promoting “inclusive and sustainable economic growth and decent employment,” geographical programmes shall, inter alia, “promot[e] accessible, affordable, inclusive, reliable and secure digital connectivity [...and] address[...] cybersecurity, data privacy and other regulatory issues linked to digitalisation” (Annex II). As a contribution to “peace, stability and conflict prevention,” activities may also involve “supporting capacity-building in cyber security [and] resilient digital networks” (Annex II). 📄 Commission Delegated Regulation 2021/1530 supplements the Regulation by designating “specific objectives and priority areas of cooperation” (Art. 1). Cybersecurity-related priority areas of cooperation were identified for the following regions:
Table 36: Cybersecurity-Related Priority Areas of Cooperation of Global Europe Geographic Programmes
|
Region |
Objectives |
Cybersecurity-Related Priority Areas of Cooperation |
|---|---|---|
|
Neighbourhood East |
“investing in democracy, good governance, peace and security, the rule of law and justice” (p. 4) |
“[...] stepping-up cooperation in countering hybrid threats and disinformation, ensuring cyber security and combating cyber crimes” (p. 4) |
|
“investing in resilient digital transformation” (p. 5) |
“strengthening cyber resilience” (p. 5) |
|
|
Neighbourhood South |
“cooperating on peace and security” (p. 3) |
“stepping-up cooperation on [...] addressing cybersecurity, cybercrime and hybrid threats” (p. 3) |
|
The Americas |
“digital transformation and innovation” (p. 15) |
“Supporting standardisation and policy cooperation addressing cybersecurity [...]” (p. 15) |
[1] Annex I specifies what countries the EU considers as ‘neighborhood countries’.
-
As one of four areas, thematic programmes shall center around activities in the area of “peace, stability and conflict prevention,” also to support the mitigation of “global and trans-regional [emerging] threats” through “technical and financial assistance”. In relation to cybersecurity, such assistance shall enhance “the capacity of law enforcement and judicial and civil authorities involved in the fight against [...] cyber-crime” and address “threats to public spaces, critical infrastructure, including [...] cybersecurity” (Annex III).
— Council Conclusions on EU External Cyber Capacity Building Guidelines
The 2018 📄 Council Conclusions on EU External Cyber Capacity Building Guidelines 129 underscore that “external cyber capacity building [CCB] initiatives by the EU and its Member States should prioritise addressing cybercrime and increasing cybersecurity in partner countries and regions, with a focus on reforms across the main pillars of cyber resilience, namely by
-
supporting an overarching strategic framework,
-
promoting legislative reforms and increasing the capacities of the criminal justice system,
-
developing and increasing incident management capabilities,
-
developing education, professional training and expertise in this field and
-
promoting cyber hygiene and awareness as well as a culture of security assessment of digital products, processes and services (p. 8).”
Both the EU and Member States shall draw on the NIS Directive “as inspiration for the development of cybersecurity legislation in partner countries” (p. 9). Furthermore, every external CCB activity shall take into account the “EU’s core values and principles for cybersecurity” (p. 7) and build on development cooperation-related lessons learned to elevate their “effectiveness and sustainability (p. 7):
Table 38: Overview of EU External Cyber Capacity Building Guidelines
|
Values and Principles (p. 7) |
Lessons Learned (p. 7f) |
|---|---|
|
|
Support to Other International Organizations
— International Atomic Energy Agency
Through 📄 Council Decision 2024/656, the Council decided to continue supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in specific areas guided by three objectives. One of the three objectives aspires to “build[...] capacity to strengthen nuclear security” (Art. 1(3), point (c)). As one of six components under the objective, this also includes “capacity building in computer security” (p. 7) through the provision of “international, regional and national training courses” (p. 8) on cyber and IT security for nuclear security professionals. These trainings shall be conducive to “gaining enhanced information and computer security capabilities at the State and facility levels to support the prevention and detection of, and response to, computer security incidents that have the potential to either directly or indirectly adversely impact nuclear safety and security” (p. 8). Whereas the HR/VP holds the responsibility for the overall implementation of the Decision, the technical implementation rests with the IAEA (Art. 2). This Decision builds upon prior Decisions outlining support actions for the IAEA that have also encompassed issues of cyber and information security (see further 📄 Council Decision 2013/517 and 📄 Council Decision 2020/1656).
— Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Through its 📄 Decision 2021/1026, the Council decided to support the Cyber Security and Resilience and Information Assurance Programme of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) through three types of activities, facilitating the:
-
“operationalisation of an enabling environment for ongoing cyber security and resilience efforts within multi-site OPCW operations;”
-
“designing of customised solutions for on-premises and cloud-based system integration and configuration with OPCW ICT systems and privileged access management (PAM) solutions;”
-
and “initiation and testing of PAM solutions” (Art. 1(2)).
Whereas the HR/VP holds the responsibility for the overall implementation of the activities, the technical implementation rests with the OPCW’s own Technical Secretariat (Art. 2). A bit more than two million euros were dedicated for the realization of the project. The Decision expires on 30 August 2024.
Policy Area 8: Cybersecurity of EU Institutions, Bodies and Agencies
Deep Dive: Regulation 2023/2841
|
📄 Regulation laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (2023/2841) |
|---|
|
Entry into force: 7 January 2024 |
|
Previous legislation: NA |
|
Subsequent documents of relevance: NA |
|
Objective (Art. 1): “achieve a high common level of cybersecurity within Union entities” |
|
Subject matter (Art. 1) “This Regulation lays down measures [...] with regard to:
|
|
Actors established/regulated by Regulation 2023/2841:
|
|
Deep Dive Structure -> Cybersecurity Measures -> Information-Sharing, Reporting, Incident Response and Management -> Compliance -> Review |
As somewhat an equivalent to the obligations stipulated for essential and important entities in the NIS 2 Directive, Regulation 2023/2841 lays down cybersecurity-related obligations that must be implemented by every EU institution, body, or agency. 130 According to the Regulation, the “highest level of management of each Union entity shall be responsible for [its] implementation” (Art. 6(5)).
Overviews of the relevant provisions on CERT-EU and the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board (IICB) are covered within their actor profiles in Chapter 13.
Cybersecurity Measures
The Regulation foresees that every Union entity 131 must put in place an “internal cybersecurity risk-management, governance and control framework” (Art. 6), conduct “cybersecurity maturity assessments” (Art. 7), undertake “cybersecurity risk management measures” (Art. 8), and develop a “cybersecurity plan” (Art. 9). For each of these measures, the IICB is tasked with drafting guidelines that Union entities “shall take into account” (Art. 5). Before drafting these guidelines, the IICB shall consult ENISA and obtain guidance by CERT-EU.
EUIBAs should establish the framework following an “initial cybersecurity review” (Art. 6(1)). The ambit of the framework shall be “the entirety of the unclassified ICT environment of the Union entity concerned, including any on-premises ICT environment, operational technology network, outsourced assets and services in cloud computing environments or hosted by third parties, mobile devices, corporate networks, business networks not connected to the internet and any devices connected to those environments” (Art. 6(2)), for which it shall put in place
-
“internal cybersecurity policies, including objectives and priorities, for the security of network and information systems,” and
-
“roles and responsibilities of the Union entity’s staff tasked with ensuring the effective implementation of this Regulation” (Art. 6(3)).
Under this provision, EU entities are also obliged to ensure that “effective mechanisms [are] in place to ensure that an adequate percentage of the ICT budget is spent on cybersecurity” (Art. 6(7)). The framework also includes the designation of a “local cybersecurity officer” (or equivalent) to act as the entities’ cybersecurity SPOC, who shall “report directly to the highest level of management on a regular basis on the state of implementation” (Art. 6(8)).
In addition, each Union entity must undertake a cybersecurity maturity assessment every two years (Art. 7) 132 and “take appropriate and proportionate technical, operational and organisational measures to manage the cybersecurity risks identified” (Art. 8(1)). In effect, the cybersecurity risk-management measures “shall ensure a level of security of network and information systems across the entirety of the ICT environment commensurate to the cybersecurity risks posed” (Art. 8 (1)). The Regulation specifies domains for measures and points out examples for particular measures. Among the domains feature “cybersecurity policy,” “policies on cybersecurity risk analysis and information system security,” “policy objectives regarding the use of cloud computing services”, “organisation of cybersecurity,” “supply chain security,” or “incident handling” (for a complete list, see Art. 8(2)). Measures taken in these domains should at least comprise, inter alia, the “use of cryptography and encryption,” “proactive measures for detection and removal of malware and spyware,” or “criteria for secure software development and evaluation” (for a complete list see Art. 8(3)). Building upon the insights gained when carrying out prior measures, EU entities shall each adopt a “cybersecurity plan” that includes, inter alia, the measures taken in accordance with complying with Article 8 as well as the “Union entity’s cyber crisis management plan for major incidents” (Art. 9). Subsequently, every entity shall share their plan with the IICB (Art. 3) and, upon request, with the European Parliament and Council (Art. 20(4)).
The following timelines apply for the implementation of each measure:
|
Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
IICB (after consultation with ENISA and guidance from CERT-EU) |
Issuance of guidelines to Union entities to conduct an initial cybersecurity review and establishing an internal cybersecurity risk-management, governance and control framework, carrying out cybersecurity maturity assessments, taking cybersecurity risk-management measures, and adopting the cybersecurity plan |
8 September 2024 |
- |
Art. 5(1) |
|
Each Union entity |
Establishment of an internal cybersecurity risk-management, governance and control framework |
8 April 2025 |
Review on a regular basis, at least every four years |
Art. 6(1) |
|
Each Union entity |
Conduct of cybersecurity maturity assessment |
8 July 2025 |
At least every two years thereafter |
Art. 7(1) |
|
Each Union entity |
Enactment of appropriate and proportionate technical, operational and organisational measures to manage the cybersecurity risks identified under the Framework, and to prevent or minimise the impact of incidents |
8 September 2025 |
- |
Art. 8(1) |
|
Each Union entity |
Approval of cybersecurity plan |
8 January 2026 |
Revision every two years |
Art. 9(1) |
|
IICB |
Submission of a report [1] on implementation progress and CERT-EU-Member State cooperation -> European Parliament and Council [1] This report shall also be used as “an input to the biennial report on the state of cybersecurity in the Union” (Art. 10(14)) to be prepared pursuant to the NIS 2 Directive. |
8 January 2025 |
Annually thereafter |
Art. 10(14) |
Information-Sharing, Reporting, Incident Response and Management
Voluntarily, EUIBAs can share “information on, incidents, cyber threats, near misses and vulnerabilities” that are impacting them with the CERT-EU (Art. 20(1)). To this end, CERT-EU shall provide for “efficient means of communication, with a high level of traceability, confidentiality and reliability” (Art. 20(1)). The other way around, CERT-EU may also “request Union entities to provide it [without undue delay] with information from their respective ICT system inventories, including information relating to cyber threats, near misses, vulnerabilities, indicators of compromise, cybersecurity alerts and recommendations regarding configuration of cybersecurity tools to detect incidents” (Art. 20(2)). 133 The Regulation further puts in place reporting obligations for EU entities to report when they become subject of a “significant incident” (Art. 21). To determine an incident’s significance, the Regulation lists two elements that can give rise to a significant incident:
-
(a) the incident “has caused or is capable of causing severe operational disruption to the functioning of, or financial loss to, the Union entity concerned;” or
-
(b) the incident “has affected or is capable of affecting other natural or legal persons by causing considerable material or non-material damage” (Art. 21(1)).
In reporting such an incident to CERT-EU, the following specific timelines apply:
Table 38: Overview of Regulation 2023/2841’s Incident Reporting Obligations
|
I. Action to be taken by EU entity |
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
(a) Without undue delay, >24h of “becoming aware” of significant incident |
(b) Without undue delay, > 72h of “becoming aware” of significant incident |
(c) “Where applicable [...] without undue delay” |
(d) Upon request by CERT-EU |
(e) <1 month after [I (b)] has been submitted |
|
Submission of an incident notification [1] to CERT-EU. Where applicable, the notification shall update information provided in the warning of step (a) and “indicate an initial assessment of the significant incident, including its severity and impact, as well as, where available, the indicators of compromise” (Art. 21(2), point (b)) |
Communication of the incident to “the users of the network and information systems affected, or of other components of the ICT environment, that are potentially affected by a significant incident or a significant cyber threat” paired with “where appropriate, [the] need to take mitigating measures, any measures or remedies” (Art. 21(5)) |
Submission of an intermediate report to CERT-EU outlining “relevant status updates” (Art. 21(2), point (c)) |
Submission of a final report [2] to CERT-EU. If the incident is still ongoing at the time, essential and important entities must submit a progress report instead. In the latter case, a final report must then additionally be provided “within one month of their handling of the incident” (Art. 21(2), point (d) and (e)) |
|
[1] An EUIBA’s incident notification shall include “any information enabling CERT-EU to determine any cross-entity impact, impact on the hosting Member State or cross-border impact following a significant incident” (Art. 21(4)). [2] The final report shall comprise “(i) a detailed description of the incident, including its severity and impact; (ii) the type of threat or root cause that is likely to have triggered the incident; (iii) applied and ongoing mitigation measures; [and] (iv) where applicable, the cross-border or cross-entity impact of the incident” (Art. 21(2), point (d)). |
||||
|
II. Action to be taken by CERT-EU |
|---|
|
No specified timeline |
|
Every quarter, CERT-EU shall provide the IICB, ENISA, EU INTCEN, and the CSIRTs Network with a “summary report including anonymised and aggregated data on significant incidents, incidents, cyber threats, near misses and vulnerabilities” (Art. 21(8)). 134 The Regulation mandates the IICB to “issue guidelines or recommendations further specifying the arrangements for, and format and content of, the reporting pursuant to this Article” by 8 July 2024 (Art. 21(9)). 135
The Regulation stipulates that the CERT-EU acts as the Union’s “cybersecurity information exchange and incident response coordination hub” (Art. 22). This involves facilitation with respect to information-sharing among entities and Member State counterparts and of Union-wide incident response coordination. The latter involves
-
“contribution to consistent external communication;”
-
“mutual support, such as sharing information relevant to Union entities, or providing assistance, where relevant directly on site;”
-
“optimal use of operational resources;”
-
and “coordination with other crisis response mechanisms at Union level” (Art. 22(2)).
CERT-EU’s role in incident response also extends to support for Union entities in the area of “situational awareness of incidents, cyber threats, vulnerabilities and near misses” (Art. 22(3)) with the close involvement of ENISA. CERT-EU is further tasked with developing “guidelines or recommendations on incident response coordination and cooperation for significant incidents,” which are to be agreed upon by the IICB by 8 January 2025 (Art. 22(4)). The IICB is further instructed to prepare a cyber crisis management plan, “in close cooperation with CERT-EU and ENISA,” that touches upon the following issues:
-
“arrangements concerning coordination and information flow among Union entities for the management of major incidents at operational level;”
-
“common standard operating procedures (SOPs);”
-
“a common taxonomy of major incident severity and crisis triggering points;”
-
“regular exercises;”
-
and “secure communication channels that are to be used” (Art. 23(1)).
The coordination of the management of major incidents among EUIBAs rests with the CERT-EU. To this end, CERT-EU “shall maintain an inventory of the available technical expertise that would be needed for incident response in the event of major incidents” 136 for which EUIBAs need to provide a “list of experts available within their respective organisations detailing their specific technical skills” every year (Art. 23(3) and (4)).
|
Who |
What |
When |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|
|
CERT-EU |
Submission of a report on significant incidents, incidents, cyber threats, near misses and vulnerabilities -> IICB, ENISA, EU INTCEN, and CSIRTs Network |
Every three months |
Art. 21(8) |
|
IICB |
Issuance of guidelines or recommendations further specifying the arrangements for, and format and content of, incident reporting |
8 July 2024 |
Art. 21(9) |
|
IICB |
Adoption of guidelines or recommendations on incident response coordination and cooperation for significant incidents |
8 January 2025 |
Art. 22(4) |
Compliance
In addition to other tasks, the Regulation tasks the IICB to “effectively monitor the implementation of this Regulation and of adopted guidelines, recommendations and calls for action by the Union entities” (Art. 12(1)). In cases of non-compliance, the IICB is, inter alia, empowered to “communicate a reasoned opinion to the Union entity concerned with observed gaps in the implementation of this Regulation,” “issue a warning to address identified shortcomings within a specified period,” or “issue a recommendation that all Member States and Union entities implement a temporary suspension of data flows to the Union entity concerned” (for a complete list of powers, see further Article 12(2)).
Review
|
Who |
What |
When |
Post-Deadline |
Legal Basis |
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
IICB |
Submission of a report on the Regulation’s implementation -> Commission |
8 January 2025 |
Annually thereafter |
Art. 25(1) |
|
Commission |
Assessment and report on the Regulation’s implementation and “experience gained at a strategic and operational level” -> European Parliament and Council |
8 January 2027 |
Biannually thereafter |
Art. 25(2) |
|
Commission |
Evaluation of the Regulation’s functioning and submission of a report -> European Parliament, Council and European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions |
By 8 January 2029 |
- |
Art. 25(3) |
Rules for Particular EUIBAs
— European External Action Service
In June 2023, the Union’s High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy adopted a 📄 Decision on the security rules for the European External Action Service (EEAS). Scope-wise, the Decision applies “to all EEAS staff and all staff in Union Delegations”. The Decision specifies “the general regulatory framework for managing effectively the risks to staff placed under the responsibility of the EEAS [...], to EEAS premises 137 , physical assets, information, and visitors” (Art. 1). In relation to cybersecurity, the Decision stipulates that the EEAS shall ensure that a process is in place for reporting security incidents, for which “cyber attacks” are enumerated as a potential scenario (Art. 7 (1)). The Decision also provides for the possibility of carrying out security investigations “in case of cyber-incidents” (Art. 10). The Decision further assigns particular tasks and functions to the EEAS Directorate responsible for headquarters (HQ) security and EEAS information security within the purview of the EEAS Directorate General for Resource Management. For instance, the Directorate is in charge of the “Communication and Information Systems (CIS) and information security for Union Delegations” (Art. 13).
— European Commission
The 📄 Commission Decision on the security of communication and information systems in the European Commission (2017) regulates the use of “communication and information systems (CISs) 138 which are owned, procured, managed or operated by or on behalf of the Commission and all usage of those CISs by the Commission” (Art. 1(1)). The Decision applies to “all Commission departments and Executive Agencies” (Art. 1(3)) and “Members of the Commission, to Commission staff [...], to national experts seconded to the Commission [...], to external service providers and their staff, to trainees and to any individual with access to CIS” (Art. 1(4)). “Overall responsibility for the governance of IT security as a whole within the Commission” rests with the Commission’s Corporate Management Board (Art. 5), with the support of the Information Security Steering Board (ISSB), which is entrusted with the “operational responsibility for the governance of IT security as a whole within the Commission” (Art. 6). The Decision lays down “legality, transparency, proportionality and accountability” as IT security principles within the Commission (Art. 3(1)). To this end, the following elements shall be ensured appropriately: authenticity, availability, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, protection of personal data and professional secrecy (Art. 3(3)). The Decision specifies and assigns tasks for the following entities/actors in general and in relation to IT security incident 139 handling:
Table 39: Overview of Tasks and Responsibilities in Relation to IT Security and IT Security Handling Within Commission Decision 2017/46
|
Entities/ Actors |
Definition |
Non-exhaustive Examples of Tasks and Responsibilities in Relation to IT Security |
Non-exhaustive Examples of Tasks and Responsibilities in Relation to IT Security Incident Handling (Art. 15) |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security (DG HR) |
Art. 6:
|
|
|
|
Directorate-General for Informatics (DG DIGIT) [1] [1] DG DIGIT is called the Directorate-General for Digital Services since November 2023
|
Art. 7:
|
|
|
|
Commission departments |
any Commission Directorate-General or service, or any Cabinet of a Member of the Commission (Art. 2, point (3)) |
Art. 8:
|
|
|
System owners |
the individual responsible for the overall procurement, development, integration, modification, operation, maintenance, and retirement of a CIS (Art. 2, point (33)) |
Art. 9:
|
|
|
Data owners |
the individual responsible for ensuring the protection and use of a specific data set handled by a CIS (Art. 2, point (7)) |
Art. 10:
|
|
|
Local Informatics Security Officers (LISOs) |
the officer who is responsible for IT security liaison for a Commission department (Art. 2, point (26)) |
Art. 11:
|
|
|
Users |
any individual who uses functionality provided by a CIS, whether inside or outside the Commission (Art. 2, point (34)) |
Art. 12:
|
|
The Commission Decision also instructs the DG DIGIT and DG HR to regularly “exchange information and coordinate the handling of security incidents” (Art. 15(3)). The Commission may draw on CERT–EU to “support the incident handling process when appropriate and for knowledge sharing with other EU institutions and agencies that may be affected” (Art. 15(4)).
Compliance with the outlined provisions and deliverables is mandatory (Art. 14(1)). Non-compliance may, for instance, result in disciplinary action or the imposition of mitigation measures in specified circumstances (Art. 14). The Decision is complemented by Commission Decision 2018/559 laying down implementing rules for Article 6 and Commission Decision 2017/8841 laying down implementing rules for Articles 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, the latter of which is not publicly available.
The 📄 Commission Decision on Security in the Commission (2015) “sets out the objectives, basic principles, organisation and responsibilities regarding security at the Commission” (Art. 2(2)). In the Decision’s recital, the Commission notes that “the Commission, like other international bodies, faces major threats and challenges in the field of security, in particular as regards terrorism, cyberattacks and political and commercial espionage” (recital (2)). The Decision stipulates that “all Communication and Information Systems (‘CIS’) used by the Commission shall comply with the Commission's Information Systems Security Policy, as set out in Decision C(2006) 3602, its implementing rules and corresponding security standards” (Art. 10(1)), subsequently repealed by Commission Decision 2017/46. The Decision grants DG HR the power to conduct “security inquiries [..., for instance,] in case of serious cyber-incidents” (Art. 13(1), point (d)) under specified circumstances. In such cases, DG HR and DG DIGIT “shall collaborate closely” (Art. 13 (7)). In this respect, the Decision mandates DG HR to “conduct[...] forensic technical analysis in cooperation with the competent Commission departments in support of the security inquiries [...] related to counterintelligence, data leakage, cyberattacks and information systems security” (Art. 11). Consultations between DG HR and DG DIGIT on security inquiries shall also extend to examining “when it is appropriate to inform the competent authorities of the host country or any other Member State concerned” (Art. 13(7)), a decision to be ultimately taken by the DG HR. In relation to cybersecurity, the Decision further tasks the DG HR with “implementing security measures aimed at mitigating risks to security and developing and maintaining appropriate CIS to cover its operational needs” (Art. 18(1), point (5)) and “ensur[ing] external liaison [...] with the security authorities of other Union institutions, of agencies and bodies, of the Member States and of third countries in the field of response to cyberattacks with a potential impact on security in the Commission” (Art. 18(2), point (4)).
Who Does What in EU Cybersecurity Policy: Actor Profiles
Table 40 provides an overview of the involved actors per policy area (see Figure 4), ordered by five actor type categories:
-
EU Institutions, Bodies, and Agencies (EUIBAs) and EU-internal Coordination Bodies;
-
EU-Member State Coordination Bodies;
-
Member States;
-
Other Stakeholders;
-
and Bodies with Stakeholder Involvement.
This Chapter includes actor profiles for each actor listed in categories 1, 2, and 5 within dedicated subsections in alphabetical order. The profiles specify an actor’s role, mandate, and the activities they engage in with respect to cyber and IT security (policy). 140
Figure 4: Policy Areas of Compendium
Table 40: Involved Actors Per Policy Area and Actor Type
|
Actor Type |
Policy Areas |
Involved Actors (in alphabetical order) |
|---|---|---|
|
1: EU Institutions, Bodies and Agencies (EUIBAs) and EU-internal Coordination Bodies |
All Policy Areas |
|
|
Policy Areas 2, 6 & 7 |
|
|
|
Policy Area 3 |
|
|
|
Policy Area 4 |
|
|
|
Policy Area 5 |
|
|
|
Policy Area 6 |
|
|
|
Policy Area 7 |
|
|
|
Policy Area 8 |
|
|
|
2: EU-Member State Coordination Bodies |
Policy Area 2 |
|
|
Policy Areas 2, 3, 5, 6 & 7 |
|
|
|
Policy Areas 2 & 6 |
|
|
|
Policy Area 4 |
|
|
|
3: Member States |
All Policy Areas |
|
|
Policy Area 2 |
|
|
|
Policy Areas 2 & 4 |
|
|
|
Policy Area 6 |
|
|
|
4: Other Stakeholders |
Policy Area 2 |
Inter alia:
|
|
Policy Areas 2 & 4 |
|
|
|
Policy Area 3 |
Inter alia:
|
|
|
Policy Area 5 |
Inter alia:
|
|
|
Policy Area 6 |
Inter alia:
|
|
|
5: Bodies with Stakeholder Involvement |
Policy Area 2 |
|
EU Institutions
— Council of the European Union (Council)
Website: www.consilium.europa.eu
EU Member States coordinate their policies at the EU level in the Council of the European Union (often just referred to as “Council” to differentiate it from the European Council). Together with the European Parliament, the Council is tasked with “exercis[ing] legislative and budgetary functions” (Art. 16(1) TEU). The Council, which meets at the level of the ministers responsible for their policy area at the national level, convenes in ten thematic configurations – such as Foreign Affairs (FAC), Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), or Economic and Financial Affairs (ECOFIN). The Council is involved in the EU legislative process and may also, in particular circumstances, adopt EU legal acts by itself. The Council is responsible for “defining and implementing” (Art. 26(2) TEU) the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) based on the decisions and guidelines adopted by the European Council. Once activated, for instance, in the event of an EU-wide crisis emanating from a cybersecurity-related threat, the Council takes over coordination on the EU level through the Integrated Political Crisis Response (IPCR). The Council has established several bodies for coordination and information exchange, as well as the preparation of ministerial meetings. Of cyber and IT security policy relevance are, inter alia, the following:
|
Subordinate body |
Description |
|---|---|
|
Political and Security Committee (PSC) |
The PSC is responsible for the EU’s CFSP. It usually meets twice a week but gathers more frequently when necessary. The PSC monitors international situation developments and is responsible for the political control and strategic management of crisis management operations. It may be involved in the decision-making process of cyber-related diplomatic actions and the response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises at the EU level. The PSC is composed of Member States’ ambassadors in Brussels or representatives of Member States’ foreign ministries. [See further Council of the European Union: Political and Security Committee (PSC)] |
|
Horizontal Working Party on Cyber Issues (HWPCI) |
The HWPCI, set up in 2016, coordinates the Council’s work on cyber policy and respective legal acts. The tasks and objectives of the HWPCI also include harmonizing and unifying approaches to cyber policy issues, improving information sharing on cyber issues between EU Member States, and setting EU cyber priorities and strategic objectives within the EU. The HWPCI may, for example, prepare meetings of the PSC on a case-by-case basis. The HPWCI maintains cooperative relations with the Commission, EEAS, ENISA, Europol, Eurojust, and the EDA. [See further Council of the European Union: Horizontal Working Party on Cyber Issues (Cyber)] |
|
Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI) |
The COSI works towards strengthening operational measures and coordination among Member States in relation to the internal security of the EU, for instance, in areas such as law enforcement and judiciary. The COSI includes senior officials from the interior and justice ministries of all EU Member States, representatives of the Commission and the EEAS. Europol, Eurojust and other EUIBAs may be invited to participate as observers. [See further Council of the European Union: Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security (COSI)] |
The Council is assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council (GSC), which also comprises a dedicated unit for cybersecurity (GSC.SMART.2.B).
The presidency of the Council and chairmanship of Council bodies rotate biannually among EU Member States. The Council may instruct the Commission to negotiate international agreements, with their conclusion being subject to a decision of the Council based on a Commission proposal. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy chairs the FAC, and representatives of the EEAS chair the PSC. The Council is represented in the IICB. The NIS Cooperation Group is chaired by the respective Member State holding the Presidency of the Council. Every 18 months, and for the first time by 18 July 2024, EU-CyCLONe reports to the Council about its work. The IICB reports annually (for the first time by 8 January 2025) to the Council on the implementation of Regulation 2023/2841 and CERT-EU-Member State cooperation. The EDA is subordinate to the Council of the EU, to which it reports and from which it receives its guidance. The Council of the EU is involved in the appointment of the EDPS, who can advise it upon request.
— European Central Bank (ECB)
Website: www.ecb.europa.eu
As the supervisory authority for the euro area, the European Central Bank (ECB) also assumes responsibility for monitoring and ensuring the operational capability of financial market infrastructure and system-relevant payment systems by building cyber resilience. To this end, the ECB promotes, among other things, the international exchange of security-related information, identifies best practices, and has established a common European framework for “threat intelligence-based ethical red-teaming” (TIBER-EU) to, inter alia, diagnose strengths and weaknesses. In addition, national central banks in the euro area are required to report significant cybersecurity incidents to the ECB. The ECB also oversees how the national central banks manage relevant risks to their IT systems.
The ECB supervises the national central banks of the euro area. It cooperates with other EU institutions, such as the Commission and the CERT-EU, as well as national cybersecurity authorities. The ECB chairs and provides the Secretariat for the Euro Cyber Resilience Board for pan-European Financial Infrastructures (ECRB). 141 The ECB is represented in the IICB.
— European Commission (EC)
Website: commission.europa.eu
The European Commission plays a strategic and organizational role within EU cybersecurity architecture. With respect to legislation, unless it is specifically precluded, the Commission is the sole actor authorized to propose legislative EU acts for adoption (Art. 17(2) TEU). In addition, it is responsible for keeping track of the implementation status of EU policies and legal acts. The Commission consists of a College of issue area-Commissioners under the political guidance of the Commission President. The Commissioners “are responsible for the implementation of the political priorities laid down in the President’s political guidelines and the Commission Work Programme” and are supported by their “Cabinets and the Commission services.” 142 Every Commission acts on the basis of strategic priorities defined at the beginning of its term, which are further specified in dedicated annual Commission work programs. Decision 2017/46 specifies and assigns tasks for the Directorate-General for Digital Services (DG DIGIT) and the Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security (DG HR) (within the purview of the Commissioner for Budget and Administration) in relation to IT security in general and particularly regarding IT security incident handling as outlined in detail in Policy Area 8. In addition, several Commission Directorates-General (DGs) work on cyber/IT security. Among them is the Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT), within the purview of the Commissioner for the Internal Market, which is responsible for the development and implementation of Commission policies in the areas of the digital economy (“digital single market”) and society, as well as research and innovation. To this end, among other things, it works towards “ensur[ing] European leadership and independence in critical digital technologies” and “making Europe a global leader in the data economy and in cybersecurity.” 143 DG CONNECT acts as the lead DG for Digital Europe, which provides strategic funding in various fields, including cybersecurity, to promote the digital transformation of society and the economy. In addition, other DGs are responsible for relevant files covered within this compendium which address cybersecurity considerations (for a complete list of files covered within this compendium, see Chapter 4):
Table 41: Overview of Commission DGs and Responsibilities for Cybersecurity-Related Files
|
Commissioner |
DGs and Files |
|---|---|
|
Competition
|
DG for Competition (COMP) |
|
DG for Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) |
|
|
Energy |
DG for Energy (ENER) |
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Financial Services, Financial Stability and Capital Markets Union |
DG for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union (FISMA) |
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Health and Food Safety |
DG for Health and Food Safety (SANTE) |
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Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth |
DG for Research and Innovation (RTD) |
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Internal Market |
DG for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT) |
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DG for Defence Industry and Space (DEFIS) |
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DG for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs (GROW) |
|
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International Partnerships |
DG for International Partnerships (INTPA) |
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Values and Transparency |
DG for Justice and Consumers (JUST) |
|
Home Affairs |
DG for Migration and Home Affairs (HOME) |
|
Trade |
DG for Trade (TRADE) |
|
Transport
|
DG for Mobility and Transport (MOVE) |
“Overall responsibility for the governance of IT security as a whole within the Commission” rests with the Commission’s Corporate Management Board (CMB) 144 (Art. 5 Commission Decision 2017/46), with the support of the Information Technology and Cybersecurity Board, 145 which is entrusted with the “operational responsibility for the governance of IT security as a whole within the Commission” (Art. 6 Commission Decision 2017/46).
DG CONNECT is the DG responsible (partner DG) for ENISA and represents the Commission in its Management and Executive Board together with DG DIGIT. CERT-EU is institutionally located within DG DIGIT. The Council of the EU may entrust the Commission with the negotiation of international agreements, the conclusion of which is decided by the Council based on a proposal from the Commission. The EEAS “assist[s] [...] the Commission in the exercise of [its] respective functions in the area of external relations” (Art. 2(2), Regulation 2010/427). Commission services and the EEAS shall regularly consult “on all matters relating to the external action of the Union in the exercise of their respective functions, except on matters covered by the CSDP” (Art. 3(2), Regulation 2010/427). The Commission may draw on CERT–EU to “support the incident handling process when appropriate and for knowledge sharing with other EU institutions and agencies that may be affected” (Art. 15(4) Commission Decision 2017/46). Furthermore, CERT-EU assists the Commission “on the coordinated management of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises” (Art. 17(1), Regulation 2023/2841) in the framework of EU-CyCLONe. In relation to their cybersecurity-related tasks, cooperative relations exist with the ACER, the EASA, EC3, the ECB, eu-LISA, and the EUSPA. The Commission provides the secretariat for the IICB, the NIS Cooperation Group and, assisted by ENISA, the ECCG. The Commission is represented in the IICB, the NIS Cooperation Group, and the CERG. Commission representatives chair the CERG and, assisted by ENISA, the ECCG. The Commission participates in EU-CyCLONe and the CSIRTs Network as an observer. It is a member of the EUCTF. The Commission is represented in the ECCC’s Governing Board, the EC3’s Programme Board, and the EASA’s Management Board. Experts from the Commission can attend meetings and participate in the work of the ENISA AG. The SCCG, which it jointly chairs with ENISA, inter alia, supports the Commission in preparing the Union rolling work programme for European cybersecurity certification. The HWPCI lists that it maintains cooperative relations with the Commission. The EDPS can advise the Commission upon request.
— European Parliament (EP)
Website: www.europarl.europa.eu
Together with the Council, the European Parliament “exercis[es] legislative and budgetary functions” (Art. 14(1) TEU). In terms of its legislative functions, the European Parliament acts as “equal co-legislator” when legislative acts are adopted according to the ordinary legislative procedure. To exercise its legislative powers, the European Parliament is subdivided into various issue area-specific standing committees, which convene in public sessions once or twice monthly to prepare the Parliament’s plenary sessions. Individual committees are, inter alia, responsible for “draw[ing] up, amend[ing] and adopt[ing] legislative proposals” and “consider[ing] Commission and Council proposals.” 146 Involved committees on cybersecurity-related legislation contained within this compendium are, for instance, the Industry, Research and Energy Committee (ITRE) for the NIS 2 Directive and the proposed Cyber Resilience Act, the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee (LIBE) for the CER Directive or the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee (ECON) for the DORA Regulation. In addition to legislative work, the European Parliament is also empowered to “exercise oversight over other institutions, to monitor the proper use of the EU budget and to ensure the correct implementation of EU law”, for instance, by owning the “right to approve and dismiss the European Commission.” 147 As part of its supervisory functions, the European Parliament can also set up committees of inquiry, such as the Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA). 148 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the committees are supported by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), which, inter alia, maintains an overview of the status quo of legislative initiatives and evaluates the Commission’s impact assessments on proposals.
The European Parliament is represented in the IICB. It can request participation in CERG meetings and may be invited to discussions within the NIS Cooperation Group. Every 18 months, and for the first time by 18 July 2024, EU-CyCLONe reports to the European Parliament about its work (Art. 16(7) NIS 2 Directive). The IICB reports annually (for the first time by 8 January 2025) to the European Parliament on the implementation of Regulation 2023/2841 and CERT-EU-Member State cooperation.
EU Bodies
— European Union External Action Service (EEAS)
Year of establishment: 2011
Legal basis: 📄 Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service (2010/427)
Website: www.eeas.europa.eu
The European External Action Service is the “European Union’s diplomatic service.” 149 It is, inter alia, tasked with “support[ing] the High Representative [HR/VP...] in fulfilling his/her mandate to conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘CFSP’) of the European Union” and “in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission for fulfilling within the Commission the responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations, and in coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action” (Art. 2(1), Regulation 2010/427). In addition to the HR/VP, the EEAS “assist[s] the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations” (Art. 2(2), Regulation 2010/427). The Decision establishing the EEAS further assigns a supporting role vis-à-vis Member States and a coordinating function to it. Specifically, it stipulates that “the EEAS shall support, and work in cooperation with, the diplomatic services of the Member States, as well as with the General Secretariat of the Council and the services of the Commission, in order to ensure consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action and between those areas and its other policies” (Art. 3(1), Regulation 2010/427). From an organizational point of view, the EEAS comprises “a central administration and [...] Union Delegations to third countries and [...] international organisations” (Art. 1(4), Regulation 2010/427). Within the EEAS’ Department on Peace, Security and Defence (MD-PSD), a dedicated division deals with “Hybrid Threats & Cyber” (SECDEFPOL.2). As part of the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the EEAS also comprises a division on “Communication and Information Systems & Cyber Defence” (EUMS.E). Furthermore, the EEAS hosts the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (EU INTCEN) and the EUMS’ Intelligence Directorate (EUMS INT). EU INTCEN is a civil analysis unit within the EEAS, that processes intelligence received from Member States and other publicly accessible information. It is made up of an “Intelligence Analysis and Reporting” (INTCEN.1) and “Support/Open Sources Research“ (INTCEN.2) Division. Unlike national intelligence services in EU Member States, EU INTCEN, which reports directly to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, has no independent operational intelligence-gathering capabilities. EU INTCEN products can also be made available to other EU institutions operating within the CFSP, the CSDP, or in the area of counterterrorism. Moreover, the EU’s Hybrid Fusion Cell, which “receive[s], analy[zes] and share[s] classified and open source information [...] relating to indicators and warnings concerning hybrid threats,” is institutionally located within EU INTCEN. 150 The EUMS INT represents the EU INTCEN’s military counterpart. It seeks to support the EUMS by providing “intelligence input” to facilitate early warning, situational awareness, and “crisis response planning and assessment for operations and exercises.” 151 Together with the EUMS INT, INTCEN forms the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC) “to deliver joint civilian and military intelligence assessments.” 152 The EEAS maintains the “EEAS Crisis Response Mechanism (CRM) [which] is activated upon occurrence of a serious situation or emergency concerning or anyway involving the external dimension of the EU” 153 and is involved in the implementation of the EU’s Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox. At the multilateral level, the EEAS takes part in the discussion within the United Nations (UN) Open-ended Working Group on security of and in the use of information and communications technologies (OEWG) and the Ad Hoc Committee to Elaborate a Comprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communications Technologies for Criminal Purposes (AHC), among other fora. 154 As outlined in detail in policy area 8, Decision 2023/C 263/04 lays down security rules for the EEAS, including provisions on cyber and information security.
The EEAS is managed by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the HR/VP). The EEAS and Commission entities shall regularly consult “on all matters relating to the external action of the Union in the exercise of their respective functions, except on matters covered by the CSDP” (Art. 3(2), Regulation 2010/427). In particular, the EEAS shall be involved “in the preparatory work and procedures relating to [respective] acts to be prepared by the Commission” (Art. 3(2), Regulation 2010/427). The HR/VP chairs the Council’s FAC, EEAS representatives chair the PSC. Together with the EDA, the EEAS forms the secretariat of PESCO. The EEAS is represented in the COSI (Council of the EU). The EEAS participates in the NIS Cooperation Group as an observer. It is represented in the IICB. The Regulation establishing the ECCC provides for cooperative working relations with the EEAS. The EEAS is represented in the EC3’s Programme Board. Every quarter, EU INTCEN receives a “summary report including anonymised and aggregated data on significant incidents, incidents, cyber threats, near misses and vulnerabilities” (Art. 21(8) Regulation 2023/2841) from CERT-EU. The HWPCI lists that it maintains cooperative relations with the EEAS.
— European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS)
Year of establishment: 2004
Website: www.edps.europa.eu
The European Data Protection Supervisor and the supervisory authority supporting his or her duties are responsible for ensuring the supervision of and adherence to data protection principles when processing personal data processed by the EU’s many institutions. Safeguarding the protection of privacy includes, for example, conducting investigations or processing any submitted complaints. In addition, the EDPS observes and evaluates possible implications for data protection that may arise from new technological developments. The EDPS is appointed for a five-year term and works together with national data protection authorities within EU Member States. In the past, the EDPS also took a stance on, inter alia, the EU’s cybersecurity strategy and other legislative proposals, recommendations, and communications of the European Commission from a data-privacy law perspective.
On request, the EDPS can advise the European Commission and the Council of the EU. The Council of the EU is involved in the appointment of the EDPS. The EDPS assumes a supervisory role over the EU agencies Europol and Eurojust regarding their processing of personal data. eu-LISA maintains cooperative relations with the EDPS. The EDPS is represented in the IICB.
EU Agencies
— European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust)
Year of establishment: 2002
Legal basis: 📄 Regulation on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) (2018/1727)
Website: www.eurojust.europa.eu
Eurojust plays a role in combating threats such as cybercrime on an operational level. By promoting information exchange, connecting ongoing investigations, developing criminal law strategies, and enabling joint action,Eurojust is responsible for coordinating case investigations. This coordination is intended to strengthen the investigative capabilities of Member States’ law enforcement agencies in the area of cybercrime, the understanding of cybercrime, and the investigative options of both law enforcement and the judiciary. Eurojust regularly publishes reports, such as the annual Cybercrime Judicial Monitor 155 , which provides an overview of legislation and case law at the EU and national level, or occasion-based reports on specific challenges and best practices.
Eurojust works with EC3’s specialized advisory groups, networks of heads of cybercrime units, and prosecutors specializing in cybercrime. Cooperative relations, inter alia, exist with the following EUIBAs: Europol, EC3 and eu-LISA. The HWPCI maintains cooperative relations with Eurojust. Together with Europol, Eurojust has published a report on common challenges in the fight against cybercrime in the past. Eurojust is a member of the EUCTF. Eurojust can be invited as an observer to meetings of the COSI (Council of the EU). The EDPS has a supervisory role over Eurojust regarding the lawful processing of personal data. Eurojust is represented on the EC3’s Programme Board. Eurojust is part of the eu-LISA’s Management Board in an observational capacity and is a member of some of its advisory groups.
— European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA)
Year of establishment: 2004
Website: www.enisa.europa.eu
ENISA 156 , the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, is tasked with “achieving a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union”, “reducing the fragmentation of the internal market,” and “approximating Member State laws, regulations and administrative provisions” (Art. 3 Regulation 2019/881). To this end, the Cybersecurity Act assigns to ENISA the following tasks (non-exhaustive):
Table 42: Overview of Tasks Assigned to ENISA
|
Area |
Exemplary Tasks |
|---|---|
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Development and implementation of Union policy and law (Art. 5 Regulation 2019/881) |
|
|
Capacity- building (Art. 6 Regulation 2019/881) |
Assistance to Member States with regard to
Assistance to Member States and EUIBAs with regard to
Assistance to EUIBAs with regard to
|
|
Operational cooperation at Union level (Art. 7 Regulation 2019/881) |
Vis-à-vis Member States through CSIRTs Network:
Vis-à-vis Union and Member States:
Vis-à-vis EUIBAs:
|
|
Market, cybersecurity certification, and standardisation (Art. 8 Regulation 2019/881) |
|
|
Knowledge and information (Art. 9 Regulation 2019/881) |
|
|
Awareness- raising and education (Art. 10 Regulation 2019/881) |
|
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Research and innovation (Art. 11 Regulation 2019/881) |
|
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International cooperation (Art. 12 Regulation 2019/881) |
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The NIS 2 Directive further tasks ENISA with the development and maintenance of a “European vulnerability database” (Art. 12(2) NIS Directive), upon consultation with the NIS Cooperation Group, and “a registry of DNS service providers, TLD name registries, entities providing domain name registration services, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, as well as providers of online marketplaces, of online search engines and of social networking services platforms” (Art. 27(1) NIS 2 Directive). ENISA is responsible for drafting a biannual “report on the state of cybersecurity in the Union” for submission and presentation to the European Parliament (Art. 18 NIS Directive). ENISA is further involved in the drafting of common draft regulatory and implementing technical standards in the framework of the DORA Regulation. Annually, ENISA publishes a threat landscape report (ENISA Threat Landscape), which identifies and assesses threats from cyberspace. In addition, ENISA organizes regular cybersecurity exercises in various formats, such as the biennial Cyber Europe Exercise together with EU Member States.
DG CONNECT is the DG responsible (parent DG) for ENISA and represents the Commission in ENISA’s Management and Executive Board together with DG DIGIT. In fulfilling its mandate, ENISA acts independently (Art. 3(3) Regulation 2019/881). ENISA provides the secretariat of the CSIRTs Network, EU-CyCLONe, and the SCCG. As outlined above, ENISA supports Member States’ operational cooperation within the CSIRTs Network. Also, in the framework of EU-CyCLONe, ENISA is assigned a supporting role by facilitating “the secure exchange of information as well as provide necessary tools to support cooperation between Member States ensuring secure exchange of information” (Art. 16(2) NIS 2 Directive). ENISA supports the Commission in providing the ECCG’s Secretariat. Member States and the Commission are represented in ENISA’s Management Board. ENISA chairs the ENISA AG and co-chairs the SCCG. ENISA is among the members of the IICB. ENISA is tasked with supporting the IICB in setting up an informal group that comprises Union entities’ designated local cybersecurity officers. ENISA participates in the NIS Cooperation Group, the EUCTF, and the ECRB. Based on information received by Member State SPOCs, ENISA shall brief the NIS Cooperation Group and the CSIRTs Network every six months concerning “findings on notification” (Art. 23(9) NIS 2 Directive). ENISA and CERT-EU shall maintain a “structured cooperation with ENISA on capacity building, operational cooperation and long-term strategic analyses of cyber threats” (Art. 13(5) Regulation 2023/2841). Every three months, ENISA receives a “summary report including anonymised and aggregated data on significant incidents, incidents, cyber threats, near misses and vulnerabilities” (Art. 21(8) Regulation 2023/2841) from CERT-EU. The ECCC shall “undertake [its] tasks in collaboration with ENISA [...], as appropriate” (Art. 3(2) Regulation 2021/887). ENISA is represented in the ECCC’s Governing Board as a permanent observer. In early 2021, ENISA and eu-LISA entered into a three-year joint cooperation plan to strengthen cooperation and exchange knowledge as well as expertise in the field of information security, among other areas for cooperation. EDA, CERT-EU, EC3, and ENISA concluded a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation and exchange in the field of cybersecurity in 2018. In June 2024, ENISA and the ESAs concluded an MoU for increased cooperation and information-sharing among each other. 157 The ENISA AG advises ENISA on, among other things, the implementation of its tasks. Upon request, also the SCCG may advise ENISA. Cooperative working relations, inter alia, exist between ENISA and the HWPCI, ACER, Europol, and EUSPA. ENISA is represented on the EC3’s Programme Board. The ECCG, in addition to the Commission, may request ENISA to develop new candidate certification schemes. ENISA maintains working arrangements with the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 158 and Ukrainian authorities 159 . 160
— European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) & European Cybercrime Centre (EC3)
Year of establishment: 1999 (Europol)/2013 (EC3)
Legal basis: 📄 Regulation on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) (2016/794)
Website: www.europol.europa.eu
Europol is the law enforcement agency of the European Union. It supports the European Commission and EU Member States in prosecuting cybercrime, terrorism, and organized crime. Europol supports Member States in previously initiated investigations and analyzes crime trends in the EU. Europol also cooperates with non-EU member states and international organizations. In the area of cybercrime, Europol is strengthening law enforcement in particular through its European Centre for Cybercrime Prevention (EC3). The EC3 focuses on three areas in combating cybercrime: forensics, expertise and stakeholder management, and operations through dedicated teams. For cyber-dependent crimes, child sexual exploitation, and payment fraud, the EC3, inter alia,
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“serves as the central hub for criminal information and intelligence”;
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“supports operations and investigations by Member States by offering operational analysis, coordination and expertise”;
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“provides highly specialised technical and digital forensic support capabilities to investigations and operations”;
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and “provides 24/7 operational and technical support to LEAs [law enforcement agencies] for immediate reaction to urgent cyber incidents and/or cyber crises via stand-by duty and the EU Law Enforcement Emergency Response Protocol” (Europol: European Cybercrime Centre - EC3).
The EC3 publishes the Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) annually. 161 The EC3 further houses the Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT) 162 , which is tasked with facilitating information-driven and coordinated action against key cybercriminal threats through cross-border investigations and operations by its partners. Upon request, Europol can assist Member State competent authorities “in responding to cyberattacks of suspected criminal origin” (Art. 4(1), point (m)). This assistance may also encompass the “support necessary for competent authorities of the Member States to interact with private parties, in particular by providing the necessary infrastructure for such interaction, for example, when competent authorities of the Member States [...] exchange information with private parties in the context of cyberattacks” (recital (42), Regulation 2022/991). Europol maintains the Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA) for information exchange purposes.
As part of its tasks, Europol shall cooperate with ENISA, particularly “through the exchange of information and provision of analytical support” (Art. 4(1), point (j) Regulation 2016/794). Europol is a member of the EUCTF. It participates in EMPACT, EC3 provides its secretariat. Every six months, Europol and INTCEN jointly produce a threat analysis transmitted to the COSI (Council of the EU), to which Europol can also be invited as an observer. The EDPS has a supervisory role over Europol regarding the lawful processing of personal data. Among the EC3’s partners at the EU level are the CERT-EU, Eurojust, ENISA, and the Commission. The HPWCI maintains cooperative relations with Europol. The Regulation establishing the ECCC provides for cooperative working relations with Europol. The EDA, CERT-EU, EC3, and ENISA concluded a Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation and exchange in the field of cybersecurity in 2018. The members of the EC3’s Programme Board, inter alia, comprise CERT-EU, the EDA, the EEAS, ENISA, Eurojust, the Commission, and the EUCTF. Europol is a member of eu-LISA’s Management Board in an observational capacity and participates in some of its advisory groups. Europol is among the entities invited to designate a representative to participate in the ENISA AG.
— European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER)
Year of establishment: 2011
Legal basis: 📄 Regulation establishing a European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (2019/942)
Website: www.acer.europa.eu
ACER assists EU Member States’ energy regulatory authorities in exercising their regulatory tasks, “coordinat[ing] their action” and “mediat[ing] and settl[ing] disagreements between them” (Art. 1(2), Regulation 2019/942). It is also tasked with contributing to the “establishment of high-quality common regulatory and supervisory practices” (Art. 1(2), Regulation 2019/942). As part of its mandate, ACER also undertakes cybersecurity-related tasks to reinforce “the cybersecurity of Europe’s energy system.” 163 To this end, ACER “provide[s] expert advice on EU legislation and cyber rules relating to the energy sector,” for instance, in relation to the Network Code on Cybersecurity, 164 cooperates and shares information with Member States’ energy regulators through “a dedicated cybersecurity task force” 165 and works towards “foster[ing] best practices globally”, for instance, in the area of standardization. 166
ACER works with national energy regulatory authorities and the European Networks of Transmission System Operators for Electricity and for Gas (ENTSO-E, ENTSOG) to “monitor the implementation of the Union-wide network-development plans” regarding “trans-European energy infrastructure” (Art. 11 Regulation 2019/942). In its cybersecurity-related efforts, ACER, inter alia, collaborates with ENISA, DG ENER and the DG JRC within the Commission.
— European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA)
Year of establishment: 2004
Website: www.euspa.europa.eu
EUSPA is responsible for implementing the EU Space Programme at the operational level. Among other tasks, it provides “state-of-the-art, safe and secure positioning, navigation and timing services based on Galileo and EGNOS” and fosters “the development of a vibrant European space ecosystem by providing market intelligence, and technical know-how to innovators, academia, start-ups, and SMEs.” 167 As the “security gatekeeper of the EU Space Programme”, EUSPA is also responsible for the “operational security, security monitoring and the security accreditation of the EU Space Programme.” 168 In this respect, it provides “cybersecurity and engineering competence” for all its components and acts as “space security monitoring and operations centre in the EU.” 169
In fulfilling these functions, EUSPA cooperates with the Commission, CERT-EU and ENISA. EUSPA supports the Commission with regard to the EU Space Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (EU Space ISAC) and the Euro Quantum Communication Infrastructure (EuroQCI). EUSPA is represented in the IICB.
— European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA)
Year of establishment: 2011
Website: www.eulisa.europa.eu
eu-LISA manages integrated, large-scale IT systems, that ensure the internal security of the Schengen Area. For instance, these systems allow the exchange of visa data between Schengen Area countries and the determination of responsibility amongst EU countries in the examination of a particular asylum application. eu-LISA further tests new technologies to help create a more modern, effective, and secure border management system in the EU. In developing or managing its IT systems, eu-LISA “shall consult and follow the recommendations of [ENISA] regarding network and information security, where appropriate” (Art. 41(3) Regulation 2018/1726). eu-LISA “shall ensure [...] an appropriate level of data and physical security” (Art. 2, point (g) Regulation 2018/1726), for instance, by
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“adopt[ing] appropriate measures, including security plans, inter alia, to prevent the unauthorised reading, copying, modification or deletion of personal data during transfers of personal data or transport of data media, in particular by means of appropriate encryption techniques” and
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making sure that “all system-related operational information circulating in the communication infrastructure [is] encrypted” (Art. 11(3) Regulation 2018/1726).
eu-LISA maintains cooperative relations with the Council of the EU, the Commission, Eurojust, Europol and the EDPS. Eurojust and Europol are also represented on eu-LISA’s Management Board as observers and in some of its advisory groups. ENISA and eu-LISA concluded a three-year cooperation plan at the beginning of 2021 to strengthen the exchange of knowledge and expertise in the field of information security among other areas for cooperation. eu-LISA is among the entities invited to designate a representative to participate in the ENISA AG.
— European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
Year of establishment: 2002
Legal basis: 📄 Regulation on common rules in the field of civil aviation and establishing a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (2018/1139)
Website: www.easa.europa.eu
The EASA shall work towards “ensuring the proper functioning and development of civil aviation in the Union” (Art. 75(2), Regulation 2018/1139). To this end, it is, inter alia, tasked with assisting the Commission and Member States, “carry[ing] out, on behalf of Member States, functions and tasks ascribed to them by applicable international conventions, in particular the Chicago Convention” and “promot[ing] Union aviation standards and rules at international level” (Art. 75(2), Regulation 2018/1139). Its mandate also extends to incorporating the consideration of “cyber risks [...] during aircrafts design, development and operation” 170 and subsequent controls thereof. In 2017, the EASA established the European Centre for Cybersecurity in Aviation (ECCSA), a voluntary network among stakeholders in the civil aviation sector, including national aviation authorities. EASA further maintains the European Strategic Cooperation Platform (ESCP) and a Network of Cybersecurity Analysts (NoCA), which comprises Members from the EASA and Member States’ aviation authorities.
The EASA is instructed to cooperate with the Commission and Member States “on security matters related to civil aviation, including cyber security, where interdependencies between civil aviation safety and security exist” (Art. 88 1) Regulation 2018/1139). Member States and the Commission are also represented on the EASA’s Management Board.
— European Cybersecurity Competence Centre (ECCC)
Year of establishment: 2021
Website: cybersecurity-centre.europa.eu
The European Cybersecurity Industrial, Technology and Research Competence Centre (ECCC), located in Bucharest, was established to
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“strengthen [the Union’s] leadership and strategic autonomy in the area of cybersecurity by retaining and developing the Union’s research, academic, societal, technological and industrial cybersecurity capacities and capabilities necessary to enhance trust and security, including the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of data, in the Digital Single Market”,
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“support Union technological capacities, capabilities and skills in relation to the resilience and reliability of the infrastructure of network and information systems, including critical infrastructure and commonly used hardware and software in the Union”,
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“increase the global competitiveness of the Union’s cybersecurity industry, ensure high cybersecurity standards throughout the Union and turn cybersecurity into a competitive advantage for other Union industries” (Art. 3(1) Regulation 2021/887),
by “promoting research, innovation and deployment in the area of cybersecurity” (Art. 4(1) Regulation 2021/887). To this end, the ECCC is, inter alia, mandated to “establish[...] strategic recommendations for research, innovation and deployment in cybersecurity” and “implementing actions under relevant Union funding programmes” (Art. 4(3), Regulation 2021/887). To fulfill its missions, the ECCC engages in two sets of activities, further specified below:
|
Strategic Tasks Art. 5 (2) |
Implementation Tasks Art. 5 (3) |
|---|---|
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Among others, for instance,
|
Among others, for instance,
|
The ECCC is responsible for implementing the call for proposals for cybersecurity projects within the Horizon Europe cluster Civil Security for Society as outlined in the 2023-2024 work programme. Regulation 2021/887 establishes the ECCC until 31 December 2029.
The ECCC “shall carry out [its strategic and implementation tasks] in close cooperation with the Network” (Art. 5(4), Regulation 2021/887) and shall “undertake [its] tasks in collaboration with ENISA and the Community, as appropriate” (Art. 3(2), Regulation 2021/887). The ECCC “shall [further] cooperate with relevant” EUIBAs, among them the EEAS, EC3, the EDA, the DG JRC, European Research Executive Agency, the European Research Council Executive Agency, the European Health and Digital Executive Agency, in order to “ensure consistency and complementarity while avoiding any duplication of effort” (Art. 10(1), Regulation 2021/887). The ECCC and the EDA shall work towards formalizing their cooperative relationship through a working arrangement to “facilitate information sharing among respective staffs on respectively civil, dual use and defence technology priorities.” 171 Member States and the Commission are represented on the ECCC’s Governing Board. ENISA is represented in the Board through a permanent observer. The ECCC is represented in the IICB. The ECCC is supported by a Strategic Advisory Group consisting of Cybersecurity Competence Community Member representatives from entities other than EUIBAs.
— European Defence Agency (EDA)
Year of establishment: 2004
Legal basis: 📄 Council Decision defining the statute, seat and operational rules of the European Defence Agency (2015/1835)
Website: eda.europa.eu
The European Defence Agency supports all EU Member States “in developing their capabilities to improve cyber resilience.” 172 Specifically, the EDA supports, among other things, the creation of a risk management model for cybersecurity in the context of military capability supply chains, the establishment of the Cyber Ranges Federation project, the development of specific capabilities for Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) detection, and cyber situational awareness. The EDA informs Member States annually “on the landscape of emerging technologies, including those applicable to cyber defence.” 173 The EDA is responsible for the management of the Military Computer Emergency Response Team Operational Network (MICNET), which was established in 2013.
The EDA is subordinate to the Council of the EU, to which it reports and from which it receives its guidance. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also assumes the role of EDA head. The Steering Board of the EDA meets at the level of the Member States’ defense ministers. Together with the EEAS, the EDA jointly manages all secretarial functions for the PESCO. 174 The EDA is represented on the Steering Board of the PESCO project CIDCC and the EC3 Programme Board. The EDA signed a Memorandum of Understanding with ENISA, the EC3, and CERT-EU, intending to develop a cooperation framework among the entities. The EDA and the ECCC shall work towards formalizing their cooperative relationship through a working arrangement to “facilitate information sharing among respective staffs on respectively civil, dual use and defence technology priorities.” 175
— European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)
Year of establishment: 2011
Legal basis:
Website: www.eba.europa.eu | www.eiopa.europa.eu | www.esma.europa.eu
Together, the European Banking Authority (EBA), European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) form the so-called European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) tasked with financial supervision. As part of the mandate of each entity, their respective legal bases, among others, stipulate that the ESAs shall promote “an effective bilateral and multilateral exchange of information between competent authorities, pertaining to all relevant issues, including cyber security and cyber-attacks” (Art. 29(1), point (b), Regulations 1093/2010, 1094/2010, and 1095/2010). The ESAs cooperate and coordinate their work through a Joint Committee, for which cybersecurity constitutes one of its priorities (Art. 54(2), Regulations 1093/2010, 1094/2010 and 1095/2010).
The ESAs “may participate in the activities of the [NIS] Cooperation Group for matters that concern their supervisory activities in relation to financial entities” and “may request to be invited to participate in the activities of the [NIS] Cooperation Group for matters in relation to essential or important entities [...] that have also been designated as critical ICT third-party service providers” within the DORA Regulation (Art. 47(1) Regulation 2022/2554). The DORA Regulation provides for the establishment of an Oversight Forum as a subcommittee of the Joint Committee to support the Lead Overseer and Joint Committee in the area of ICT third-party risk. In the context of the DORA Regulation, the ESAs are involved in the drafting of common draft regulatory and implementing technical standards DORA (see further DORA Deep Dive) and shall report annually on major ICT-related incidents through its Joint Committee. In June 2024, ENISA and the ESAs concluded an MoU for increased cooperation and information-sharing among each other. 176
EU Interinstitutional Services
— Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions, bodies and agencies (CERT-EU)
Year of establishment: 2011
Legal basis: 📄 Regulation laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (2023/2841) 177
Website: cert.europa.eu
CERT-EU is the computer emergency response team for Union entities. Concerning the entities’ unclassified networks 178 , it acts as “their cybersecurity information exchange and incident response coordination hub” and contributes to the “prevent[ion], detect[ion], handl[ing], mitigat[ion], respon[se] to and recover[y] from incidents” (Art. 13(1) Regulation 2023/2841). To this end, CERT-EU is tasked with “collect[ing], manag[ing], analy[zing] and shar[ing] information with the Union entities on cyber threats, vulnerabilities and incidents in unclassified ICT infrastructure” and “coordinat[ing] 179 responses to incidents at interinstitutional and Union entity level” (Art. 13(2) Regulation 2023/2841). It supports Union entities, inter alia, by assisting with the (coordinated) implementation of Regulation 2023/2841 and notifying the IICB on any related challenges, providing CSIRT baseline services, and “coordinat[ing] the management of major incidents” (Art. 13(3) Regulation 2023/2841). In relation to its support for implementing Regulation 2023/2841, CERT-EU is empowered to “issu[e] (a) calls for action describing urgent security measures that Union entities are urged to take within a set timeframe; (b) proposals to the IICB for guidelines addressed to all or a subset of the Union entities; [or] (c) [...] for recommendations addressed to individual Union entities” (Art. 14(1) Regulation 2023/2841). 180 In line with the requirements set out in NIS 2, CERT-EU assumes the function of CVD coordinator for all EU entities. CERT-EU also offers additional chargeable services to Union entities, such as “a proactive scanning of the network and information systems of the Union entity concerned to detect vulnerabilities with a potential significant impact” (Art. 13(6) Regulation 2023/2841 lists all of these services). CERT-EU houses six teams working on forensics and operational response to cyber events; cyber threat intelligence; offensive security; DevSecOps, cooperative relationships; and security consultation. CERT-EU also publishes security advisories, security guidance, and other threat-intelligence-related reports, such as a monthly “Cyber Security Brief” on its website.
Institutionally, CERT-EU is located within DG DIGIT. However, its status is that of an “autonomous interinstitutional service provider for all Union entities” (Art. 16(1) Regulation 2023/2841). The IICB “supervis[es] the implementation of general priorities and objectives by CERT-EU and provid[es] strategic direction to CERT-EU” (Art. 10(2), point (b), Regulation 2023/2841). Upon approval by the IICB, the Commission appoints the head of CERT-EU. He or she must regularly report to the IICB’s chair and provide annual reports “on the activities and performance of CERT-EU during the reference period” (Art. 15(5) Regulation 2023/2841) addressed to both the IICB and its chair. CERT-EU’s head may participate in IICB discussions as an observer. Regulation 2023/2841 puts in place reporting obligations for EUIBAs when facing a significant incident, of which they shall notify CERT-EU. CERT-EU assists the Commission “on the coordinated management of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises” (Art. 17(1) Regulation 2023/2841) in the framework of EU-CyCLONe. CERT-EU is a member of the CSIRTs Network. CERT-EU shall maintain a “structured cooperation with ENISA on capacity building, operational cooperation and long-term strategic analyses of cyber threats” (Art. 13(5) Regulation 2023/2841). CERT-EU may “cooperate or exchange information” (Art. 13(5) Regulation 2023/2841) with the EC3. Regulation 2023/2841 also allows the CERT-EU to “cooperate and exchange information” with the EC3 (Europol). A Memorandum of Understanding for cooperation and exchange in the field of cybersecurity was concluded between EDA, EC3, ENISA, and CERT-EU. Apart from cooperation at the Union level, CERT-EU “shall, without undue delay, cooperate and exchange information with Member State counterparts, [...] with regard to incidents, cyber threats, vulnerabilities, near misses, possible countermeasures as well as best practices and on all matters relevant for improving the protection of the ICT environments of Union entities” (Art. 17(1) Regulation 2023/2841), also within the framework of the CSIRTs Network. This exchange of information with Member State authorities shall also specifically extend to situations where CERT-EU “becomes aware of a significant incident occurring within the territory of a Member State”, which shall be notified to the respective Member State “without delay” (Art. 17(2) Regulation 2023/2841). CERT-EU is among the entities invited to designate a representative for participation in the ENISA AG. CERT-EU is represented on the EC3 Programme Board. In fulfilling its functions, EUSPA, inter alia, cooperates with CERT-EU.
EU-internal Coordination Bodies
— Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board (IICB)
Year of establishment: 2024
The IICB was established through Regulation 2023/2841, laying down cybersecurity obligations for every EU entity. Its mandate is twofold: first, it shall observe and contribute to the implementation of these obligations by Union entities, and second, with respect to CERT-EU, it assumes supervisory functions and “provid[es...] strategic direction” (Art. 10(2), point (b) Regulation 2023/2841) to it. Relating to the former, it shall develop a “multiannual strategy on raising the level of cybersecurity in the Union entities” (Art. 11, point (c) Regulation 2023/2841), to be updated at least every five years. To ensure compliance with the regulation, it can, in cases of perceived contravention, for instance, issue warnings, recommend an audit, or advise that “all Member States and Union entities implement a temporary suspension of data flows to the Union entity concerned” (Art. 12(2), point (g) Regulation 2023/2842). Every year, the IICB shall provide the European Parliament and the Council of the EU with a report on the “progress made with the implementation of [...] Regulation [2023/2841] and specifying in particular the extent of cooperation of CERT-EU with Member State counterparts” (Art. 10(4), Regulation 2023/2842). 181 The IICB convenes at least three times annually. CERT-EU or any IICB member may request an additional meeting. The Board can set up designated technical advisory groups to assume particular functions. The IICB is responsible for monitoring and ensuring the compliance of EUIBAs with Regulation 2023/2841.
Members of the IICB are one representative each by the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council of the EU, the Commission, the EU’s Court of Justice, the ECB, the Court of Auditors, EEAS, the European Economic and Social Committee, European Committee of the Regions, the European Investment Bank, the ECCC, ENISA, the EDPS, and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme. In addition, it comprises three representatives to be assigned by the EU Agencies Network 182 (EUAN) to “represent the interests of the bodies, offices and agencies of the Union [other than those previously mentioned] that run their own ICT environment” (Art. 10(3), point (b), Regulation 2023/2841). As observers, the head of CERT-EU, as well as the Chairs of the NIS Cooperation Group, the CSIRTs Network, and EU-CyCLONe may participate in IICB discussions. The Commission provides the IICB’s secretariat. With the support of ENISA, the IICB shall contribute to setting up an informal group that comprises Union entities’ designated local cybersecurity officers. The appointment of the Head of the CERT-EU by the Commission depends on a prior approval by at least two-thirds of the IICB members. On an annual basis, and for the first time by 8 January 2025, the IICB submits a progress report on the implementation of Regulation 2023/2841 and CERT-EU-Member State cooperation to the Council and European Parliament. Every three months, CERT-EU provides the IICB with a “summary report including anonymised and aggregated data on significant incidents, incidents, cyber threats, near misses and vulnerabilities” (Art. 21 (8) Regulation 2023/2841).
EU-Member State Coordination Bodies
— Computer Security Incident Response Teams Network (CSIRTs Network)
Year of establishment: 2016
Legal basis: 📄 Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2, Directive 2022/2555)
Website: csirtsnetwork.eu
The CSIRTs Network was established through both NIS Directives and aims to contribute to existing, trusted operational cooperation between Member States. It provides a forum for cooperation and developing a coordinated response to cross-border cybersecurity incidents. The NIS 2 Directive assigns to it the following tasks (non-exhaustive):
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exchanging
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information on “CSIRTs’ capabilities”,
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“relevant information about incidents, near misses, cyber threats, risks and vulnerabilities”,
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“information with regard to cybersecurity publications and recommendations”,
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“information in relation to [a particular] incident and associated cyber threats, risks and vulnerabilities” (“at the request of a member of the CSIRTs network potentially affected by an incident”)
-
-
“facilitat[ing] the sharing, transfer and exchange of technology and relevant measures, policies, tools, processes, best practices and frameworks among the CSIRTs”,
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“at the request of a member of the CSIRTs network, discuss[ing] and, where possible, implement[in] a coordinated response to an incident that has been identified within the jurisdiction of that Member State”,
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“provid[ing] Member States with assistance in addressing cross-border incidents”,
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“cooperat[ing], exchang[ing] best practices and provid[ing] assistance to the CSIRTs designated as [CVD coordinators] with regard to the management of the coordinated disclosure of vulnerabilities which could have a significant impact on entities in more than one Member State” (Art. 15(3) NIS 2 Directive).
The CSIRTs Network consists of representatives of the designated national CSIRTs and CERT-EU. The Commission participates in the network as an observer. ENISA acts as its secretariat and is further tasked with “actively provid[ing] assistance for the cooperation among the CSIRTs” (Art. 15(2) NIS 2 Directive). The CSIRTs Network receives its strategic guidance from the NIS Cooperation Group. The CSIRTs Network and EU-CyCLONe shall cooperate closely based on respective procedural arrangements. Every two years (for the first time by 17 January 2025), the CSIRTs Network shall report to the NIS Cooperation Group on the “progress made with regard to [...] operational cooperation” (Art. 15(4) NIS 2 Directive). The Chair of the CSIRTs Network may participate in IICB discussions as an observer. The CSIRTs Network shall receive a “summary report including anonymised and aggregated data on significant incidents, incidents, cyber threats, near misses and vulnerabilities” (Art. 21(8) Regulation 2023/2841) by CERT-EU every three months. Twice a year, ENISA shares with the CSIRTs Network its notification-related findings (Art. 23(9) NIS 2 Directive). When Member States determine that a reported vulnerability “could have a significant impact on entities in more than one Member State,” the national CVD coordinators shall interact with their counterparts in other EU Member States within the framework of the CSIRTs Network (Art. 12(1) NIS 2 Directive).
— Critical Entities Resilience Group (CERG)
Year of establishment: 2023
Legal basis: 📄 Directive on the resilience of critical infrastructures (CER Directive, Directive 2022/2557)
The CER Directive establishes the Critical Entities Resilience Group (CERG) to “support the Commission and facilitate cooperation among Member States and the exchange of information on issues relating to this Directive” (Art. 19(1) CER Directive). The CER Directive assigns to it the following tasks (non-exhaustive):
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“supporting the Commission in assisting Member States in reinforcing their capacity to contribute to ensuring the resilience of critical entities;”
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“facilitating the exchange of best practices with regard to the identification of critical entities by the Member States;”
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“exchanging best practices related to the notification of incidents;”
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“exchanging information and best practices on innovation, research and development relating to the resilience of critical entities” (Art. 19(3) CER Directive).
The CERG operates on a system of biennial work programs, with the first to be adopted by 17 January 2025 (Art. 19(4) CER Directive). The Commission is empowered to “adopt implementing acts laying down procedural arrangements necessary for the functioning of the Critical Entities Resilience Group” (Art. 19(6) CER Directive). The Commission is further mandated to provide the CERG with a summary report on information received by Member States on their national strategies on the resilience of critical entities and risk assessments at least every four years (for the first time by 17 January 2027).
Representatives of EU Member States and the Commission take part in the CERG. The CERG is chaired by the Commission’s representative. External stakeholders can participate when relevant. The European Parliament can request participation, upon which the Commission may invite experts of the European Parliament to attend the Group’s meetings. At least once a year, the CERG shall convene with the NIS Cooperation Group for a joint meeting.
— European Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network (EU-CyCLONE)
Year of establishment: Launched in 2020, formally established in 2023
Legal basis: 📄 Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2, Directive 2022/2555)
The idea for a European Cyber Crisis Liaison Organisation Network (CyCLONe) was first introduced within the European Commission’s Blueprint for a coordinated reaction to large, transnational cybersecurity incidents and crises. Its establishment has been formalized through the NIS 2 Directive. Among EU-CyCLONe’s objectives are to “support the coordinated management of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises at operational level” (Art. 16(1) NIS 2 Directive). The NIS 2 Directive assigns to it the following tasks:
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“increas[ing] the level of preparedness of the management of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises;”
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“develop[ing] a shared situational awareness for large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises;”
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“assess[ing] the consequences and impact of relevant large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises and propose possible mitigation measures;”
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“coordinat[ing] the management of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises and support decision-making at political level in relation to such incidents and crises;” and
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“discuss[ing], upon the request of a Member State concerned, national large-scale cybersecurity incident and crisis response plans” (Art. 16(3) NIS 2 Directive).
In the past, various exercises have taken place in the framework of EU-CyCLONe (CySOPex and BlueOLEx).
EU-CyCLONe comprises the cyber crisis management authorities (designated as such under Art. 9 NIS 2 Directive, the Cyber Crises Liaison Organisations (CyCLOs)) of all EU Member States and the Commission in an observational capacity. The Commission may only actively take part in EU-CyCLONe’s deliberations when “a potential or ongoing large-scale cybersecurity incident [occurs that] has or is likely to have a significant impact on services and activities” (Art. 16(2) NIS 2 Directive). A Member State representative of the respective current EU presidency chairs EU-CyCLONe. ENISA acts as the network’s secretariat and it is tasked with “support[ing] the secure exchange of information as well as provide necessary tools to support cooperation between Member States ensuring secure exchange of information” (Art. 16(2) NIS 2 Directive). Additionally, ENISA also facilitates “the organisation of exercises for CyCLONe members, such as CySOPex (played by officers) and BlueOLEx (played by executives).” 183 CERT-EU assists the Commission in relation to “the coordinated management of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises” (Art. 17(1) Regulation 2023/2841) in the framework of EU-CyCLONe. EU-CyCLONe receives strategic guidance from the NIS Cooperation Group. EU-CyCLONe and the CSIRTs Network shall cooperate closely on the basis of respective procedural arrangements (Art. 16 6) NIS 2 Directive). The network shall report regularly to the NIS Cooperation Group on “the management of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises, as well as trends, focusing in particular on their impact on essential and important entities” (Art. 16(5) NIS 2 Directive). Additionally, every 18 months and for the first time by 18 July 2024, EU-CyCLONe must report to the European Parliament and the Council about its work (Art. 16(7) NIS 2 Directive). The Chair of EU-CyCLONe may participate in IICB discussions as an observer. Member States must submit to EU-CyCLONe “relevant information relating to [...] their national large-scale cybersecurity incident and crisis response plans” at the maximum three months after their adoption (Art. 9(5) NIS 2 Directive).
— European Cybersecurity Certification Group (ECCG)
Year of establishment: 2019
Legal basis: 📄 Regulation on ENISA and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification (2019/881)
The European Cybersecurity Certification Group (ECCG) was established with the 2019 Cybersecurity Act. It is tasked, inter alia, with carrying out the following activities:
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“advis[ing] and assist[ing] the Commission in its work to ensure the consistent implementation and application of” the Cybersecurity Certification Framework;
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“assist[ing], advis[ing] and cooperat[ing] with ENISA in relation to the preparation of a candidate scheme;”
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“adopt[ing] an opinion on candidate schemes prepared by ENISA;”
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“request[ing] ENISA to prepare candidate schemes;”
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“adopt[ing] opinions addressed to the Commission relating to the maintenance and review of existing European cybersecurity certifications schemes;”
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“facilitat[ing] the cooperation between national cybersecurity certification authorities;”
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and “facilitat[ing] the alignment of European cybersecurity certification schemes with internationally recognised standards” (Art. 62(4), Regulation 2019/881).
The ECCG comprises “representatives of national cybersecurity certification authorities or representatives of other relevant national authorities” (Art. 62(2) Regulation 2019/881), with the Member States being represented by a maximum of one member. The Commission, assisted by ENISA, chairs the ECCG and provides its Secretariat. The ECCG cooperates with the SCCG.
— European Union Cybercrime Task Force (EUCTF)
Year of establishment: 2010
The European Union Cybercrime Task Force (EUCTF) seeks to “develop and promote a harmonised approach within the European Union to the criminal misuse of information and communication technology and the fight against cybercrime.” 184 Functioning as a network, the EUCTF meets two times annually to “identify, discuss and prioritise the key challenges and actions.” 185
Europol, the European Commission, and Member States jointly set up the EUCTF. Its members are the National Cybercrime Units of the Member States and a few associated non-EU countries, as well as representatives of the Commission, Eurojust, and Europol. EC3 provides its secretariat. The ECTF is a member of EC3’s Programme Board.
— NIS Cooperation Group
Year of establishment: 2016
Legal basis: 📄 Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (NIS 2, Directive 2022/2555)
Website: digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis-cooperation-group
The first Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive) put in place a Cooperation Group, whose establishment has been renewed through its successor, the NIS 2 Directive. The NIS Cooperation Group seeks to facilitate strategic cooperation and the exchange of information between Member States. Its tasks comprise the provision of guidance to national competent authorities “in relation to the transposition and implementation” of the NIS 2 Directive as well as the “development and implementation of policies on coordinated vulnerability disclosure” (Art. 14(4) NIS 2 Directive). The NIS 2 Directive assigns to it the following further tasks (non-exhaustive):
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“exchang[ing] best practices and information in relation to the implementation of this Directive, including in relation to cyber threats, incidents, vulnerabilities, near misses, awareness-raising initiatives, training, exercises and skills, capacity building, standards and technical specifications as well as the identification of essential and important entities;”
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“exchang[ing] advice and cooperat[ing] with the Commission on emerging cybersecurity policy initiatives and the overall consistency of sector-specific cybersecurity requirements;”
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“exchang[ing] views on the implementation of sector-specific Union legal acts that contain provisions on cybersecurity;”
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“discuss[ing] and carry[ing] out on a regular basis an assessment of the state of play of cyber threats or incidents, such as ransomware;”
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“carry[ing] out coordinated security risk assessments of critical supply chains;”
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“contribut[ing] to cybersecurity capabilities across the Union by facilitating the exchange of national officials through a capacity building programme involving staff from the competent authorities or the CSIRTs;”
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“exchang[ing] views on the policy on follow-up actions following large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises on the basis of lessons learned of the CSIRTs network and EU-CyCLONe” (Art. 14(4) NIS 2 Directive).
The NIS Cooperation meets regularly 186 and operates on a system of biennial work programs. It acts based on consensus and can set up subgroups to work on specific questions related to its work. As part of its mandate, the NIS Cooperation Group can develop and publish non-binding guidelines and documents. 187 The Commission is empowered to “adopt implementing acts laying down procedural arrangements necessary for the functioning of the Cooperation Group” (Art. 14(8) NIS 2 Directive). 188
The NIS Cooperation Group consists of representatives of Member States, the European Commission (acting as the secretariat), and ENISA. The EEAS participates in an observational capacity. The NIS Cooperation Group is chaired by the respective Member State holding the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. For instance, when they concern their “supervisory activities in relation to financial entities” (Art. 47(1) DORA Regulation), the European supervisory authorities and designated national competent authorities under the DORA Regulation may participate in NIS Cooperation Group activities. In addition, representatives of the European Parliament or other “relevant stakeholders” may be invited. The Group “provide[s] strategic guidance to the CSIRTs Network and EU-CyCLONe on specific emerging issues” (Art. 14(4), point (l) NIS 2 Directive). It can request the former to provide it with a “technical report on selected topics” (Art. 14(6) NIS 2 Directive). ENISA shares its notification-related findings twice a year with the NIS Cooperation Group (Art. 23(9) NIS 2 Directive). EU-CyCLONe shall report regularly to the NIS Cooperation Group on “the management of large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises, as well as trends, focusing in particular on their impact on essential and important entities” (Art. 16(5) NIS 2 Directive). Every two years, for the first time by 17 January 2025, the CSIRTs Network shall report to the NIS Cooperation Group on the “progress made with regard to [...] operational cooperation” (Art. 15(4) NIS 2 Directive). At least once a year, the NIS Cooperation Group shall convene with the Critical Entities Resilience Group for a joint meeting. The Chair of the NIS Cooperation Group may participate in IICB discussions as an observer. The NIS 2 Directive provides for the Cooperation Group to “carry out [Union level] coordinated security risk assessments of specific critical ICT services, ICT systems or ICT products supply chains” (Art. 22(1) NIS 2 Directive) based on (non-) technical risk considerations with the support of ENISA and the Commission. ENISA shall consult the NIS Cooperation Group in developing and maintaining the European vulnerability database as stipulated in the NIS 2 Directive.
Bodies With Stakeholder Involvement
— ENISA Advisory Group (ENISA AG)
Year of establishment: 2019
Legal basis: 📄 Regulation on ENISA and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification (2019/881)
The ENISA AG was established with the 2019 Cybersecurity Act. It is tasked with “advis[ing] ENISA in respect of the performance of ENISA’s tasks” (Art. 21(5) Regulation 2019/881) in all areas except for cybersecurity certification. Its advisory function particularly relates to consulting the ENISA “Executive Director on the drawing up of a proposal for ENISA’s annual work programme, and on ensuring communication with the relevant stakeholders on issues related to the annual work programme” (Art. 21(5) Regulation 2019/881).
The Group comprises a maximum of 33 “recognised experts representing the relevant stakeholders, such as the ICT industry, providers of electronic communications networks or services available to the public, SMEs, operators of essential services, consumer groups, academic experts in the field of cybersecurity, and representatives of competent authorities notified in accordance with [the Electronic Communications Code], of European standardisation organisations, as well as of law enforcement and data protection supervisory authorities” (Art. 21(1) Regulation 2019/881) and is chaired by ENISA’s Executive Director or a designated alternate. Members of the AG serve a term of two and a half years. Experts from the Commission and Member States can attend meetings and participate in the work of the AG. The Executive Director of ENISA can invite representatives of other entities to participate in meetings without the right to vote. In addition to the 33 appointed stakeholder members, BEREC, Europol/EC3, eu-LISA, and CERT-EU, among other institutions, were invited to nominate representatives for the 2023–2025 term of ENISA AG. 189
— Stakeholder Cybersecurity Certification Group (SCCG)
Year of establishment: 2019
Legal basis: 📄 Regulation on ENISA and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification (2019/881)
Upon the Cybersecurity Act's entry into force, a cybersecurity certification stakeholder group was established. The SCCG is tasked with
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“advis[ing] the Commission on strategic issues regarding the European cybersecurity certification framework” and “upon request, advis[ing] ENISA on general and strategic matters concerning ENISA’s tasks relating to market, cybersecurity certification, and standardisation;”
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“assist[ing] the Commission in the preparation of the Union rolling work programme” for European cybersecurity certification;
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“issu[ing] an opinion on the Union rolling work programme;”
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and “in urgent cases, provid[ing] advice to the Commission and the ECCG on the need for additional certification schemes not included in the Union rolling work programme” (Art. 22(3) Regulation 2019/881).
The SCCG comprises representatives of European stakeholders, who are appointed by the Commission based on a proposal by ENISA. Representatives of the European Commission and ENISA jointly chair the SCCG. ENISA provides its Secretariat. The ECCG cooperates with the SCCG.
Outlook: EU Cybersecurity Policies on the Horizon
In addition to the legal acts already covered within this compendium, a number of EU legislative and non-legislative initiatives of cybersecurity relevance have been announced, entered into force after May 2024, or can be expected to be adopted in due course.
Tables 43 and 44 keep track of these initiatives respectively (as of June 17, 2024):
Table 43: Status Quo of Initiatives for Legislative Acts of Cybersecurity Relevance as of June 17, 2024
|
Legislative Initiative |
Policy Area |
Status |
Resources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Regulation on measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents (Cyber Solidarity Act) |
Overarching Policies |
Close to adoption |
|
|
Amendment of Cybersecurity Act on managed security services |
Internal Market |
Close to adoption |
|
|
Regulation on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements (Cyber Resilience Act) |
Internal Market |
Close to adoption |
|
|
Regulation on laying down harmonised rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) |
Internal Market |
Adopted, awaiting publication in the EU’s Official Journal |
|
|
Revised Product Liability Directive |
Internal Market |
Close to adoption |
|
|
Revision of the foreign direct investment (FDI) screening regulation |
Economic, Monetary and Commercial Policy |
Announced |
|
|
EU Space Law |
Education, Research and Space Policy |
Announced |
|
|
Information Security Regulation for EUIBAs |
Cybersecurity of EUIBAs |
Announced |
Table 44: Status Quo of Initiatives for Non-Legislative Acts of Cybersecurity Relevance as of June 17, 2024
|
Legal Basis |
Delegated/Implementing Act |
Status |
Resources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
DORA |
Regulatory Technical Standards specifying the criteria for classification of ICT-related incidents |
Awaiting publication |
|
|
Regulatory Technical Standards specifying criteria regarding ICT risk management |
Awaiting publication |
||
|
Regulations specifying criteria (policy) for the critical ICT third-party service providers in the financial sector |
Awaiting publication |
||
|
Delegated regulation specifying fees for the critical ICT third-party service providers in the financial sector |
Published, in force from June 19, 2024 onwards |
||
|
Delegated regulation on further specifying the criticality criteria for critical ICT 3rd party service providers |
Published, in force from June 19, 2024 onwards |
||
|
Implementing regulation laying down templates for a register of information of ICT contracts |
Planned |
||
|
Regulation on the internal market for electricity |
Network Code for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows |
Adopted, in force from June 13, 2024 onwards |
|
|
NIS 2 Directive |
Rules specifying the obligations laid down in Articles 21(5) and 23(11) of the NIS 2 Directive |
Planned |
|
|
Regulation 2019/2144 |
Protection of vehicles against cyberattacks |
Planned |
Annex I: Where to Find Information on EU Cybersecurity Policy
|
Actor |
Link & Description of Resource |
|---|---|
|
EU Publications Office |
|
|
European Parliament |
oeil.secure.europarl.europa.eu
|
|
www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train
|
|
|
www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank
|
|
|
Council |
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/public-register
|
|
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-eu/preparatory-bodies/horizontal-working-party-on-cyber-issues
|
|
|
consilium-europa.libguides.com/cybersecurity
|
|
|
www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/library/library-blog/think-tank-review
|
|
|
Commission |
ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register
|
|
|
|
digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/cybersecurity-policies
|
|
|
digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/nis-cooperation-group
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EEAS |
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ENISA |
www.enisa.europa.eu/publications
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CERT-EU |
cert.europa.eu/publications/threat-intelligence
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Annex II: List of Definitions Used Within EU Cybersecurity Policies
|
Term |
Definition |
Source |
|---|---|---|
|
assurance level |
a basis for confidence that an ICT product, ICT service or ICT process meets the security requirements of a specific European cybersecurity certification scheme, indicates the level at which an ICT product, ICT service or ICT process has been evaluated but as such does not measure the security of the ICT product, ICT service or ICT process concerned |
Art. 2, point (21) Regulation 2019/881 |
|
attribution |
a practice of assigning a malicious cyber activity to a specific state or non-state actor |
p. 18, 2023 Implementing Guidelines of EU Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox |
|
communication and information system (CIS) |
any system enabling the handling of information in electronic form, including all assets required for its operation, as well as infrastructure, organisation, personnel and information resources. This definition includes business applications, shared IT services, outsourced systems, and end-user devices |
Art. 2, point (5) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
any system enabling the handling of information in electronic form, including all assets required for its operation, as well as the infrastructure, organisation, personnel and information resources |
Art. 1, point (3) Decision 2015/443 |
|
|
computer data |
a representation of facts, information or concepts in a form suitable for processing in an information system, including a programme suitable for causing an information system to perform a function |
Art. 2, point (b) Directive 2013/40 |
|
connected product |
an item that obtains, generates or collects data concerning its use or environment and that is able to communicate product data via an electronic communications service, physical connection or on-device access, and whose primary function is not the storing, processing or transmission of data on behalf of any party other than the user |
Art. 2, point (5) Regulation 2023/2854 |
|
critical infrastructure |
an asset, a facility, equipment, a network or a system, or a part of an asset, a facility, equipment, a network or a system, which is necessary for the provision of an essential service |
Art. 2, point (4) Directive 2022/2557 |
|
an asset, network, system or part thereof which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, the health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption, breach or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State or in the Union as a result of the failure to maintain those functions |
Art. 2, point (4) Regulation 2021/1149 |
|
|
cyber attacks |
actions [which] are not duly authorised by the owner or by another right holder of the system or data or part of it, or are not permitted under the law of the Union or of the Member State concerned”, that either involve “access to information systems”, “information system interference”, “data interference”, or “data interception” |
Art. 1(3), Council Decision 2019/797 and Regulation 2019/796 |
|
cyber defence |
one of the cybersecurity dimensions (mostly seen as the military dimension, but comprising both military and civilian approaches). It may also be considered as measures to defend critical systems and information in order to achieve cybersecurity. Cyber defence comprises all technical and non-technical measures to improve resilience of ICT-based systems (such as CIS, C2 and any weapon or sensor systems) supporting MS' defence and national security interests, and to prevent, detect, react to and recover from a Cyber Attack on these systems |
p. 25, European Union Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations |
|
cyber deterrence |
cyber deterrence in the context of EU military CSDP is the ability to persuade continuously any cyber attacker that targeting EU CSDP military operations and missions in or through cyberspace will cost the attacker more than the gains expected. It encompasses all measures along the full spectrum of EU CSDP instruments |
p. 25, European Union Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations |
|
cyber resilience |
the ability to continuously deliver the intended outcome despite adverse cyber events, in particular the capacity of an organization to face events (incident or attack), resist a failure or cyberattack and recover its previous condition after the incident |
p. 26, European Union Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations |
|
cyber threat |
any potential circumstance, event or action that could damage, disrupt or otherwise adversely impact network and information systems, the users of such systems and other persons |
Basis: Art. 2, point (8) Regulation 2019/881 |
|
Referenced by Art. 3, point (11) Regulation 2023/2841; Art. 3, point (12) Regulation 2022/2554; Art. 2, point (4) Regulation 2021/887; and Art. 6, point (10) Directive 2022/2555 |
||
|
cyber-attack |
a malicious ICT-related incident caused by means of an attempt perpetrated by any threat actor to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthorised access to, or make unauthorised use of, an asset |
Art. 3, point (14) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
cyber-surveillance items |
dual-use items specially designed to enable the covert surveillance of natural persons by monitoring, extracting, collecting or analysing data from information and telecommunication systems |
Art. 2, point (20), Regulation 2021/821 |
|
cybercrime |
either crimes whose commission necessarily involves information and communications technology systems (ICT systems), either as tools for committing the crime or as the primary targets of the crime (cyber-dependent crimes), or traditional crimes which can be increased in scale or reach by the use of computers, computer networks or other ICT systems (cyber-enabled crimes) |
Art. 2, point (5) Regulation 2021/1149 |
|
cybersecurity |
the activities necessary to protect network and information systems, the users of such systems, and other persons affected by cyber threats |
Basis: Art. 2, point (1) Regulation 2019/881 |
|
Referenced by Art. 3, point (4) Regulation 2023/2841; Art. 2, point (1) Regulation 2021/887; and Art. 6, point (3) Directive 2022/2555 |
||
|
cybersecurity communities |
collaborative civilian, law enforcement, diplomacy and defence groups representing both Member States and relevant EU institutions, bodies and agencies which exchange information in pursuit of shared goals, interests and missions in relation to cybersecurity |
p. 7, Commission Recommendation 2021/1086 |
|
cybersecurity products, services and processes |
commercial and non-commercial ICT products, services or processes with the specific purpose of protecting network and information systems or ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and accessibility of data that are processed or stored in network and information systems, as well as the cybersecurity of the users of such systems and other persons affected by cyber threats |
Art. 2, point (3) Regulation 2021/887 |
|
cybersecurity risk |
the potential for loss or disruption caused by an incident and is to be expressed as a combination of the magnitude of such loss or disruption and the likelihood of occurrence of the incident |
Basis: Art. 6, point (9) Directive 2022/2555 |
|
Referenced by: Art. 3, point (14) Regulation 2023/2841 |
||
|
cyberspace |
the virtual global and common domain within the information environment consisting of all interconnected and interdependent networks of global, organisational and national information infrastructure, based on the Internet and telecommunications networks, to be extended by other networks, computer systems and embedded processors, and containing also stand-alone systems and networks |
p. 25, European Union Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations |
|
cyberspace domain of operations |
the global operational domain cutting through and being a substrate of all others, encompassing all cyberspace related information, information operations and strategic communications, and consisting of all interconnected information technology, communication networks, and included systems, which process, store or transmit information, separated or independent |
p. 25, European Union Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations |
|
cyberspace operations |
operation aimed to retain freedom of manoeuvre in cyberspace / in the cyber domain to accomplish operational objectives, deny freedom of action to adversaries, and enable other operational activities |
p. 25, European Union Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations |
|
cyberspace situational awareness and situational understanding |
the level of perception and understanding of all environmental elements and events, with respect to time or space and the projection of their status after some variable has changed, that allow making rational decisions and actions in cyberspace |
p. 26, European Union Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations |
|
data interception |
intercepting, by technical means, non-public transmissions of digital data to, from or within an information system, including electromagnetic emissions from an information system carrying such digital data |
Art. 2, point (d) Council Decision 2019/797 and Art. 1(7), point (d) Council Regulation 2019/796 |
|
data interference |
deleting, damaging, deteriorating, altering or suppressing digital data on an information system, or rendering such data inaccessible; it also includes theft of data, funds, economic resources or intellectual property |
Art. 2, point (c) Council Decision 2019/797 and Art. 1(7), point (c) Council Regulation 2019/796 |
|
digital operational resilience |
the ability of a financial entity to build, assure and review its operational integrity and reliability by ensuring, either directly or indirectly through the use of services provided by ICT third-party service providers, the full range of ICT-related capabilities needed to address the security of the network and information systems which a financial entity uses, and which support the continued provision of financial services and their quality, including throughout disruptions |
Art. 3, point (1) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
electronic communications network |
a transmission system, whether or not based on a permanent infrastructure or centralised administration capacity, and, where applicable, switching or routing equipment and other resources, including network elements which are not active, which permit the conveyance of signals by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic means, including satellite networks, fixed (circuit- and packet-switched including internet) and mobile terrestrial networks, electricity cable systems, to the extent that they are used for the purpose of transmitting signals, networks used for radio and television broadcasting, and cable television networks, irrespective of the type of information conveyed |
Art. 3, point (25) Regulation 2018/1725 and Art. 2, point (1) Directive 2018/1972 |
|
electronic identification |
the process of using person identification data in electronic form uniquely representing either a natural or legal person, or a natural person representing another natural person or a legal person |
Art. 3, point (1), Regulation 910/2014 |
|
electronic identification scheme |
a system for electronic identification under which electronic identification means are issued to natural or legal persons or natural persons representing other natural persons or legal persons |
Art. 3, point (4), Regulation 910/2014 |
|
essential service |
a service which is crucial for the maintenance of vital societal functions, economic activities, public health and safety, or the environment |
Art. 2, point (5) Directive 2022/2557 |
|
EU Cybersecurity Incident and Crisis Response Plan |
a compilation of roles, modalities and procedures leading to the completion of the EU Cybersecurity Crisis Response Framework described in point (1) of the Commission Recommendation of 13 September 2017 on Coordinated Response to Large Scale Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises (‘Blueprint’) |
p. 7, Commission Recommendation 2021/1086 |
|
EU Cybersecurity Rapid Reaction team |
a team composed of recognised cybersecurity experts, drawn notably from the CSIRTs of the Member States, with support from ENISA, CERT-EU and Europol, which is ready to remotely assist participants impacted by large-scale incidents and crises |
p. 7, Commission Recommendation 2021/1086 |
|
European cybersecurity certificate |
a document issued by a relevant body, attesting that a given ICT product, ICT service or ICT process has been evaluated for compliance with specific security requirements laid down in a European cybersecurity certification scheme |
Art. 2, point (11) Regulation 2019/881 |
|
European cybersecurity certification scheme |
a comprehensive set of rules, technical requirements, standards and procedures that are established at Union level and that apply to the certification or conformity assessment of specific ICT products, ICT services or ICT processes |
Art. 2, point (9) Regulation 2019/881 |
|
ICT asset |
a software or hardware asset in the network and information systems used by the financial entity |
Art. 3, point (7) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
ICT process |
a set of activities performed to design, develop, deliver or maintain an ICT product or ICT service |
Basis: Art. 2, point (14) Regulation 2019/881 |
|
Referenced by Art. 6, point (14) Directive 2022/2555 |
||
|
ICT product |
an element or a group of elements of a network or information system |
Basis: Art. 2, point (12) Regulation 2019/881 |
|
Referenced by Art. 6, point (12) Directive 2022/2555 |
||
|
ICT risk |
any reasonably identifiable circumstance in relation to the use of network and information systems which, if materialised, may compromise the security of the network and information systems, of any technology dependent tool or process, of operations and processes, or of the provision of services by producing adverse effects in the digital or physical environment |
Art. 3, point (5) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
ICT service |
a service consisting fully or mainly in the transmission, storing, retrieving or processing of information by means of network and information systems |
Basis: Art. 2, point (13) Regulation 2019/881 |
|
Referenced by Art. 6, point (13) Directive 2022/2555 |
||
|
ICT services |
digital and data services provided through ICT systems to one or more internal or external users on an ongoing basis, including hardware as a service and hardware services which includes the provision of technical support via software or firmware updates by the hardware provider, excluding traditional analogue telephone services |
Art. 3, point (21) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
ICT third-party risk |
an ICT risk that may arise for a financial entity in relation to its use of ICT services provided by ICT third-party service providers or by subcontractors of the latter, including through outsourcing arrangements |
Art. 3, point (18) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
ICT-related incident |
a single event or a series of linked events unplanned by the financial entity that compromises the security of the network and information systems, and have an adverse impact on the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of data, or on the services provided by the financial entity |
Art. 3, point (8) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
incident |
an event compromising the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored, transmitted or processed data or of the services offered by, or accessible via, network and information systems |
Basis: Art. 6, point (6) Directive 2022/2555 |
|
Referenced by Art. 3, point (7) Regulation 2023/2841 |
||
|
an event which has the potential to significantly disrupt, or that disrupts, the provision of an essential service, including when it affects the national systems that safeguard the rule of law |
Art. 2, point (3) Directive 2022/2557 |
|
|
any event having an actual adverse effect on the security of network and information systems |
Basis: Art. 4, point (7) Directive 2016/1148 |
|
|
Referenced by Art. 2, point (6) Regulation 2019/881 |
||
|
incident handling |
any actions and procedures aiming to prevent, detect, analyse, and contain or to respond to and recover from an incident |
Basis: Art. 6, point (8) Directive 2022/2555 |
|
Referenced by Art. 3, point (10), Regulation 2023/2841 |
||
|
all procedures supporting the detection, analysis and containment of an incident and the response thereto |
Basis: Art. 4, point (8) Directive 2016/1148 |
|
|
Referenced by Art. 2, point (7) Regulation 2019/881 |
||
|
information asset |
a collection of information, either tangible or intangible, that is worth protecting |
Art. 3, point (6) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
information assurance |
also defined as protection of information systems against unauthorized access to or modification of information, whether in storage, processing, or transit, and against the denial of service to authorized users, including those measures necessary to detect, document, and counter such threats |
p. 26, European Union Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations |
|
information security policy |
a set of information security objectives, which are or have to be established, implemented and checked. It comprises, but is not limited to, Decisions 2015/444 and 2015/443 |
Art. 2, point (10) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
information system interference |
hindering or interrupting the functioning of an information system by inputting digital data, by transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing such data, or by rendering such data inaccessible |
Art. 2, point (b) Council Decision 2019/797 and Art. 1(7), point (b) Council Regulation 2019/796 |
|
information system(s) |
a device or group of inter-connected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a programme, automatically processes computer data, as well as computer data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by that device or group of devices for the purposes of its or their operation, use, protection and maintenance |
Art. 2, point (a) Directive 2013/40 |
|
a device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a programme, automatically processes digital data, as well as digital data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by that device or group of devices for the purposes of its or their operation, use, protection and maintenance |
Art. 2, point (a) Council Decision 2019/797 and Art. 1(7), point (a) Council Regulation 2019/796 |
|
|
integrated EU cybersecurity situation report |
a report gathering input from participants in the Joint Cyber Unit, building on the EU Cybersecurity Technical Situation Report defined under Article 7(6) of Regulation (EU) 2019/881 |
p. 7, Commission Recommendation 2021/1086 |
|
IT security (or security of CIS) |
the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and availability of CISs and the data sets that they process |
Art. 2, point (13) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
IT security guidelines |
consist of recommended but voluntary measures that help support IT security standards or serve as a reference when no applicable standard is in place |
Art. 2, point (14) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
IT security incident |
an event that could adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of a CIS |
Art. 2, point (15) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
IT security measure |
a technical or organisational measure aimed at mitigating IT security risks |
Art. 2, point (16) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
IT security need |
a precise and unambiguous definition of the levels of confidentiality, integrity and availability associated with a piece of information or an IT system with a view to determining the level of protection required |
Art. 2, point (17) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
IT security objective |
a statement of intent to counter specified threats and/or satisfy specified organisational security requirements or assumptions |
Art. 2, point (18) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
IT security plan |
the documentation of the IT security measures required to meet the IT security needs of a CIS |
Art. 2, point (19) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
IT security policy |
a set of IT security objectives, which are or have to be established, implemented and checked. It comprises this decision and its implementing rules |
Art. 2, point (20) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
IT security requirement |
a formalised IT security need through a predefined process |
Art. 2, point (21) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
IT security risk |
an effect that an IT security threat might induce on a CIS by exploiting a vulnerability. As such, an IT security risk is characterised by two factors: (1) uncertainty, i.e. the likelihood of an IT security threat to cause an unwanted event; and (2) impact, i.e. the consequences that such an unwanted event may have on a CIS |
Art. 2, point (22) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
IT security threat |
a factor that can potentially lead to an unwanted event which may result in harm to a CIS. Such threats may be accidental or deliberate and are characterised by threatening elements, potential targets and attack methods |
Art. 2, point (25) Commission Decision 2017/46 |
|
large-scale cybersecurity incident |
an incident which causes a level of disruption that exceeds a Member State’s capacity to respond to it or which has a significant impact on at least two Member States |
Basis: Art. 6, point (7) Directive 2022/2555 |
|
Referenced by Art. 3, point (9) Regulation 2023/2841 |
||
|
large-scale incident |
an incident as defined under Article 4(7) of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 [= any event having an actual adverse effect on the security of network and information systems] with a significant impact in at least two Member States |
p. 7, Commission Recommendation 2021/1086 |
|
legacy ICT system |
an ICT system that has reached the end of its lifecycle (end-of-life), that is not suitable for upgrades or fixes, for technological or commercial reasons, or is no longer supported by its supplier or by an ICT third-party service provider, but that is still in use and supports the functions of the financial entity |
Art. 3, point (3) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
major ICT-related incident |
an ICT-related incident that has a high adverse impact on the network and information systems that support critical or important functions of the financial entity |
Art. 3, point (10) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
major incident |
an incident which causes a level of disruption that exceeds a Union entity’s and CERT-EU’s capacity to respond to it or which has a significant impact on at least two Union entities |
Art. 3, point (8) Regulation 2023/2841 |
|
major operational or security payment-related incident |
an operational or security payment-related incident that has a high adverse impact on the payment-related services provided |
Art. 3, point (11) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
major threat to security |
a threat to security that can reasonably be expected to lead to loss of life, serious injury or harm, significant damage to property, compromise of highly sensitive information, disruption of IT systems or of essential operational capacities of the Commission |
Art. 1, point (17) Decision 2015/443 |
|
managed security service provider |
a managed service provider that carries out or provides assistance for activities relating to cybersecurity risk management |
Art. 6, point (40) Directive 2022/2555 |
|
managed service provider |
an entity that provides services related to the installation, management, operation or maintenance of ICT products, networks, infrastructure, applications or any other network and information systems, via assistance or active administration carried out either on customers’ premises or remotely |
Art. 6, point (39) Directive 2022/2555 |
|
market surveillance |
the activities carried out and measures taken by market surveillance authorities to ensure that products comply with the requirements set out in this Regulation |
Art. 3, point (23) Regulation 2023/988 |
|
national cybersecurity certification scheme |
a comprehensive set of rules, technical requirements, standards and procedures developed and adopted by a national public authority and that apply to the certification or conformity assessment of ICT products, ICT services and ICT processes falling under the scope of the specific scheme |
Art. 2, point (10) Regulation 2019/881 |
|
national cybersecurity strategy |
a coherent framework of a Member State providing strategic objectives and priorities in the area of cybersecurity and the governance to achieve them in that Member State |
Art. 6, point (4) Regulation 2022/2555 |
|
near miss |
an event that could have compromised the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored, transmitted or processed data or of the services offered by, or accessible via, network and information systems, but that was successfully prevented from materialising or that did not materialise |
Basis: Art. 6, point (5) Directive 2022/2555 |
|
Referenced by Art. 3, point (6) Regulation 2023/2841 |
||
|
network and information system |
(a) an electronic communications network as defined in Article 2, point (1), of Directive (EU) 2018/1972; (b) any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which, pursuant to a programme, carry out automatic processing of digital data; or (c) digital data stored, processed, retrieved or transmitted by elements covered under points (a) and (b) for the purposes of their operation, use, protection and maintenance [1] While Regulations 2021/887 and 2019/881 refer to Art. 4, point (1) Directive 2016/1148 (NIS Directive) instead of Art. 6, point (1) Directive 2022/2555 (NIS 2 Directive) for the definition of ‘network and information system’, the actual definitions used in both Directives are similar in wordings. |
Basis: Art. 6, point (1) Directive 2022/2555 |
|
Referenced by Art. 3, point (2) Regulation 2023/2841 and Art. 3, point (2) Regulation 2022/2554, as well as Art. 2, point (2) Regulation 2021/887 and Art. 2, point (2) Regulation 2019/881 [1] |
||
|
operating system |
a system software that controls the basic functions of the hardware or software and enables software applications to run on it |
Art. 2, point (10) Regulation 2022/1925 |
|
operational or security payment-related incident |
a single event or a series of linked events unplanned by the financial entities referred to in Article 2(1), points (a) to (d), whether ICT-related or not, that has an adverse impact on the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of payment-related data, or on the payment-related services provided by the financial entity |
Art. 3, point (9) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
personal data |
any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person |
Art. 4, point (1) Regulation 2016/679 |
|
processing |
any operation or set of operations which is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction |
Art. 4, point (2) Regulation 2016/679 |
|
product |
any item, whether or not it is interconnected to other items, supplied or made available, whether for consideration or not, including in the context of providing a service, which is intended for consumers or is likely, under reasonably foreseeable conditions, to be used by consumers even if not intended for them |
Art. 3, point (1) Regulation 2023/988 |
|
radio equipment |
an electrical or electronic product, which intentionally emits and/or receives radio waves for the purpose of radio communication and/or radiodetermination, or an electrical or electronic product which must be completed with an accessory, such as antenna, so as to intentionally emit and/or receive radio waves for the purpose of radio communication and/or radiodetermination |
Art. 2(1), point (1) Directive 2014/53 |
|
resilience |
a critical entity’s ability to prevent, protect against, respond to, resist, mitigate, absorb, accommodate and recover from an incident |
Art. 2, point (2) Directive 2022/2557 |
|
the ability to face economic, social and environmental shocks or persistent structural changes in a fair, sustainable and inclusive way |
Art. 2, point (5) Regulation 2021/241 |
|
|
risk |
the potential for loss or disruption caused by an incident and is to be expressed as a combination of the magnitude of such loss or disruption and the likelihood of occurrence of the incident |
Art. 6, point (9) Directive 2022/2555 and Art. 2, point (6) Directive 2022/2557 |
|
the combination of the probability of an occurrence of a hazard causing harm and the degree of severity of that harm |
Art. 3, point (4) Regulation 2023/988 |
|
|
the combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm |
Art. 2, point (23) Regulation 2017/745 |
|
|
risk assessment |
the overall process for determining the nature and extent of a risk by identifying and analysing potential relevant threats, vulnerabilities and hazards which could lead to an incident and by evaluating the potential loss or disruption of the provision of an essential service caused by that incident |
Art. 2, point (7) Directive 2022/2557 |
|
safe product |
any product which, under normal or reasonably foreseeable conditions of use, including the actual duration of use, does not present any risk or only the minimum risks compatible with the product’s use, considered acceptable and consistent with a high level of protection of the health and safety of consumers |
Art. 3, point (2) Regulation 2023/988 |
|
security in the Commission |
the security of persons, assets and information in the Commission, and in particular the physical integrity of persons and assets, the integrity, confidentiality and availability of information and communication and information systems, as well as the unobstructed functioning of Commission operations |
Art. 1, point (12) Decision 2015/443 |
|
security incident |
an event having an actual adverse effect on the security of electronic communications networks or services |
Art. 2, point (42) Directive 2018/1972 |
|
security of network and information systems |
the ability of network and information systems to resist, at a given level of confidence, any event that may compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of stored, transmitted or processed data or of the services offered by, or accessible via, those network and information systems |
Basis: Art. 6, point (2) Directive 2022/2555 |
|
Referenced by Art. 3, point (3) Regulation 2023/2841 and Art. 3, point (4) Regulation 2022/2554 |
||
|
security of networks and services |
the ability of electronic communications networks and services to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of those networks and services, of stored or transmitted or processed data, or of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those electronic communications networks or services |
Art. 2, point (21) Directive 2018/1972 |
|
serious risk |
a risk which, based on a risk assessment and taking into account the normal and foreseeable use of the product, is considered to require rapid intervention by the market surveillance authorities, including cases where the effects of the risk are not immediate |
Art. 3, point (5) Regulation 2023/988 |
|
significance of a disruption |
In order to determine the significance of a disruption, the following parameters shall, in particular, be taken into account: (a) the number and proportion of users affected by the disruption; (b) the duration of the disruption; (c) the geographical area affected by the disruption, taking into account whether the area is geographically isolated. |
Art. 15(1), Directive 2022/2557 |
|
significance of the impact of a security incident |
in order to determine the significance of the impact of a security incident, where available the following parameters shall, in particular, be taken into account: (a) the number of users affected by the security incident; (b) the duration of the security incident; (c) the geographical spread of the area affected by the security incident; (d) the extent to which the functioning of the network or service is affected; (e) the extent of impact on economic and societal activities. |
Art. 40(2), Directive 2018/1972 |
|
significant cyber threat |
a cyber threat which, based on its technical characteristics, can be assumed to have the potential to have a severe impact on the network and information systems of an entity or the users of the entity’s services by causing considerable material or non-material damage |
Basis: Art. 6, point (11) Directive 2022/2555 |
|
Referenced by Art. 3, point (12) Regulation 2023/2841 |
||
|
a cyber threat the technical characteristics of which indicate that it could have the potential to result in a major ICT-related incident or a major operational or security payment-related incident |
Art. 3, point (13) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
|
financial entities shall classify cyber threats as significant based on the criticality of the services at risk, including the financial entity’s transactions and operations, number and/or relevance of clients or financial counterparts targeted and the geographical spread of the areas at risk. |
Art. 18(2), Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
|
significant effect of a cyber attack |
The factors determining whether a cyber-attack has a significant effect as referred to in Article 1(1) include any of the following: (a) the scope, scale, impact or severity of disruption caused, including to economic and societal activities, essential services, critical State functions, public order or public safety; (b) the number of natural or legal persons, entities or bodies affected; (c) the number of Member States concerned; (d) the amount of economic loss caused, such as through large-scale theft of funds, economic resources or intellectual property; (e) the economic benefit gained by the perpetrator, for himself or for others; (f) the amount or nature of data stolen or the scale of data breaches; or (g) the nature of commercially sensitive data accessed. |
Art. 3, Decision 2019/797 and Art. 2, Regulation 2019/796 |
|
significant disruptive effect |
When determining the significance of a disruptive effect [...], Member States shall take into account the following criteria: (a) the number of users relying on the essential service provided by the entity concerned; (b) the extent to which other sectors and subsectors as set out in the Annex depend on the essential service in question; (c) the impact that incidents could have, in terms of degree and duration, on economic and societal activities, the environment, public safety and security, or the health of the population; (d) the entity’s market share in the market for the essential service or essential services concerned; (e) the geographic area that could be affected by an incident, including any cross-border impact, taking into account the vulnerability associated with the degree of isolation of certain types of geographic areas, such as insular regions, remote regions or mountainous areas; (f) the importance of the entity in maintaining a sufficient level of the essential service, taking into account the availability of alternative means for the provision of that essential service. |
Art. 7(1), Directive 2022/2557 |
|
significant incident |
an incident shall be considered to be significant if: (a) it has caused or is capable of causing severe operational disruption of the services or financial loss for the entity concerned; (b) it has affected or is capable of affecting other natural or legal persons by causing considerable material or non-material damage. |
Art. 23(3), Directive 2022/2555 |
|
an incident shall be considered to be significant if: (a) it has caused or is capable of causing severe operational disruption to the functioning of, or financial loss to, the Union entity concerned; (b) it has affected or is capable of affecting other natural or legal persons by causing considerable material or non-material damage. |
Art. 21(1), Regulation 2023/2841 |
|
|
software application |
any digital product or service that runs on an operating system |
Art. 2, point (15) Regulation 2022/1925 |
|
threat intelligence |
information that has been aggregated, transformed, analysed, interpreted or enriched to provide the necessary context for decision-making and to enable relevant and sufficient understanding in order to mitigate the impact of an ICT-related incident or of a cyber threat, including the technical details of a cyber-attack, those responsible for the attack and their modus operandi and motivations |
Art. 3, point (15) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
threat-led penetration testing (TLPT) |
a framework that mimics the tactics, techniques and procedures of real-life threat actors perceived as posing a genuine cyber threat, that delivers a controlled, bespoke, intelligence-led (red team) test of the financial entity’s critical live production systems |
Art. 3, point (17) Regulation 2022/2554 |
|
vulnerability |
a weakness, susceptibility or flaw of ICT products or ICT services that can be exploited by a cyber threat |
Basis: Art. 6, point (15) Directive 2022/2555 |
|
Referenced by Art. 3, point (13) Regulation 2023/2841 |
||
|
a weakness, susceptibility or flaw of an asset, system, process or control that can be exploited |
Art. 3, point (16) Regulation 2022/2554 |
Annex III: List of Abbreviations Used in Compendium
|
Abbreviation |
Full Name |
|---|---|
|
ACER |
European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators |
|
AFSJ |
Area of freedom, security and justice |
|
APT |
Advanced Persistent Threat |
|
BEREC |
Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications |
|
CARD |
Coordinated Annual Review on Defence |
|
CBMs |
Confidence-building measures |
|
CCB |
Cyber capacity-building |
|
CD |
Cyber Defence |
|
CDOP |
Cyber Defence Operational Picture |
|
CDP |
Capability Development Plan |
|
CDPF |
Cyber Defence Policy Framework |
|
CER Directive |
Critical Entities Resilience Directive |
|
CERG |
Critical Entities Resilience Group |
|
CERT |
Computer Emergency Response Team |
|
CERT-EU |
Computer Emergency Response Team for the EU institutions, bodies and agencies |
|
CFSP |
Common Foreign and Security Policy |
|
CIDCC |
Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre |
|
CIISI-EU |
Cyber Information and Intelligence Sharing Initiative |
|
CIS |
Communication and Information Systems |
|
COREPER |
Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Governments of the Member States to the European Union |
|
COSI |
Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal Security |
|
CRA |
Cyber Resilience Act |
|
CRF |
Cyber Ranges Federations |
|
CRRT |
Cyber Rapid Response Teams and Mutual Assistance in Cyber Security |
|
CSDP |
Common Security and Defence Policy |
|
CSIRTs |
Computer Security Incident Response Teams |
|
CSIRTs Network |
Computer Security Incident Response Teams Network |
|
CTI |
Cyber Threat Intelligence |
|
CTIRISP |
Cyber Threats and Incident Response Information Sharing Platform |
|
CVD |
Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure |
|
CyCLOs |
Cyber Crises Liaison Organisations |
|
DG |
Directorate-General |
|
DG COMP |
Directorate-General for Competition |
|
DG CONNECT |
Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology |
|
DG DEFIS |
Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space |
|
DG DIGIT |
Directorate-General for Digital Services |
|
DG ECFIN |
Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs |
|
DG ENER |
Directorate-General for Energy |
|
DG FISMA |
Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital Markets Union |
|
DG GROW |
Directorate General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs |
|
DG HOME |
Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs |
|
DG HR |
Directorate-General for Human Resources and Security |
|
DG INTPA |
Directorate-General for International Partnerships |
|
DG JRC |
Joint Research Centre |
|
DG JUST |
Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers |
|
DG MOVE |
Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport |
|
DG RTD |
Directorate-General for Research and Innovation |
|
DG SANTE |
Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety |
|
DG TRADE |
Directorate-General for Trade |
|
DNS |
Domain Name System |
|
DORA |
Digital Operational Resilience Act |
|
e-CODEX |
e-Justice Communication via Online Data Exchange |
|
EASA |
European Union Aviation Safety Agency |
|
EBA |
European Banking Authority |
|
EC |
European Commission |
|
EC3 |
European Cybercrime Centre |
|
ECB |
European Central Bank |
|
ECCC |
European Cybersecurity Competence Centre |
|
ECCG |
European Cybersecurity Certification Group |
|
ECCSA |
European Centre for Cybersecurity in Aviation |
|
ECOFIN |
Economic and Financial Affairs Council |
|
ECRB |
Euro Cyber Resilience Board for pan-European Financial Infrastructures |
|
ECSF |
European Cyber Skills Competence Framework |
|
EDA |
European Defence Agency |
|
EDF |
European Defence Fund |
|
EDPS |
European Data Protection Supervisor |
|
EDTIB |
European Defence Technological and Industrial Base |
|
EEAS |
European External Action Service |
|
EGNOS |
European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service |
|
eIDAS Regulation |
Regulation on electronic identification and trust services |
|
EIOPA |
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority |
|
EMPACT |
European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats |
|
ENISA |
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity |
|
ENISA AG |
ENISA Advisory Group |
|
ENTSO-E |
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity |
|
ENTSOG |
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas |
|
EP |
European Parliament |
|
EPF |
European Peace Facility |
|
ESAs |
European Supervisory Authorities |
|
ESDC |
European Security and Defence College |
|
ESMA |
European Securities and Markets Authority |
|
ESRB |
European Systemic Risk Board |
|
ETIAS |
European Travel Information and Authorisation System |
|
ETSI |
European Telecommunications Standards Institute |
|
EU |
European Union |
|
EU CAIH |
EU Cyber Academia and Innovation Hub |
|
EU DSO Entity |
European Distribution System Operators Entity |
|
EU INTCEN |
European Union Intelligence and Situation Centre |
|
EU SOCTA |
European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment |
|
EU Space ISAC |
EU Space Information Sharing and Analysis Centre |
|
EU-CyCLONe |
European Cyber Crises Liaison Organisation Network |
|
eu-LISA |
European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice |
|
EUAN |
EU Agencies Network |
|
EUCDCC |
EU Cyber Defence Coordination Centre |
|
EUCI |
EU classified information |
|
EUCTF |
European Union Cybercrime Task Force |
|
EUIBAs |
EU Institutions, Bodies, and Agencies |
|
EUMC |
EU Military Committee |
|
EUMS |
European Union Military Staff |
|
EUMS INT |
European Union Military Staff Intelligence Directorate |
|
EUPM Moldova |
European Union Partnership Mission Moldova |
|
Eurojust |
European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation |
|
Europol |
European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation |
|
EuroQCI |
European Quantum Communication Infrastructure |
|
EUSPA |
European Union Agency for the Space Programme |
|
FAC |
Foreign Affairs Council |
|
FDI |
Foreign direct investments |
|
FMN |
Federated Mission Networking |
|
GDPR |
General Data Protection Regulation |
|
GNSS |
Global navigation satellite system |
|
GOVSATCOM |
European Union Governmental Satellite Communications |
|
GSC |
General Secretariat of the Council |
|
HR/VP |
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice President of the Commission |
|
HWPCI |
Horizontal Working Party on Cyber Issues |
|
IAEA |
International Atomic Energy Agency |
|
ICT |
Information and communication technologies |
|
ICTAC |
ICT Advisory Committee of the EU Agencies |
|
IEP |
Internet Exchange Point |
|
IICB |
Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board |
|
IOCTA |
Internet Online Crime Threat Assessment |
|
IoT |
Internet of Things |
|
IPCR |
Integrated Political Crisis Response |
|
ISAA |
Integrated Situational Awareness and Analysis |
|
ISF |
Internal Security Fund |
|
ISMS |
Information security management systems |
|
ISSB |
Information Security Steering Board |
|
IT |
Information technology |
|
ITRE |
Committee on Industry, Research and Energy |
|
J-CAT |
Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce |
|
JC |
ESA Joint Committee |
|
JCU |
Joint Cyber Unit |
|
JHA |
Justice and Home Affairs Council |
|
JITs |
Joint Investigation Teams |
|
JON |
Joint Oversight Network |
|
LEAs |
Law enforcement agencies |
|
LIBE |
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs |
|
LISO |
Local Informatics Security Officer |
|
MiCA |
Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation |
|
MICNET |
Military Computer Emergency Response Team Operational Network |
|
MilCERT |
Military Computer Emergency Response Team |
|
MLA |
Mutual Legal Assistance |
|
MSP |
Managed service provider |
|
NCC |
National Coordination Centre |
|
NEC |
National EMPACT coordinator |
|
NIS |
Directive concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (2016) |
|
NIS 2 |
Directive on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union (2022) |
|
NoCA |
Network of Cybersecurity Analysts |
|
PEGA |
Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware |
|
PESCO |
Permanent Structured Cooperation |
|
PoA |
Programme of Action |
|
PSC |
Political and Security Committee |
|
QCI |
Quantum communication infrastructure |
|
R&D |
Research and development |
|
RED |
Radio Equipment Directive |
|
RRF |
Recovery and Resilience Facility |
|
RTS |
Regulatory technical standards |
|
SCCG |
Stakeholder Cybersecurity Certification Group |
|
SIAC |
Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity |
|
SIENA |
Secure Information Exchange Network Application |
|
SMEs |
Small and medium-sized enterprises |
|
SOCs |
Security Operation Centres |
|
SOP |
Standard Operating Procedures |
|
SPOC |
Single Point of Contact |
|
TEU |
Treaty on European Union |
|
TFEU |
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union |
|
TIBER-EU |
European framework for Threat Intelligence-based Ethical Red Teaming |
|
TLPT |
Threat-led penetration testing |
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Jasen Ho for research support, particularly on EU legal acts and policies in the areas of energy, transport, health, education and research policy, as well as Sven Herpig and Luisa Seeling for their support with this publication.
Concept and Supervision Infographics, Backend Curation: Alina Siebert
Backend Curation Support: Martha Rahel Reinicke
Design Infographics: Jan Klöthe
1 Council Conclusions on exploring the potential of the Joint Cyber Unit initiative - complementing the EU Coordinated Response to Large-Scale Cybersecurity Incidents and Crises (13048/21) .
2 Council Conclusions on the Future of Cybersecurity: implement and protect together (10133/24) .
3 Ibid.
4 Given EUR-Lex’s limitation of combining a maximum of two search terms, the numbers depicted in Figure 1 aggregate the results for two keyword searches for in-text mentionings for visual purposes: (1) “cyber security” or “cybersecurity” and (2) “information security” or “IT security.” The search queries illustrated in both Figure 1 and 2 were conducted on April 5, 2024.
5 For ease of understanding, the term ‘EU cybersecurity policy’, when used throughout this compendium, entails all documents listed and explained in this compendium, thus both legal acts and policies.
6 In accordance, for instance, the compendium does not touch upon the Network Code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows, which entered into force in June 2024, or the proposed Cyber Resilience Act and Cyber Solidarity Act which were close to adoption at the time of the compendium’s publication.
7 The number includes all documents of a type explained in Chapter 3. Prior legal acts that are no longer in force were omitted from the count. The numbers are the following for each policy area: 17 (overarching policies), 31 (internal market), 12 (economy, monetary and commercial policy), 13 (internal security, justice and law enforcement), 21 (energy, transport and health policy), 10 (education, research and space policy), 44 (foreign and security policy) and 6 (cybersecurity of EUIBAs).
8 The EU must further comply with the principle of subsidiarity, meaning that “in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member State” (Art. 5(3) TEU). Moreover, as a general rule, “the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties” (Art. 5(4) TEU), also known as the principle of proportionality.
9 Council Conclusions on the Future of Cybersecurity: implement and protect together (10133/24) .
10 European Commission (n.d.): What the European Commission does in law .
11 For instance, if an EU country fails to “fully incorporate a directive into its national law” ( EUR-Lex (n.d.): Enforcement of EU law ) by the specified deadline or misapplies EU law, the Commission is empowered to take corrective measures. Corrective measures employed by the European Commission include the pre-infringement process known as EU Pilot and the subsequent infringement procedure. EU Pilot is used when the Commission identifies a “potential non-compliance with EU law” ( European Commission (n.d.): EU Pilot ). It is “a mechanism for informal dialogue between the Commission and the Member State” (ibid.) in question and aims to resolve the issue through cooperation. If a breach is evident, acknowledged, or persists following the pre-infringement process, a formal infringement procedure may be initiated, potentially leading to a referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union. In certain instances, the Commission may request the imposition of financial sanctions on the concerned Member State(s). For further information, see European Commission (n.d.): Implementing EU law and EUR-Lex (n.d.): Enforcement of EU law .
12 EUR-Lex (2022): European Union regulations .
13 EUR-Lex (2022): European Union directives .
14 Ibid.
15 EUR-Lex (2021): European Union decisions .
16 For more information on the adoption process within the EU’s ordinary legislative procedure, see Council of the EU (n.d.): The ordinary legislative procedure , EUR-Lex (n.d.): Ordinary legislative procedure (Codecision) , and EUR-Lex (n.d.): Trilogue .
17 For more information on the EU’s special legislative procedure, see EUR-Lex (n.d.): Special legislative procedure .
18 For further information, see EUR-Lex (n.d.): Delegated acts and EUR-Lex (n.d.): Implementing acts .
19 EUR-Lex (n.d.): Implementing acts .
20 For further information, see EUR-Lex (n.d.): Recommendation and EUR-Lex (n.d.): Opinion .
21 European Commission (n.d.): Types of EU law .
22 Ibid.
23 Council of the EU (n.d.): Council conclusions and resolutions .
24 Ibid.
25 For instance, for the Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox the table lists ‘June 2017’, even though subsequent documents of relevance, revised implementing guidelines, were issued in June 2023.
26 In relation to the 2017 EU Cybersecurity Strategy, the Council adopted Conclusions on the Joint Communication “Resilience, Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU” in November 2017.
27 To the best of the author’s knowledge, both the implementation and action plan are not publicly accessible.
28 Council Implementing Decision 2018/1993 notes in its recital that the IPCR has already been “used to exercise the Union response to major crises caused by cyber-attacks”, among other threat scenarios (recital (12)).
29 As potential actors to be involved at the technical level, the Recommendation lists the designated competent authorities and single points of contact (SPOCs) pursuant to the NIS 2 Directive, national CSIRTs, ENISA, Europol/EC3, CERT-EU, the Commission, and the EEAS (e.g., via the SIAC) (p. 8f.). At the operational level, the Recommendation additionally mentions national cybersecurity agencies, sectoral authorities, and the Council as actors to be possibly involved in the response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises (p. 10f.). At the highest level, the political/strategic level, the Recommendation alludes to the potential involvement of national “Ministers responsible for cybersecurity”, the President of the European Council, the respective Council presidency, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Horizontal Working Party on Cyber Issues (HWPCI) and the HR/VP (p. 12).
30 Article 4 of the Decision lists four digital targets, including, for instance, “the digitalisation of public services” through “100 % online accessible provision of key public services”, among other indicators.
31 In 2023, the Commission published its first Report on the Digital Decade .
32 A list of published national roadmaps can be found here . The Commission is tasked with supporting and advising Member States in drafting their national roadmaps.
33 This is the Commission’s second Cybersecurity Work Programme that covers the period of 2023 to 2024. The first Work Programme covered the period of 2021 to 2022.
34 To qualify as a medium-sized enterprise, the entity must have more than 50 employees and an annual turnover exceeding 10 million euros ( Commission Recommendation concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises, Recommendation 2003/361 ).
35 Exceptions to this general rule are (i) “providers of public electronic communications networks or providers of publicly available electronic communications services” for whom the location of the provision of their services is decisive, (ii) “DNS service providers, TLD name registries, entities providing domain name registration services, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, as well as providers of online marketplaces, of online search engines or of social networking services platforms” where jurisdiction depends on “where the decisions related to the cybersecurity risk-management measures are predominantly taken” and (iii) public administration entities for which their establishing Member State determines jurisdiction (see further Art. 26(1) and (2)
36 For a definition of these and further types, see Annex I and II of the NIS 2 Directive.
37 For instance, DORA represents such a sector-specific legal act for financial entities (see further European Commission: Commission Guidelines on the application of Article 4(1) and (2) of Directive 2022/2555 ). In this regard, the NIS 2 Directive stipulates that it “does not apply to entities which Member States have exempted from the scope of Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 in accordance with Article 2(4) of that Regulation” (Art. 2(10)).
38 The guidelines can be accessed here .
39 Information in this respect, for instance, relates to “information relating to cyber threats, near misses, vulnerabilities, techniques and procedures, indicators of compromise, adversarial tactics, threat-actor-specific information, cybersecurity alerts and recommendations regarding configuration of cybersecurity tools to detect cyberattacks” (Art. 29(1)).
40 In concrete terms, peer reviews can comprise “physical or virtual on-site visits and off-site exchanges of information” (Art. 19(6)).
41 For further details on what mutual assistance may entail precisely and in which scenarios it may be enacted, see Art. 37(1).
42 The Cybersecurity Act defines an ICT product as “an element or a group of elements of a network or information system” (Art. 2, point (12)).
43 An ICT service is defined as “a service consisting fully or mainly in the transmission, storing, retrieving or processing of information by means of network and information systems” (Art. 2, point (13)).
44 An ICT process is defined as “a set of activities performed to design, develop, deliver or maintain an ICT product or ICT service” (Art. 2, point (14)).
45 A European cybersecurity certification scheme is defined as “a comprehensive set of rules, technical requirements, standards and procedures that are established at Union level and that apply to the certification or conformity assessment of specific ICT products, ICT services or ICT processes” (Art. 2, point (9)).
46 To ensure a smooth transition, “existing certificates that were issued under national cybersecurity certification schemes and are covered by a European cybersecurity certification scheme shall remain valid until their expiry date” (Art. 57(3)).
47 Conformity assessment bodies are entrusted with “perform[ing] conformity assessment activities including calibration, testing, certification and inspection” ( Regulation 765/2008 ). In order to be designated as such, they must be accredited by a national accreditation body. National cybersecurity certification authorities must inform the Commission about all accredited conformity assessment bodies.
48 For instance, the NIS 2 Directive provides for such an opportunity (see further Art. 24 NIS 2 Directive).
49 In the Recommendation, the Commission defines 5G networks as “a set of all relevant network infrastructure elements for mobile and wireless communications technology used for connectivity and value-added services with advanced performance characteristics such as very high data rates and capacity, low latency communications, ultra-high reliability, or supporting a high number of connected devices. These may include legacy network elements based on previous generations of mobile and wireless communications technology such 4G or 3G. 5G networks should be understood to include all relevant parts of the network.” (p. 4).
50 Progress reports on Member States’ progress in implementing the EU Toolbox on 5G Cybersecurity were published in 2020 and 2023 respectively.
51 The Toolbox, inter alia, specifies the drafting of guidance on implementing security-related measures in existing standards also covering 5G networks or “improv[ed] coordination in incident response and crisis management” (p. 13) as actions to support the attainment of the strategic and technical measures.
52 As strategic measures, the Toolbox lists, for example, the imposition of “strengthened obligations on operators” (p. 20) and working towards “an adequate balance of suppliers at national level” (p. 22).
53 A full list of all strategic and technical measures can be found on page 12f. With regard to applicable EU legislation, the Toolbox notes that “many of the technical measures may be implemented in the context of the transposition of the European Electronic Communications Code” (p. 16) [ee further Chapter 6.2]. The Toolbox’s technical measures also establish links with the EU cybersecurity certification schemes as they, for instance, outline the potential for “using EU certification for 5G network components, customer equipment and/or suppliers’ processes” (p. 12), as was also initially foreseen in the Commission’s 2019 Recommendation.
54 Among the actors listed in the Toolbox’s Table 1 feature Member States, relevant authorities, operators, the Commission and ENISA.
55 Radio equipment is defined as “an electrical or electronic product, which intentionally emits and/or receives radio waves for the purpose of radio communication and/or radiodetermination, or an electrical or electronic product which must be completed with an accessory, such as antenna, so as to intentionally emit and/or receive radio waves for the purpose of radio communication and/or radiodetermination” (Art. 2(1), point (1)).
56 Electronic communications networks and services are defined in Article 2. To specify the measures these need to implement, the Commission is granted the power to adopt implementing acts (Art. 40(5)). The ‘security of networks and services’ is being defined as “the ability of electronic communications networks and services to resist, at a given level of confidence, any action that compromises the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of those networks and services, of stored or transmitted or processed data, or of the related services offered by, or accessible via, those electronic communications networks or services” (Art. 2, point (21)).
57 A ‘security incident’ is being defined as “an event having an actual adverse effect on the security of electronic communications networks or services” (Art. 2, point (42)).
58 The regulation defines a product as “any item, whether or not it is interconnected to other items, supplied or made available, whether for consideration or not, including in the context of providing a service, which is intended for consumers or is likely, under reasonably foreseeable conditions, to be used by consumers even if not intended for them” (Art. 3, point (1)).
59 For an overview of Commission Decision 2017/46, see further Chapter 12.2.
60 Electronic identification is defined as “the process of using person identification data in electronic form uniquely representing either a natural or legal person, or a natural person representing another natural person or a legal person” (Art. 3, point (1)).
61 Electronic identification means is defined as “a material and/or immaterial unit containing person identification data and which is used for authentication for an online service or, where appropriate, for an offline service” (Art. 3, point (2)).
62 Trust services constitute “an electronic service normally provided for remuneration which consists of any of the following”, e.g. “issuance [or validation] of certificates for electronic signatures, certificates for electronic seals, certificates for website authentication or certificates for the provision of other trust services” (for further examples of respective services, see Art. 3, point (16)(a)-(n)).
63 The Regulation defines a European Digital Identity Wallet as “an electronic identification means which allows the user to securely store, manage and validate person identification data and electronic attestations of attributes for the purpose of providing them to relying parties and other users of European Digital Identity Wallets, and to sign by means of qualified electronic signatures or to seal by means of qualified electronic seals” (Art. 3, point (42)), whose “issuance, use and revocation [...] shall be free of charge to all natural persons” (Art. 5a(13)). Their use shall be voluntary (Art. 5a(15)). In principle, the “source code of the application software components of European Digital Identity Wallets shall be open-source licensed”, for which only “duly justified” exceptions are foreseen (Art. 5a(2)).
64 The Regulation further notes that Member States shall ensure interoperability between their electronic identification schemes (Art. 12).
65 Cases where an identified vulnerability is “not remedied within three months of such identification” shall result in the cancellation of the respective certificate (Art. 12a(3)).
66 The Regulation further specifies that the reporting obligations apply to “electronic identification scheme notified pursuant to Article 9(1) or the authentication referred to in point (f) of Article 7” (Art. 10 (1)).
67 The Regulation further specifies that the reporting obligations apply to “European Digital Identity Wallets provided pursuant to Article 5a, the validation mechanisms referred to in Article 5a(8) or the electronic identification scheme under which the European Digital Identity Wallets are provided” (Art. 5e(1)). The European Digital Identity Wallets are, inter alia, not subject to the requirements contained in Art. 10 (Art. 5a(22)).
68 The European Digital Identity Cooperation Group comprises Member States’ and Commission representatives. The Commission acts as its Secretariat. Inter alia, the Group is tasked with “support[ing] the supervisory bodies in the implementation of the provisions of this Regulation” (Art. 46e(5)) by means of “exchang[ing] views, best practices and information on relevant cybersecurity aspects concerning European Digital Identity Wallets, electronic identification schemes and trust services” (Art. 46e(5), point (iv)), supported by ENISA, “exchang[ing] best practices in relation to the development and implementation of policies on the notification of security breaches” (Art. 46e(5), point (v)), and “organis[ing] joint meetings with the NIS Cooperation Group [...] to exchange relevant information in relation to trust services and electronic identification related cyber threats, incidents, vulnerabilities, awareness raising initiatives, trainings, exercises and skills, capacity building, standards and technical specifications capacity as well as standards and technical specifications” (Art. 46e(5), point (vi)). ENISA may be invited to participate in the Group’s proceedings as an observer when the Group “exchanges views, best practices and information on relevant cybersecurity aspects such as notification of security breaches, and when the use of cybersecurity certificates or standards are addressed” (Art. 46e(4)).
69 For an explanation of cybersecurity considerations in relation to the EU’s FDI screening mechanism, see further Chapter 7.4.
70 The EU’s 5G Toolbox is explained within Chapter 6.2.
71 The EU’s Digital Europe Programme is explained in Chapter 5.3.
72 Cybersecurity-related components of Horizon Europe are reflected within Chapter 10.2.
73 For a full list of entities within the scope of DORA and exceptions thereto, see Art. 2.
74 The role of the ESAs in EU cybersecurity policy is further touched upon within Chapter 13.3.
75 See further, for instance, European Securities and Markets Authority: ESAs publish first set of rules under DORA for ICT and third-party risk management and incident classification .
76 A major ICT-related incident denotes “an ICT-related incident that has a high adverse impact on the network and information systems that support critical or important functions of the financial entity” (Art. 3, point (10).
77 Art. 18(2) further specifies that financial entities “shall classify cyber threats as significant based on the criticality of the services at risk, including the financial entity’s transactions and operations, number and/or relevance of clients or financial counterparts targeted and the geographical spread of the areas at risk”.
78 Applicable to these types of financial entities, an operational or security payment-related incident is defined as “a single event or a series of linked events unplanned by the financial entities [...] whether ICT-related or not, that has an adverse impact on the availability, authenticity, integrity or confidentiality of payment-related data, or on the payment-related services provided by the financial entity” (Art. 3, point (9)). Such an incident is considered major, when it causes a “high adverse impact on the payment-related services provided” (Art. 3, point (11).
79 In cases where financial entities operate across borders and are thus supervised by more than one competent authority, Member States shall determine one single competent authority for the purposes of reporting as further specified in Article 20.
80 TLPT is defined as “a framework that mimics the tactics, techniques and procedures of real-life threat actors perceived as posing a genuine cyber threat, that delivers a controlled, bespoke, intelligence-led (red team) test of the financial entity’s critical live production systems” (Art. 3, point (17)).
81 When not listed, ICT third-party service providers may apply to either ESA to be considered as a critical ICT third-party service provider, ultimately to be decided by the ESA Joint Committee (Art. 31(11)).
82 DORA lists certain exceptions to the designation as critical ICT third-party service providers. In accordance, such a designation shall not apply to “(i) financial entities providing ICT services to other financial entities; (ii) ICT third-party service providers that are subject to oversight frameworks established for the purposes of supporting the tasks referred to in Article 127(2) [Art. 127(2) specifies the ECB’s basic tasks] of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; (iii) ICT intra-group service providers; (iv) ICT third-party service providers providing ICT services solely in one Member State to financial entities that are only active in that Member State” (Art. 31(8)).
83 The Regulation provides further that, in specified circumstances, Member States’ competent authorities “may, as a measure of last resort, [...] take a decision [to be shared with Oversight Forum] requiring financial entities to temporarily suspend, either in part or completely, the use or deployment of a service provided by the critical ICT third-party service provider until the risks identified in the recommendations addressed to critical ICT third-party service providers have been addressed” (Art. 42(6)). The decision of competent authorities may also extend to “requir[ing] financial entities to terminate, in part or completely, the relevant contractual arrangements concluded with the critical ICT third-party service providers” (Art. 42(6)). Article 42(8) lists elements for consideration by Member States’ competent authorities when making such a decision, including, for instance, the “gravity and the duration of the non-compliance” (Art. 42(8), point (a)).
84 To this end, the Commission shall adopt a delegated act by 17 July further specifying “the amount of the fees and the way in which they are to be paid” (Art. 43(3)).
85 The Oversight Forum comprises the ESAs chairpersons, Member State representatives and, as observers, “the Executive Directors of each ESA and one representative from the Commission, from the ESRB, from ECB and from ENISA” (Art. 32(4)). Inter alia, the Oversight Forum is tasked with “regularly discuss[ing] relevant developments on ICT risk and vulnerabilities and promot[ing] a consistent approach in the monitoring of ICT third-party risk at Union level” (Art. 32(1)).
86 A crypto-asset is a “digital representation of a value or of a right that is able to be transferred and stored electronically using distributed ledger technology or similar technology” (Art. 3, point (5)). An example for a crypto-asset service is the “provi[sion of] custody and administration of crypto-assets on behalf of clients” (Art. 3, point (16) also includes a full list of services considered as a crypto-asset service). In accordance, MiCA defines a crypto-asset service provider as “a legal person or other undertaking whose occupation or business is the provision of one or more crypto-asset services to clients on a professional basis” (Art. 3, point (15)).
87 The guideline has not been published to date. A national non-binding guidance by the German Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA) can be found here .
88 Past annual reports on export controls can be found here .
89 For instance, (a) Czechia uses funds provided by the Facility to ensure “full operation” of a cybersecurity competence center “providing consulting services to authorities,” (b) Italy disposes of the Facility’s financial support for the creation of their national cybersecurity agency and the “initial deployment of the national cybersecurity services,” among other measures, and (c) Slovakia seeks “standardisation of technical and procedural cybersecurity solutions” through the adoption of a “national concept for informatisation of public administration” (see further European Commission: Milestones and targets ).
90 A list of national screening mechanisms notified to the Commission can be found here .
91 Cybersecurity-related aspects of the EU’s export control regime are explained in Chapter 7.3.
92 Annex I includes a list of all the payment services within the scope of Directive 2015/2366 and Article 3 lists particular exclusions that do not fall within the Directive’s scope.
93 For reference, Article 8 of the CER Directive excludes critical entities in the banking, financial market infrastructure and digital infrastructure sectors from certain provisions.
94 Obligations contained in Articles 11-18, 21 and 22 do not apply to critical entities that Member States have identified within the banking, financial market infrastructure, and digital infrastructure sectors (Art. 8).
95 In addition to critical entities of particular European significance, the CER Directive also provides for advisory missions with respect to critical entities “at the request of the Member State that has identified the critical entity and with the agreement of the critical entity concerned” (see further Art. 13(4)).
96 The Directive tasks the Commission to work towards adopting an “implementing act laying down rules on the procedural arrangements for requests to organise advisory missions, for handling such requests, for the conduct and reports of advisory missions and for handling the communication of the Commission’s opinion [...] and of the measures taken” (Art. 18(6)).
97 Entities in the banking, financial market infrastructure, and digital infrastructure sectors are exempt from these obligations and Chapter Four “unless national measures provide otherwise” (Art. 6(3)).
98 Art. 15(3) stipulates that national SPOCs shall inform each other when an “incident has or might have a significant impact on critical entities and the continuity of the provision of essential services to or in one or more other Member States”.
99 With regard to financial assistance, the Directive tasks the “Commission [to] inform Member States about financial resources at Union level available to Member States for enhancing the resilience of critical entities” (Art. 20(3)).
100 Other AFSJ IT systems are the Schengen Information System (SIS II), the Visa Information System (VIS), the European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (Eurodac), the Entry/Exit System (EES), DubliNet, and the European Criminal Records Information System – Third Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN).
101 This notification requirement is applicable to them, “unless an equivalent notification procedure applies under another Union legal act” (Art. 15).
102 A transmission system operator is defined as “a natural or legal person who is responsible for operating, ensuring the maintenance of and, if necessary, developing the transmission system in a given area and, where applicable, its interconnections with other systems, and for ensuring the long-term ability of the system to meet reasonable demands for the transmission of electricity” (Art. 2, point (35)).
103 The ENTSO for Electricity is a platform for cooperation among transmission system operators at Union level. It is tasked with promoting “the completion and functioning of the internal market for electricity and cross-zonal trade and to ensure the optimal management, coordinated operation and sound technical evolution of the European electricity transmission network” (Art. 28(1)).
104 The EU DSO entity is a platform for cooperation among distribution system operators at Union level. It is tasked with promoting “the completion and functioning of the internal market for electricity” and “optimal management and a coordinated operation of distribution and transmission systems” (Art. 52(1)).
105 Network codes are rules that “govern the work of [energy network] operators and determine how access to electricity is given to users across the EU.” ( European Commission: Electricity network codes and guidelines ).
106 These efforts culminated in the Commission Delegated Regulation 2024/1366 establishing a network code on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows , which entered into force in June 2023.
107 Chapter 13 further explains what the EASA does in the area of cybersecurity (policy).
108 See further European Union Aviation Safety Agency (n.d.): Aircraft certification .
109 The German Federal Ministry of Health (BMG) defines eHealth as applications that utilize the possibilities offered by modern information and communication technologies (ICT) to support the treatment and care of patients (own translation based on Federal Ministry of Health: E-Health ).
110 The eHealth Network subsequently issued Guidelines on the electronic exchange of health data under Cross-Border Directive 2011/24, which can be accessed here .
111 The eHealth Digital Service Infrastructure for Cross-Border eHealth Information Services was developed by Member States to facilitate the exchange of health-related data across borders and enhance the “interoperability between national eHealth systems” (recital (8), Commission Implementing Decision 2019/1765 .
112 More information on and a full list of the NCCs can be found here . To qualify as an NCC, the Regulation stipulates that the designated entity shall “be a public sector entity or an entity, a majority of which is owned by the Member State, which performs public administrative functions under national law”, “hav[e] the capacity to support the Competence Centre and the Network in fulfilling their mission”, “possess or have access to research and technological expertise in cybersecurity” and “have the capacity to engage effectively and coordinate with industry, the public sector, the academic and research community and citizens” (Art. 6(5)).
113 Its predecessor programme was the Horizon 2020 programme, which provided funding to research and innovation in the EU from 2014-2020 (see further Council Decision 2013/743 ).
114 Also the 2025-2027 overall strategic research and innovation plan includes measures relating to cybersecurity. It can be accessed here .
115 Different steps and procedures may apply in instances where the IPCR is activated. The 2017 guidelines foresaw a 4-step-process comprised of (1) preparing a decision, (2) attributing a malicious cyber activity, (3) making a decision, and (4) following a decision (pp. 10-16, 2017).
116 The guidelines define attribution “as a practice of assigning a malicious cyber activity to a specific state or non-state actor” (p. 18, 2023).
117 For further information on EU-NATO cooperation, see also Eighth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017 .
118 The horizontal cyber sanctions regime is included as one instrument within the EU’s Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox.
119 “Cyber-attacks” are defined as “actions [which] are not duly authorised by the owner or by another right holder of the system or data or part of it, or are not permitted under the law of the Union or of the Member State concerned”, that either involve “access to information systems”, “information system interference”, “data interference”, or “data interception” (Art. 1(3) Council Decision 2019/797 and Regulation 2019/796). The four scenarios mentioned reflect the punishable offenses specified in Directive 2013/40. As part of the Decision’s recital, the Council also notes that “targeted restrictive measures should focus on cyber-attacks [...] that are wilfully carried out” to “have a deterrent and dissuasive effect” (recital (8), Decision 2019/797).
120 External, in this respect, indicates that the ‘cyber attacks’ “(a) originate, or are carried out, from outside the Union; (b) use infrastructure outside the Union; (c) are carried out by any natural or legal person, entity or body established or operating outside the Union; or (d) are carried out with the support, at the direction or under the control of any natural or legal person, entity or body operating outside the Union” (Art. 1(2) Decision 2019/797 and Regulation 2019/796).
121 Threats to the EU may stem from operations “against its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, its delegations to third countries or to international organisations, its common security and defence policy (CSDP) operations and missions and its special representatives” (Art. 1(5) Decision 2019/797 and Regulation 2019/796). In addition, the sanctions regime also provides for the possibility of using restrictive measures “in response to cyber-attacks with a significant effect against third States or international organisations”, if doing so is “deemed necessary to achieve CFSP objectives” (Art. 1(6) Decision 2019/797 and Regulation 2019/796).
122 Threats to Member States may result from the targeting of critical infrastructures, “services necessary for the maintenance of essential social and/or economic activities, in particular in the sectors of: energy [...]; transport [...]; banking; financial market infrastructures; health [...]; drinking water supply and distribution; digital infrastructure; and any other sector which is essential to the Member State concerned”, “critical State functions”, the “storage or processing of classified information”, or governmental CERTs (Art. 1(4) Decision 2019/797 and Regulation 2019/796).
123 Examples of such grantable exemptions relate to the entry of own nationals (Art. 4 (2) Decision 2019/797) or “on the grounds of urgent humanitarian need” (Art. 4(6) Decision 2019/797).
124 See also Council Decisions 2022/1093 and 2022/2352 .
125 European Union External Action Service: Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) .
126 See further European Defence Agency: Capability Development Plan .
127 See further European Defence Agency: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence .
128 The EDF, established in 2021 until 2027, provides financial assistance to “foster the competitiveness, efficiency and innovation capacity of the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) throughout the Union” (Art. 3(1) Regulation 2021/697 ). Under the EDF’s umbrella, around 8 billion euros can be used to “support collaborative research [in an effort to] boost the performance of future capabilities” and “support the collaborative development of defence products and technologies” (Art. 3(2), Regulation 2021/697 ). The EDF is implemented by the Commission and works on the basis of annual work programmes that are developed within a dedicated EDF Programme Committee with the support of the EDA and the EEAS.
129 The EU funded the development of operational guidance on international cyber capacity building that were published in 2023 and 2018 respectively.
130 Excluded from the Regulation’s scope are “network and information systems handling EU classified information” (EUCI) (Art. 2(3)), with the exception that CERT-EU “may provide assistance to Union entities regarding incidents in network and information systems handling EUCI where it is explicitly requested to do so by the Union entities concerned in accordance with their respective procedures” (Art. 13(8)).
131 The Regulation defines Union entities as “Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies set up by or pursuant to the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of European Union (TFEU) or the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community” (Art. 3, point (1)).
132 “Where appropriate, [the cybersecurity maturity assessments shall] be carried out with the assistance of a specialised third party” (Art. 7(2)). management plan for major incidents” (Art. 9). Subsequently, every entity shall share their plan with the IICB (Art. 3) and, upon request, with the European Parliament and Council (Art. 20(4)).
133 Article 20’s “sharing obligations do not extend to EUCI [and] information the further distribution of which has been excluded by means of a visible marking, unless the sharing thereof with CERT-EU has been explicitly allowed” (Art. 20(6)).
134 This report shall also be used for purposes of preparing the biennial report on the state of cybersecurity as provided for pursuant to the NIS 2 Directive (Art. 21(8)).
135 When doing so, the “IICB shall take due regard to relevant implementing acts adopted under the NIS 2 Directive” (Art. 21(9)).
136 The Regulation defines ‘major incident’ as “an incident which causes a level of disruption that exceeds a Union entity’s and CERT-EU’s capacity to respond to it or which has a significant impact on at least two Union entities” (Art. 3, point (8)).
137 The Decision defines EEAS premises as “all EEAS establishments, including buildings, offices, rooms and other areas, as well as areas housing communication and information systems (including those handling EUCI), where the EEAS conducts permanent or temporary activities” (Art. 2, point (d)).
138 The Commission Decision defines CISs as “any system enabling the handling of information in electronic form, including all assets required for its operation, as well as infrastructure, organisation, personnel and information resources”, also comprising “business applications, shared IT services, outsourced systems, and end-user devices” (Art. 2, point (5))
139 An IT security incident is defined as “an event that could adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of a CIS” (Art. 2, point (15)).
140 This section builds on our continuous work on mapping the institutional cybersecurity policy landscape (see further, Germany’s Cybersecurity Architecture ).
141 The ECRB was created as a forum for exchange and discussion on strategic issues between private and public stakeholders in the financial sector. The ECRB’s goals include sharing best practices, raising awareness of cyber resilience, and under- taking joint initiatives. An output of the ECRB is the Cyber Information and Intelligence Sharing Initiative (CIISI-EU), which aims to contribute to the protection of the financial system and its infrastructure against threats from cyberspace, for example, through prevention, identification, and mutual information sharing. ECRB meetings are attended by representatives of the Commission, Europol and ENISA, among others. Among other actors, the ECB, ENISA, and Europol are also involved in the CIISI-EU.
142 European Commission: Governance in the European Commission (C(2020) 4240 final) .
143 European Commission: Communications Networks, Content and Technology .
144 The CMB “provides the highest level of corporate management oversight for operational and administrative issues in the Commission” (Art. 2, point (6) Commission Decision 2017/46 ).
145 The Information Technology and Cybersecurity Board was formerly called the Information Security Steering Board (ISSB).
146 European Parliament: The Committees of the European Parliament .
147 European Parliament: Supervisory powers .
148 For more information on the PEGA Committee of Inquiry see European Parliament: Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware .
149 European Union External Action Service: About the European External Action Service .
150 European Commission: FAQ: Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats .
151 European Union External Action Service: The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) .
152 European Union External Action Service: EEAS Vacancy Notice Contract Agent FGIV – Job title: Intelligence Analyst .
153 For more information on the EEAS CRM see p. 21f. Commission Recommendation on coordinated response to large-scale cybersecurity incidents and crises .
154 See further, for instance, Council Decision authorising the opening of negotiations on behalf of the European Union for a comprehensive international convention on countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes (2022/895) and European Union External Action Service: EU Statement – UN Open-Ended Working Group on ICT: Existing and Potential Threats .
155 Past Cybercrime Judicial Monitors can be found here .
156 Over the course of its establishment, ENISA underwent a name change from the “European Network and Information Security Agency” to “European Union Agency for Cybersecurity”. The abbreviation of the original name remained the same after the process.
157 European Securities and Markets Authority: ESAs and ENISA sign a Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen cooperation and information exchange .
158 Commission Decision approving a working arrangement between the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and the United States Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) in the area of cybersecurity (C (2023) 8553) .
159 Commission Decision approving the Working Arrangement between the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and the National Cybersecurity Coordination Center of Ukraine (NCCC) and the Administration of the State Service of Special Communication and Information Protection of Ukraine (the Administration of SSSCIP) in the area of cybersecurity (C (2023) 4016) .
160 The option for ENISA to engage in such international cooperation is provided for in Article 42 of Regulation 2019/881.
161 Past IOCTAs can be found here .
162 For more information on the J-CAT see Europol: Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce (J-CAT .
163 Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators: ACER and Cybersecurity .
164 For instance, see Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators: ACER Webinar on its Proposal for a Framework Guideline to Establish a Network Code on Cybersecurity .
165 See also Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators: ACER Working Groups and Task Forces .
166 Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators: ACER and Cybersecurity .
167 European Union Agency for the Space Programme: About EUSPA .
168 European Union Agency for the Space Programme: EU Space and security .
169 European Commission (2023): European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence .
170 European Union Aviation Safety Agency: Cybersecurity Overview .
171 Council of the European Union: Council Conclusions on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence (9618/23) .
172 European Defence Agency: Cyber .
173 European Commission: EU Policy on Cyber Defence (JOIN(2022) 49 final) .
174 For a description of all PESCO projects with a cybersecurity-related component see a respective explanation in the section on cyber defence within Policy Area 7.
175 Council of the European Union: Council Conclusions on the EU Policy on Cyber Defence (9618/23) .
176 European Securities and Markets Authority: ESAs and ENISA sign a Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen cooperation and information exchange .
177 Concerning CERT-EU, it is important to note that “the provisions of [...] Regulation [2023/2841] prevail over the provisions of the [2018] Interinstitutional arrangement on the organisation and operation of CERT-EU ” (recital (18), Regulation 2023/2841).
178 CERT-EU’s scope of action may only involve the provision of assistance towards EUIBAs “regarding incidents in network and information systems handling EUCI where it is explicitly requested to do so by the Union entities concerned in accordance with their respective procedures” (Art. 13(8) Regulation 2023/2841).
179 For instance, CERT-EU assumes an incident response coordination function in relation to “contributi[ng] to consistent external communication”, “mutual support [...] or providing assistance”, the “optimal use of operational resources” and the “coordination with other crisis response mechanisms at Union level” (Art. 22(2) Regulation 2023/2841), where relevant together with ENISA.
180 Art. 14(2) provides examples for guidelines and recommendations that may be issued by CERT-EU to that end.
181 The Regulation further specifies that this report “shall constitute an input to the biennial report on the state of cybersecurity in the Union” (Art. 10(14), Regulation 2023/2841) to be adopted by ENISA under the NIS 2 Directive.
182 The EUAN seeks to enhance collaboration between EU agencies. As one of its sub-networks, the EUAN comprises an ICT Advisory Committee of the EU Agencies, the ICTAC. The ICTAC, which meets twice a year, aims to serve as a forum to exchange best practices, experience, and knowledge. It provides a mechanism to develop common positions and aims to contribute to cooperation among themselves, for example, by sharing resources and best practices in the development, maintenance, or deployment of new ICT systems. From the actors covered within this compendium, ACER, EASA, EBA, EIOPA, ENISA, ESMA, eu-LISA, Eurojust, Europol, EUSPA and the ECCC are members of the EUAN. The EDA participates as an observer. For further information see EU Agencies Network: Our role, governance and strategy and EU Agencies Network: 2024-2025 Work Programme of the EU Agencies Network .
184 Europol: European Union Cybercrime Task Force .
185 Ibid.
186 The agendas of NIS Cooperation Group meetings can be found here . Member States also cooperate in the framework of the NIS Cooperation Group within dedicated workstreams, for instance, on 5G Cybersecurity or Energy. A full list of workstreams is not publicly available.
187 Past outputs of the NIS Cooperation Group can be found here . For instance, in January 2020, the NIS Cooperation Group published the EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures in relation to the cybersecurity of 5G networks.
188 The respective Commission Implementing Decision currently in force predates the entry into force of the NIS 2 Directive.
189 European Union Agency for Cybersecurity: Decision No 2023/02 of the Management Board of the European Union Agency For Cybersecurity (ENISA) Setting Up An Advisory Group for the Period 2023-2025 .
Author
Christina Rupp
Senior Policy Researcher Cybersecurity Policy and Resilience
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